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CURRENT
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Influences on childbearing intentions across the fertility career: demographic and socioeconomic factors and the value of children

Rodolfo A. Bulatao
and James T. Fawcett

Number 60-F • June 1983

PAPERS OF THE EAST-WEST POPULATION INSTITUTE

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Bulatao, Rodolfo A., 1944-
Influences on childbearing intentions across the fertility career.

(Papers of the East-West Population Institute, ISSN 0732-0531 ; no. 60-F (June 1983). Current studies on the value of children)
Bibliography: p.
1. Family size–Social aspects. 2. Family size–Economic aspects. 3. Fertility, Human. 4. Fertility, Human–Decision-making–Mathematical models. I. Fawcett, James T., 1935- . II. East-West Population Institute. III. Title. IV. Series: Papers of the East-West Population Institute ; no. 60-F. V. Series: Papers of the East-West Population Institute. Current studies on the value of children.
HQ760.B842 1983 304.6'32 83-11639
ISBN 0-86638-043-4

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FOREWORD

This study was conducted as part of a program of comparative analyses sponsored by the Panel on Fertility Determinants of the Committee on Population and Demography, National Research Council. The two authors, Rodolfo A. Bulatao and James T. Fawcett, who are both now at the East-West Population Institute, were connected with the panel as staff member and as a panel member, respectively.

The panel was created by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education of the National Research Council, in response to a request from the Agency for International Development, to assess research in the area of fertility determinants in developing countries and make recommendations for further work. As part of its program, the panel commissioned several cross-national studies, with the objectives of determining what could be learned from existing sets of comparative data, improving measurement techniques within a comparative context, exploring linkages between micro and macro analyses, and providing exemplars for comparative work. Other comparative analyses are appearing as World Fertility Survey scientific reports and as Committee on Population and Demography reports, among which this report is listed as No. 25.

The cross-national data from the Value of Children project of the East-West Population Institute and collaborating institutions have been particularly useful to the panel in its work. The data were used in one other comparative study and were drawn on for other aspects of the panel's work, including an analytical review of research on the determinants of fertility in developing countries and a series of studies of the causes of fertility trends in eight countries. The country studies also benefited from previous work of the Committee on Population and Demography to determine actual levels and trends in fertility and mortality in a broad range of developing countries.

The project dealt with in this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the panel that supervised the work were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance from the range of disciplines related to the study of population. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors, following procedures approved by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.

This work was accomplished with the assistance and advice of a number of individuals and institutions, including the members of the panel. They are listed in Appendix E; other assistance is acknowledged in a following note from the authors.

W. Parker Mauldin
Chair, Panel on Fertility Determinants

PREFACE

The data used in this paper were collected in a collaborative cross-national investigation involving these researchers: Masri Singarimbun and Russell K. Darroch (Indonesia); Sung Jin Lee (Republic of Korea); Rodolfo A. Bulatao (Philippines); Peter S.J. Chen, Betty Jamie Chung, and Eddie Kuo (Singapore); Tom T.H. Sun and Tsong-Shien Wu (Taiwan); Chalio Buripakdi, Nibhon Debavalya, and Visid Prachuabmoh (Thailand); Cigdem Kagitcibasi (Turkey); and Lois W. Hoffman, Fred Arnold, and James T. Fawcett (United States). Support for these studies was provided by a number of institutions, including the East-West Population Institute, the International Development Research Centre, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Smithsonian Institution, the Research Institute for the Study of Man, and the U.S. National Institute for Child Health and Human Development. Most of the present analysis was conducted while the first author was at the National Research Council on the staff of the Panel on Fertility Determinants, which was supported by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The assistance of Carol Bradford Ward of the Panel staff in this analysis is gratefully acknowledged. Very useful comments on an earlier draft were provided by members of the Panel on Fertility Determinants and reviewers for the Committee on Population and Demography.

ABSTRACT The influence of various determinants of childbearing intentions throughout the fertility career is investigated, using data for seven countries from the Value of Children project. It is hypothesized that several sets of determinants–age and childbearing experience, socioeconomic characteristics, and values and disvalues attached to children–have distinctive effects on fertility intentions at particular parities. Desire for another child and ideal family size are taken to represent fertility intentions. From cognitive-balance principles, it is argued that these two measures are interdependent, and they are treated as jointly determined in two-stage least squares regressions, run first across all parities and then within specific parities. Some hypotheses, particularly those relating to gender preference, receive good support; others, such as those relating to income and education, do not. Mixed results are reported for the predicted effects of values and disvalues. In interpreting the results, attention is directed to contrasts between the two measures of fertility intentions, to the implications of the relative importance of particular factors across countries, and to the usefulness of a perspective on fertility decision making that combines the single-decision and the successive-decisions approaches.

INTRODUCTION

The period when a couple can have children typically extends from marriage to menopause. Within this period, referred to here as the fertility career, many personal and familial changes take place that can be expected to influence the couple's fertility intentions. This paper examines differences across fertility career stages (defined by number of living children) in these various influences: age and childbearing experience, socioeconomic characteristics, the values and disvalues of children, and others. Hypotheses about possible effects are developed, based mainly on previous studies. Data from surveys of the value of children in seven countries–the Philippines, Turkey, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, China (Taiwan), Singapore, and the United States–are used to test these hypotheses.

Several researchers have argued that fertility should be modeled as a sequential process (e.g., Namboodiri, 1972; Hout, 1978): they posit that a couple's childbearing cannot be understood from a single decision early in the marriage, but should instead be analyzed as a series of successive decisions. However, such treatments have not always clarified the advantages of the sequential perspective, or the changes that are most critical in affecting fertility intentions. To highlight the issues involved, it is useful to contrast two polar views of fertility decisions.

Single vs. successive decisions, and an intermediate perspective

In the extreme single-decision perspective, a couple decide about their desired fertility after they elect to marry, and carry out that decision throughout the marriage regardless of circumstances. From this perspective, the initial decision is of prime interest; later stages of the fertility career are relevant only with regard to the couple's success in carrying out their plans. In Easterlin's (1978) terminology, demand for children is fixed at the start, and only the supply of children varies thereafter. A variant of this perspective would allow a couple's single decision to include planned reactions to various contingencies. For example, they might decide at the outset to have four children, but decide further that, if all four are girls, they will go on having children until they have a boy. Thus, although later events in the marriage may exert some influence, demand is still fixed by the single decision.

In the extreme successive-decisions (or sequential) perspective, on the other hand, the couple do not make a commitment to a specific family size at the beginning of the marriage; instead, they decide on each child one by one. Viewing it somewhat differently, their desired family size is recalculated in each successive period. For such a couple, total demand for children is not a useful concept because demand is continually variable, subject to the changing conditions of the couple's lives.

Of course, these extreme views represent convenient assumptions for research rather than descriptions of researchers' beliefs about real-world conditions. Most fertility theorists would probably agree with the intermediate perspective adopted here, which includes both extremes as special cases (see, e.g., Morgan, 1982). It is assumed that a couple make a rough decision about intended family size, perhaps setting a narrow range, early in the marriage, and refine and possibly alter this decision in response to changing circumstances. The relative importance of the original decision varies: it may provide fairly rigid guidelines for the couple's reactions to later events, or it may be very loose and easily overridden upon later reconsideration. The greater the weight given to the original decision, the closer one comes to the extreme single-decision perspective; the greater the weight given to subsequent reconsideration, the closer one comes to the extreme successive-decisions perspective. Of prime interest from the intermediate perspective are the conditions that prompt reconsideration of fertility goals.

The concern of this paper, therefore, is with fertility intentions and the factors that influence them over the course of the fertility career. The intermediate perspective provides a rationale for expecting that some influences will change, while others will not. Although identifying both types of influence will not, strictly speaking, validate the intermediate perspective, it should complicate the espousal of a pure single-decision or successive-decision perspective.

Fertility intentions: ideal family size and desire for another child

From the single-decision perspective, fertility intentions are represented by demand for a total number of children; from the successive-decisions perspective, they are represented by demand for the next child. This distinction is paralleled very roughly in the distinction between measures of ideal family size and desire for another child. In keeping with the intermediate perspective adopted here, this analysis will focus on both measures.

Ideal family size is derived from questions about the total number of children preferred under certain "ideal" circumstances, such as "if one could start childbearing all over again." Desire for another child is derived from questions about whether another child is wanted at the time of the survey, or about the number of additional children wanted at that time. A measure pertaining to having another child can be constructed based on the difference between ideal and actual family size, whereas a measure of total preference can be constructed by adding the additional children wanted to actual family size. Nevertheless, the two measures are phenomenologically distinct; they are usually treated separately (e.g., McClelland, 1983) and are in fact often contrasted, generally to the disadvantage of the ideal family size measure (e.g., Kirk, 1972; Ware, 1974).

Because both measures will be analyzed here, attention should be paid to their interrelationships. It is generally recognized that ideals should affect desires (Ryder and Westoff, 1969), but it has also been argued that the reverse sequence is possible (Kirk, 1972). Most likely, ideals and desires mutually reinforce one another. Cognitive balance theory holds that a person's related attitudes tend to become consistent over time (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953, 1956; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Festinger, 1957; Fishbein, 1963; see, e.g., Streufert and Streufert, 1978: Chap. 4 for a recent treatment). This general tendency toward cognitive consistency–also referred to, variously, as congruity or consonance–has been demonstrated in scores of experimental studies (e.g., Abelson et al., 1968). Either or both of two interrelated attitudes may be affected by this tendency, the effect being produced not by a logical reasoning process but in fact often unwittingly. Thus, in addition to any relationship due to common antecedents, ideal family size and desire for another child should show some tendency toward mutual equilibration.

Hypotheses about changing influences on intentions

Within the intermediate perspective adopted here, both types of fertility intentions–ideal family size and desire for another child–may be influenced differentially over the fertility career by three major categories of variables: (a) age and childbearing experience; (b) socioeconomic characteristics of the couple; and (c) values and disvalues attached to children. Recent reviews by Namboodiri (1983) and Bulatao and Fawcett (1981) provide a number of hypotheses about sequential fertility decisions, almost all of which involve variables in one or another of these three categories.[1] Two other factors are also mentioned–normative thresholds and homogenization process–though they do not seem as significant.

Age and Childbearing Experience

Age by itself can alter fertility intentions (Rindfuss and Bumpass, 1978). In particular, Bulatao and Fawcett (1981) identify two age effects–one having to do with the initiation of childbearing and the other with its termination. Women who first give birth at a younger age are likely to have subsequent children more rapidly and end up with larger families. A number of U.S. studies support this "early-pregnancy treadmill" effect. Its possible causes include the foreclosure of career options by early childbearing and the effect of higher fecundity on an earlier first birth. Fertility intentions may or may not be implicated in this relationship, which could also depend on factors related to the supply of children. At the other end of the reproductive span, those who have been married longer appear less likely to have additional children; several studies involving regression analyses within parities show a significant negative effect of marriage duration on period fertility (Bulatao and Fawcett, 1981). This effect is at least partly due to lower fecundity and reduced frequency of intercourse, factors that affect the supply of children but not intentions; it may also be due to such couples already having attained their family-size goals. In addition, however, intentions may be affected if older couples consider themselves outside the prime childbearing years: they may worry about health risks, see childbearing as too heavy a burden at their age, or believe that children should have more active parents; they may also be subject to less social pressure to have children.

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[1] These hypotheses are limited to what may be considered sequential effects. Not considered here are more general nonsequential hypotheses–based on past demographic and sociological research, on microeconomic theory, and so on–about the effects of such factors as income, education, and experience of child mortality, especially on total preferences.

Namboodiri identifies a number of experience factors that can lead to adjustments in fertility intentions, primarily through their connection with implementation failures. These include marital dissolution, infant and child mortality, fecundity impairment, unintended pregnancies, and a difference between preferred and actual sex composition.

Marital dissolution may affect fertility if it occurs before fertility plans have been completely carried out. Although this is a disruption in plan implementation and not a change in fertility intentions, it has been shown that the fertility of U.S. women prior to marital dissolution is lower than expected, suggesting that the discord that generally precedes divorce can affect intentions (Thornton, 1978). Marital dissolution may also affect intentions if it is followed by remarriage, which may involve a new "quota" of children for the woman: Thornton (1978) shows that remarriage starts a period of increased fertility in the United States, though this may not make up for the childbearing years lost between unions. Thus remarriage may raise total fertility across marriages. Its effect on fertility intentions for the new marriage is less clear, though it seems likely that a woman will decide on fewer children if she already has some from a previous union, particularly if the divorce imposes additional costs.

Infant and child mortality can affect fertility intentions if they lead to attempts to make up for the lost child. Heer (1983) reviews the research on this question, including studies in Taiwan, Guatemala, and

Egypt, and concludes that some demand for replacement does develop, though on the average this falls short of an attempt at full replacement. He also argues that a replacement effect is more likely to be observed at lower than at higher parities and where contraceptive use is higher.

The effect of fecundity impairment is mainly on the supply side: it does not raise or lower fertility intentions but makes it impossible to implement them. It may therefore be argued that, for sterile couples, measures of fertility intentions have limited usefulness.

The effect of unintended pregnancies on demand may be more important. Although it is difficult to determine whether any particular child was intended or not, there is abundant evidence that unintended births are a common occurrence. Couples may rationalize their unintended pregnancies, deciding after the fact that they really wanted the baby; this is another example of cognitive balance, which also applies to the relationship between attitudes and behavior (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Bem, 1967; for general discussions, see Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Fazio and Zanna, 1981). Thus apparent demand may be increased. The close relation often found between actual and ideal family size, even where contraceptive practice is infrequent, suggests that such rationalization happens frequently (Pullum, 1983).

The gender composition of earlier children can have an effect: in particular cultures, gender preference may lead to higher fertility among couples who do not have the desired number or balance of sons or daughters (see, e.g., Freedman and Coombs, 1974). Although son preference appears to be more common than daughter preference, the preference for balance, or for some minimum number of children of each sex, is even more common worldwide (see Pullum, 1983). McClelland (1979) has argued that the impact of gender preference is more complex than commonly recognized. Besides the agreement between preferred and actual number of children of each sex, one must consider the perceived probability of having sons or daughters and the cost the couple attaches to having an additional child of the "wrong" sex. Thus in some circumstances gender preference could lead to having fewer rather than more children.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Analyses of the changing effects of socioeconomic characteristics on fertility intentions have focused on income, wage rates, and education.

A number of researchers have investigated the possibility that these characteristics have different effects on fertility at different parities (Namboodiri, 1974; Simon, 1975a, 1975b; Rosenzweig and Seiver, 1975; Rosenzweig, 1976; Seiver, 1978; Snyder, 1978; Hout, 1978; Kyriazis, 1979). Bulatao and Fawcett (1981) attempt to summarize this research under four hypotheses–two relating to income and two to education or wage rates.

From work on microeconomic fertility models (e.g., Becker, 1960; Willis, 1974), and on the basis of general economic principles, it might be expected that income would have a positive effect on fertility preferences, ceteris paribus. However, because income has various indirect effects that operate to counter this "pure" effect, it has been observed that its effect is most often positive at lower levels of development and negative at higher levels (Mueller and Short, 1983). The hypotheses described here are related to this general argument, but more specifically involve differential effects depending on parity. The first hypothesis, which Bulatao and Fawcett label the "income acceleration" effect, is that couples who can afford it have their children more quickly, whereas the poor, ceteris paribus, may postpone their "purchases" of children. Many of the studies just cited found positive effects of permanent income on parity progression at low parities, providing consistent support for this hypothesis. At higher parities, on the other hand, the same studies showed that the effect of income is predominantly negative. Some explanations for this have been offered, none of them compelling; indirect effects of income that reduce demand for children are probably responsible (Mueller and Short, 1983), but the specific explanations proferred amount to little more than the notion that the rich are somehow different when it comes to later childbearing (Bulatao and Fawcett, 1981).

Like income, education is generally expected to have a negative effect on fertility, though curvilinear effects have also been noted (Cochrane, 1979, 1983). The effects of education are linked to those of potential wages because of the strong dependence of the latter on the former. Higher wages and higher education lead to greater occupational involvement and therefore to fertility delay. Several but not all of the studies cited above confirm that more-educated women, or those who can expect higher wages, are more likely to postpone having their first child, and, in some analyses, their second or third child as well. A companion hypothesis is that more-educated women, once they begin giving birth, will bunch their children more closely. The evidence on this hypothesis, however, is weaker; it does not have unequivocal support in any of the regression studies cited.

Values and Disvalues of Children

In addition to economic benefits and costs, values and disvalues of children are construed broadly here to include social and emotional satisfactions and costs that accrue to parents in the course of rearing children. Values and disvalues are subjective or attitudinal, that is, they refer to the *perceived* satisfactions and costs of children. The discussion will give separate consideration to the fertility implications of particular values and disvalues; calculation of a net value including psychosocial dimensions is problematic. It is not known, for example, to what extent people weigh current costs against future gains; perhaps a small degree of certainty about the old age security provided by children is worth a large amount of the physical strains associated with childrearing. Similarly, childrearing responsibilities may be regarded as interfering with the mother's flexibility to do other things, but how this cost stacks up against the positive emotional value of feeling needed is difficult to say. In addition, it may be argued that not all values relate to fertility positively, nor do all disvalues relate to it negatively.

Some studies have examined changes in the values and disvalues of children across parities or life-cycle stages (Bulatao and Arnold, 1977; Bulatao, 1981b; Callan, 1980; Fawcett, 1978; Hoffman, 1978; Townes et al., 1980). These studies have usually traced the prominence of particular values and disvalues across parities, without specifying relationships to fertility intentions or subsequent fertility. Drawing upon these studies, as well as on studies relating values to family-size preferences, the following discussion will cover those values and disvalues important to the initiation of childbearing (the first child), then to middle births (generally the second and third child), and finally to "large" families (four or more children).

Values attached to the first child are largely psychosocial, having to do with the following: the emotional factors of creating and strengthening the primary group, increasing the closeness of the spouses, providing the feeling of love for a child, and anticipating the fun of having children around the house; and the role development factor of achieving adult status. Some researchers have emphasized the emotional factors (Bulatao and Arnold, 1977; Terhune, 1973), and others the role development factor (Hoffman, 1978). Another first-child theme is continuity or carrying on the family name, which Bulatao (1981b) includes with primary-group strengthening as part of establishing the family.

Disvalues associated with the first birth are both economic and noneconomic. The financial costs of children are a consideration at each parity level (e.g., Bulatao and Arnold, 1977; Callan, 1980; Meyer, 1981), although the evidence suggests that such costs affect the timing more than the occurrence of the first birth. The main psychosocial costs of the first child are of two kinds: interference with the marital relationship, including less time with one's spouse, and loss of flexibility and freedom (Bulatao, 1981b; Campbell et al., 1976; Fawcett, 1978). These disvalues should have the greatest impact on the first birth, but should also remain important for the second, given the increased complications of arranging alternative childcare for two children of different ages (Callan, 1980). It should be noted, however, that significant concern with restrictions on freedom appears mainly in the more-developed, lower-fertility societies and not in the less-developed ones (Bulatao, 1979a). Like restrictions on freedom, interference with the wife's work should be most relevant when no children and one child are contrasted; a diminishing but nonnegligible effect may be expected in relation to second and third children as the demands of a growing family make it less and less likely that the wife can handle both an occupational role and a domestic role (Callan, 1980). However, overall, work restrictions are not a prominent disvalue, being clearly overshadowed by restrictions on freedom (Bulatao, 1979a). It could be argued that a modern occupational structure is necessary for this disvalue to become relevant; however, it could also be argued that women's work is more pressing in less-developed societies where households exist closer to subsistence levels.

In the middle segment of the fertility career, a particular value stands out: providing sibling companionship for the first child. Studies have consistently shown this to be a powerful and virtually universal motive for the second child (Bulatao, 1981b; Callan, 1980; Deven, 1981; Terhune, 1974; Townes et al., 1980). Powerful negative stereotypes against only children have been shown to prevail across cultures. However, the sibling companionship value goes beyond that, inspired by beliefs about the positive effects of a boy having a sister, for example, or the idea that sibling companionship is qualitatively superior to peer companionship and therefore should be maximized. Perhaps for such reasons, studies show the effect of the sibling companionship value continuing beyond the second child, albeit at a reduced level. Emotional benefits to the parents remain important for the second child; indeed, there is some evidence that they intensify (Fawcett, 1978) and that the initial experience of parenting brings about a generally more positive orientation toward having children (Hoffman, 1978; Townes et al., 1980). Further impetus for a second child derives from the various manifestations of gender preference. Even where the first child is of the preferred sex, there is often a desire for a "balance" of boys and girls or, in cases of extreme son preference, a feeling that at least two boys are needed to ensure that one will survive (Lee and Kim, 1977; Williamson, 1976; Arnold and Kuo, 1982; Bulatao, 1981a). Though gender preference motives begin to surface with the second child, they are expected to have modest effects at that point, increasing in impact at parities 3 and 4 in most societies.

The desire for "large" families (four or more children) is influenced especially by expectations of economic contributions from children. A variety of research has shown that expectations for economic help from children are associated consistently with higher fertility (Fawcett, 1982). The expectation of old age support, for instance, has a strong linkage with larger family size (De Vos, 1982).

It has been noted that perceived economic costs of children are salient at each parity. However, the evidence on these costs is confusing; measurement problems may be especially acute for this aspect of the value of children (Fawcett, 1983). Numerous studies have shown that financial considerations are the main reason given for limiting family size or for not wanting more than a particular number of children (e.g., Arnold et al., 1975). Some researchers have found that a concern about financial costs differentiates those who want more children from those who do not (Bulatao and Arnold, 1977), but others have found no such differentiation (Meyer, 1981). Also, variations in ways of measuring financial disvalues may influence the point in the fertility career at which an impact is felt (Bulatao and Arnold, 1977; Callan, 1980; Deven, 1981; Townes et al., 1980). It is predicted that financial disvalues will not show independent effects on family-size preferences in all settings, but may do so in countries where a rapid economic transition is in progress, producing a strong financial squeeze on upwardly mobile parents. In such settings, the financial costs of childrearing are especially salient because of the clear tradeoffs for quality of children or a modern parental lifestyle (Coombs, 1980; Mueller, 1972).

Other Factors

Two additional factors affecting fertility intentions, but not easily placed within any of the three major categories discussed above, may be noted: normative thresholds and the homogenization process.

The influence of cultural norms is mentioned by Namboodiri (1983); in particular, it has been argued that norms set minimum numbers of children for couples in particular cultures (Mason, 1983). If these norms exert a strong coercive effect, decisions before and after a couple reaches the minimum prescribed number can be expected to differ. Bulatao and Fawcett (1981) label this the "normative family-size threshold hypothesis": childbearing below some threshold (often difficult to define) is associated with social pressure, whereas childbearing above the threshold involves more calculating self-interest. Empirically, this should show up as a difference in the impact of particular predictors of fertility intentions; for instance, it might be argued that income and education should have little effect on intentions below the threshold–since cultural norms are assumed not to be income- or education-specific–but greater effect above the threshold. It can be seen that this hypothesis provides an alternative explanation for some of the patterns discussed earlier. However, it should be noted that, although a number of authors cite normative thresholds in explaining findings (e.g., Fawcett et al., 1972; Hout, 1978), thresholds have not been clearly established, and the evidence supporting the hypothesis is conflicting and inconsistent. It has also been hypothesized that behavior at the exact point at which the family-size norm is attained will be different from behavior before and after this point: there will be a greater tendency to postpone births or not to have any more once one has reached the norm. However, this hypothesis, propounded by Hout (1978), has little support beyond his study.

A second additional factor influencing fertility intentions is labeled the "homogenization process" by Bulatao and Fawcett (1981). It is argued that couples at higher parities are increasingly homogeneous, since those with effective preferences for fewer children never reach these parities. Empirical support for this hypothesis is adduced from the declining predictability of fertility intentions at higher parities as couples become increasingly similar on factors that might otherwise help predict intentions. However, a study by Snyder (1978) shows increasing rather than decreasing predictability of birth progressions at higher parities; moreover, statistical factors, specifically the evenness or lopsidedness of the split between those wanting and not wanting another child, might account for the declining pattern where it appears.

Summary of Predictions

Cutting through the qualifications in the preceding discussion, the effects of the various factors identified as influencing fertility intentions may be summarized in a set of specific predictions. Most of these predictions relate primarily to intentions regarding continued childbearing; the previous research on which the predictions are based has dealt almost exclusively with such intentions, if not with actual fertility. For total preferences, more involved arguments must be made. From the intermediate sequential perspective adopted here, it may be argued that total preferences do not remain fixed throughout the fertility career and therefore should be subject to some of the same influences affecting intentions to continue childbearing. In addition, following the earlier argument about cognitive balance, total preferences should also be affected by such influences through their effects on intentions to continue childbearing. There is thus some basis for expecting similar effects on total preferences, though previous research has not addressed this directly.

Predictions related to the effects of age and childbearing experience are as follows:

1. Unintended pregnancies (it was argued) should lead to apparently higher fertility preferences because of rationalization.
2. Age at first birth should be negatively related to fertility preferences.
3. Marriage duration should be negatively related to fertility preferences.
4. Marital dissolution may affect intentions through marital discord and remarriage. Because no information on marital discord is available in the data to be used, this factor will not be considered

further here; the effect of remarriage on total fertility would seem to be positive, but the effect on intentions to have children within the current marriage is more likely to be negative.

5. Child loss should lead to greater demand for children if parity is controlled; it should lead to lower demand if number of living children is controlled (because those who have lost children tend to replace them, but not fully). The effects may be greater at lower parities.
6. Gender composition should affect fertility preferences, a less-preferred composition probably leading to higher but possibly in some cases to lower preferences. The prediction of higher preferences is more common.

Finally, fecundity impairment does not so much change intentions as make them irrelevant, and will not be investigated.

Predictions related to the effects of socioeconomic characteristics are fairly succinct:

7. At low parities, the effect of income on fertility intentions will be positive.
8. At high parities, the effect of income will be negative.
9. At low parities, the effect of education will be negative.

For values and disvalues of children, the relevant predictions may be summarized as follows:

10. The economic contributions of children should have a clearcut positive effect on family-size preferences, principally at higher parities.
11. If the importance attached to carrying on the family name has a positive effect, this should be exhibited at lower parities, particularly in relation to the first birth.
12. Gender preference clearly should affect fertility intentions. This influence, probably positive, will be greater in relation to the third and fourth births.
13. The intensity of the psychosocial companionship value of children should have a positive effect primarily on first-birth intentions, but may also affect the second and other lower-order births.
14. Sibling companionship, in particular, should clearly be of positive importance in having a second child. However, because this value

is so strong and virtually everyone wants a second child, its effect may be difficult to observe.

Two values of children discussed earlier have been omitted here: closeness to one's spouse and the attainment of adult status. The reasons for the omissions were empirical. The first of these values was difficult to distinguish in the data from the companionship value of children, and therefore no separate index for it could be constructed. (This was also the case for the associated disvalue of interference with the marital relationship.) Adult status, the second value omitted here, was only weakly favored by respondents in all countries and similarly did not represent a unique dimension in the value inventory.

Predictions related to the disvalues of children, unlike most of the predictions for values, are specific to particular types of social settings:

15. The financial costs of children are not expected to have strong negative effects on desired family size, net of other variables, except in societies where a rapid economic transition is in progress. Any effects should be greater at higher parities.
16. Concern about loss of freedom and restrictions on parents' activities should affect childbearing intentions negatively at lower parities, especially in regard to the first and the second births, but only in more-developed countries.
17. Interference with the wife's work should similarly have its negative effect at lower parities, but this effect should be smaller than that of loss of freedom. There is no particular expectation, however, that this effect will be limited to more-developed countries.

Finally, in regard to the additional factors of normative thresholds and the homogenization process, no specific predictions can be made. Empirical results may be examined to see if the influence of the preceding variables on fertility intentions changes just at or just after some normative family-size threshold; however, what the thresholds are, which influences should change, and how they should change cannot be predicted.

METHOD

Samples

The predictions outlined above will be investigated cross-culturally with data from the Value of Children project, a set of parallel surveys conducted in nine countries in 1975–76. The countries to be included in this analysis are the Philippines, Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States. (Because of some differences in the surveys, the data for Thailand and West Germany are not adequate for the current analysis.)

The respondents in each country were a sample of between 1,000 and 3,000 currently married women under 40 (in Taiwan, under 45), plus about a quarter of their husbands. The samples were designed to be nationally representative, except in Indonesia, where two ethnic groups on the main island of Java–the Javanese and the Sundanese–were studied. These wives and husbands were interviewed using similar questionnaires translated from a basic English version into the appropriate local languages (and backtranslated for verification). The questionnaires covered a variety of fertility-relevant issues, including values and disvalues of children, fertility histories and preferences, and socioeconomic background (see Bulatao, 1979a, for further details).

Since fecundity impairment prevents carrying out fertility intentions, cases are excluded if the respondent believed the couple was incapable of having another child. In addition, respondents with no children are excluded because some of the measures used in the basic analyses are defined only for those with at least one child, although separate analyses for those without children who did not consider themselves sterile will also be reported. Altogether, close to 11 percent of each sample was left out, except in the United States, where the percentage was twice as large. Anywhere from 5 to 60 percent of those excluded admitted they could not have additional children.

Procedure

The analysis will involve multivariate regressions to predict fertility intentions, first for all respondents and then for those with particular numbers of living children. It will generally be assumed that the effects on fertility intentions of the different factors investigated are linear and additive. However, particular variables with skewed distributions will be normalized as much as possible before being entered into the regressions (roughly following Tukey's [1977] suggestions).

Regressions were run first for all wives and all husbands in each country. Variations on the basic regressions to determine the results of adding or replacing particular variables, to be identified below, were run next. Regressions were also run for subgroups–urban and rural residents, or members of particular ethnic groups. The purpose of these regressions was essentially to test the stability of the results; no hypotheses were formulated about differences between groups.

Finally, respondents within each country-sex group were divided by fertility career stage using number of living children, and regressions run within each subgroup (including, in this case, regressions for those with no living children). For some purposes, it might have been preferable to take child mortality into account in defining fertility stages. However, focusing only on living children can also be justified, since family interaction patterns depend only on living children. In any case, a variable reflecting child mortality will be included in the analysis.

Measures of Fertility Intentions

The dependent variables in these regressions were two measures of fertility intentions. The first of these was a dichotomous variable indicating presence or absence of desire for another child (DAC) (for convenience this was scored as 0 or 10). The second measure, ideal family size (IFS), was the number of children the respondent said she or he would want to have if "starting your family all over again, things being pretty much as they were." The roughly 12 percent of respondents who did not specify a particular number were asked a follow-up question ("Of course it may depend on a number of things, but if it were up to you alone . . ."), to which almost all gave a satisfactory numerical reply.[2] This measure is generally skewed, more in the higher-fertility countries. On the assumption that ideal family size may actually have different meanings in high- and low-fertility areas, different normalizing transformations were applied: the natural log (after adding ½) in the Philippines, Turkey, and Indonesia and the square root (also after adding ½) in the other countries. Applying a similar square root transformation throughout would, however, produce essentially similar regression results.

These two measures were assumed to be jointly dependent, and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions were used to predict them. The equations were identified by using separate sets of value and disvalue measures, discussed below, to predict each intention measure. In addition, gender composition and age of the oldest child were included only in the regressions for desire for another child (leaving out ideal family size as a predictor), and residence and media exposure only in the regressions for ideal family size.

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[2] The highest percentage not providing a specific answer to the first question was in the United States (21 percent); the highest percentage unable (or, more likely, unwilling) to provide a specific answer to either question was in Singapore (14 percent). One or two percent was more typical for the other countries. Given that Singapore and the United States were the most developed of the countries studied, the argument that developing-country respondents cannot articulate family-size preferences does not seem to hold here.

Since the desire for another child is a dichotomy, this estimation procedure is not entirely appropriate (but see Heckman, 1978). To determine what difference this made, logit regressions were also run to predict desire for another child and are discussed together with the two-stage results. (Parallel ordinary least squares [OLS] results for ideal family size are also discussed.) Also, desire for another child was replaced, in additional two-stage regressions, by another variable–the number of additional children desired (ACD). This variable could be negative because respondents who wanted no additional children were asked if they would have preferred fewer than they already had, and the number fewer incorporated into the measure; however, the results of using ACD were essentially similar and will therefore not be reported.

Given the skepticism that is sometimes expressed about subjective measures of fertility preferences (e.g., Hauser, 1967; Westoff, 1981; Hendershot and Placek, 1981), somewhat parallel analyses will also be reported using a measure of actual fertility–whether the couple had a live birth within the two years preceding the interview (CHL2).

Predictors of fertility intentions

The predictors used are grouped below in accordance with the predictions outlined above.

Age and Childbearing Experience

Living children. A key variable in predicting the desire for another child is the number of children the respondent already has. After some experimentation with this measure, its log was taken (after adding ½), and both the log (LNLC) and the untransformed number (NLC) included in the regressions for desire for another child. Living children is also included in the regressions for ideal family size, on the assumption that a positive effect could in part represent rationalization.

Age and marriage duration. Several variables were used to capture the effects of age and marriage duration: the age of the oldest child (ROLD); age at first birth (AGFB); and years since first marriage (MDUR) (the duration of the current marriage was not available in the data). Although the age of the oldest child could be expected to affect desire for another child, no good argument could be made for its affecting ideal family size, and it was therefore left out of that equation. The square root was taken of this measure because it gave a better fit.

Marital dissolution. A dummy variable (PREVM) was used to indicate whether the respondent had been married more than once.

Child loss. A dummy variable (CLOSS) was also used to indicate whether any of the respondent's children had died.

Gender composition. The analysis includes measures of the gender composition of living children and the strength of gender preference. For actual composition, the percentage of living male children was calculated, and a logit transformation applied to this (after 0 percent was rescored as 0.5 and 100 as 99.5) (LBOY). This transformation was based on the argument that a difference between, say, 90 and 100 percent girls would have more effect on fertility preferences than a difference between 40 and 50 percent girls. (Empirically, the logit was in fact more strongly related to preferences than was the raw percentage.) Imbalance between number of living sons and daughters, also assumed to be important, was represented by an additional variable—the absolute value of the preceding index (LIMB).

Gender composition was not expected to affect ideal family size: if one could start one's family over again, one would not necessarily expect the same sequence of sons and daughters. Hence, these variables were used only in the regressions for desire for another child. The strength of gender preference was assessed from value of children data, and the measure is discussed below. No measures of the perceived likelihood of having a son or daughter or of the perceived costliness of not having the preferred gender were available in the data.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Income. The surveys provide limited information on income. Total household income is given, scored in categories that varied across countries, numbering between 8 and 18. No breakdown between husband's and wife's income was obtained. Regressions were run to predict household income category in each country, including in the predictors a dummy for whether the wife was working or not (Appendix A). R^2 was generally between 0.35 and 0.47. From these regressions, rough estimates were derived for the expected income of each household projected to the husband's age 40. Given the inadequacy of the basic income data, this measure of permanent household income (PINC) is deficient, and some regressions will also be reported using the original current household income measure (CINC).

For both measures, a similar distribution approximating the normal was produced in each country by taking the natural log in Turkey, Indonesia, and Singapore and the square root in the Philippines and Korea, and not transforming in Taiwan and the United States. Given the differences in the income measures, however, only very rough comparisons can be made between countries.

Education. Wife's education (WEDUC) was scored in years completed, except for Singapore and Taiwan, where category systems were used. Husband's education (HEDUC) will not be included in the basic regressions because of collinearity with income (particularly permanent income), but some analysis including it will be reported. It was scored in the same way as wife's education.

Two additional measures of socioeconomic characteristics for which no specific predictions were made were included only in the regressions for ideal family size: urban as opposed to rural residence (URBAN) and exposure to mass media (MEDIA), measured on a ten-point scale. It was thought useful to control the effects of these variables, though no specific sequential effects were expected.

Values and Disvalues of Children

From a number of different questions, both open-ended and structured, about the importance of particular values and disvalues of children, two sets of indices were constructed: indices of the importance of particular values and disvalues as reasons for having or not having another child (to use in predicting desire for another child), and indices of their general importance in fertility (to use in predicting ideal family size).

The first of these sets of indices was derived directly from ratings of the personal importance to the respondent of 12 values as reasons for having another child, and similar ratings of 10 disvalues as reasons for not having another child. These ratings were on a three-point importance scale; the mean rating given by each respondent to all the values combined (or all the disvalues combined, in the case of specific disvalues) was subtracted from each score. Ratings of similar values were also averaged. In this manner, five value indices were constructed to represent the importance to the respondent as reasons for having another child of economic contributions from children (ECO), the family name and line (NAM), gender preference (GPR), companionship and psychosocial rewards of childbearing (COM), and sibling companionship (SIB). Unlike the other measures, the gender preference measure was not an average, but was the higher of the two ratings for wanting a son and wanting a daughter. Three disvalue indices were constructed—for the financial costs of children (FIN), restrictions on parents' freedom and activities (FRE), and work restrictions (WRK).

The general indices were constructed through a more complex process. All the measures pertaining to a particular value, including those used in the first set of indices, were combined, taking into account several exploratory factor analyses, as well as theoretical ideas about which values are important. Various transformations were applied to equalize roughly the contribution of different measures in each index, as well as to reduce heteroscedasticity and normalize the final indices, which were designed to range from 0 to 5. The general value indices do not include a measure for sibling companionship, on the assumption that this value applies to particular parities rather than to children generally. The seven general indices are these:

1. Economic contributions from children (ECOV) has three substantive components: help around the house, economic help from children (type and timing not specified), and help in the parents' old age. It should be noted that these contributions are not entirely monetary: "help" can take a number of forms. One constituent measure, for example, is ratings of the item "to have someone to depend on when you are old."

2. Carrying on the family name (NAMV) includes both family name and family line in its constituent measures, so it can apply in cultures where the name itself is unimportant.

3. Gender preference (GPRV) measures the degree to which *either* son or daughter preference is important with respect to wanting another child.

4. Companionship provided by children (COMV) was constructed from items that specify numerous psychosocial benefits to parents: the fun of having children around, pleasure from watching them grow,

avoidance of loneliness, and the value of children for bringing spouses closer and completing the family.

5. Financial costs of children (FIND) was measured by items referring to financial burdens, financial demands, and financial problems connected with children.

6. Restrictions on parents' freedom (FRED) includes measures of feeling less free because of children and of the extent to which childrearing interferes with other activities, but excludes interference with work.

7. Interference with wife's work (WRKD) indicates whether the respondent feels that children either prevent the wife's working or make it more difficult for her to have a job.

The estimated reliability of each index, based on a measure of internal consistency (alpha), is shown in Appendix B (which also provides further details on the construction of these indices). The alpha coefficients vary widely, as might be expected with indices using different numbers and types of components; few of the coefficients are high, and many are rather low (i.e., below 0.50). The most reliable indices, across countries, are those dealing with economic benefits, the family name, gender preference, and financial costs. Two countries have notably low estimates of reliability (all indices below 0.50): the Philippines and Indonesia.

RESULTS

In this section, fertility intentions in each country will first be reviewed. Then means and standard deviations for the predictors will be presented. Next, regression results will be examined: basic results for all parities combined, results with some changes in predictors, results by subgroup, results to predict recent childbearing, and, finally, results for separate regressions by number of living children.

Fertility intentions

Figure 1 shows ideal family size by number of living children for each country-sex group. The contrasts between country samples in mean level generally parallel contrasts in country fertility rates (see Bulatao, 1979b: Table 3), although ideal family size for the Turkish sample is slightly lower than would be expected. These ideals fall below con-



FIGURE 1. Ideal family size by number of living children, by country and sex

temporaneous total fertility rates (roughly adjusted for mortality[3]) in the less-developed countries, but exceed these rates in the more-developed ones. In the Philippines and Turkey, for instance, they are on the order of one child smaller than adjusted total fertility rates, whereas in the United States and Singapore they are about one child larger. Only in Korea and Taiwan are the ideals close–within half a child–of the adjusted rates. In the less-developed countries studied, the ideals suggest some discontinuity with past fertility experience; for the more-developed countries, various explanations for the difference–such as the added cost of attaining one's ideals–are possible.

The trend across parities in ideal family size is roughly similar in each country-sex group: it starts between 2 and 3 for those with no children and increases as number of living children increases. The slope is less than one, however, and for those with six or more children ideal family size is roughly between 3 and 5. Among those with three living children, roughly half of the groups have a mean ideal family size larger than mean current family size, and half have the reverse. The differences between countries are not great: ideal family size is slightly higher at each parity in Indonesia than in the other countries, is slightly lower in Korea, and increases somewhat faster across parities in Singapore. Wives' and husbands' preferences are quite similar.

These similarities suggest similar processes at work in each country: possibly self-selection, in that those with larger ideal family sizes are more likely to attain higher parities, or possibly some degree of cognitive balancing or rationalization. Whichever explanation is correct, or even if both are, the processes do not work perfectly: either some couples overshoot their ideals, or some do not fully adjust their ideals to take in all the children they have.

Figure 2 shows the percentages who desire another child by number of living children for each country-sex group. These percentages are very high–between 80 and 100 percent–for those with no children or one child; intermediate, with the greatest variation among groups, for those with two or three children; and low–between 0 and 25 percent–for those with four or more children.

Differences among country samples are most notable at the inter-

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[3] The mortality adjustment involved multiplying total fertility rates from the Committee on Population and Demography (Coale et al., 1980; National Research Council, 1980) or the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1979) by the NRR/GRR ratio for 1973 (United Nations, 1975).



FIGURE 2. Desire for another child by number of living children, by country and sex

mediate parities: the percentage wanting additional children at these parities is higher in Indonesia than elsewhere, and this percentage is also relatively high in the Philippines. Some differences appear between husbands and wives: those wanting additional children are a slightly larger percentage of husbands than wives in the Philippines and Turkey, but a slightly larger percentage of wives than husbands in the United States.

In a broad sense, Figure 2 is consistent with Figure 1 in that the majority of respondents want to stop childbearing somewhere in the range of 2 to 5 children. However, more detailed comparisons show differences between ideal family size and the desire for another child. Those for whom these two measures of intentions conflict are of two types: those who want to continue childbearing even though they would exceed their ideal family size, and those who would discontinue childbearing without having reached their ideal. Each type makes up about 5 to 10 percent of each country-sex group, so that as much as a fifth of some groups clearly show some contradiction between ideals and desires. Overall, those whose desires fall short of their own ideals slightly outnumber those with excess desires. Those whose desires fall short are most numerous at two or three living children; as a proportion of the respondents not wanting another child, they are most common at lower parities, decreasing steadily at higher parities. Those with excess desires, on the other hand, increase at each successive parity as a proportion of the respondents wanting another child, making up almost 100 percent of this group at five or more children; almost everyone wanting another child at these high parities, therefore, would exceed his or her own stated ideals.

This discussion of fertility intentions suggests the importance of a couple's actual number of children in determining intentions. It also illustrates the inadequacy of combining ideal family size and desire for another child and the consequent need to treat them separately.

Means for the predictors

Age, Childbearing Experience, and Socioeconomic Characteristics

Means and standard deviations for all the variables, except the values and disvalues, are given in Table 1 by country and sex. Several of the variables have been transformed, as described earlier, occasionally in different ways across countries. Thus, ideal family size appears lower

TABLE 1. Means and standard deviations, by country and sex

	Wives													
	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Variable	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)
DAC	.30	(.46)	.24	(.43)	.41	(.49)	.26	(.44)	.22	(.41)	.25	(.44)	.42	(.49)
IFS	13.45	(3.45)	10.71	(3.17)	14.78	(2.83)	17.34	(2.56)	18.54	(2.24)	18.85	(2.84)	17.43	(4.17)
ACD	.38	(1.13)	-.14	(1.50)	.75	(1.24)	.02	(1.05)	.11	(.98)	.26	(.84)	.58	(1.40)
LNLC	1.32	(.50)	1.15	(.48)	1.32	(.51)	1.12	(.42)	1.26	(.41)	1.16	(.48)	.96	(.41)
NLC	3.73	(2.06)	3.05	(1.78)	3.72	(2.03)	2.84	(1.37)	3.31	(1.45)	3.08	(1.74)	2.34	(1.26)
ROLD	2.78	(1.04)	2.94	(1.11)	3.14	(1.01)	2.61	(1.05)	2.98	(1.15)	2.95	(1.02)	2.73	(1.06)
AGFB	21.59	(3.81)	19.69	(3.90)	18.40	(3.47)	22.91	(3.08)	21.89	(3.11)	23.03	(4.16)	21.51	(3.75)
MDUR	9.61	(5.76)	11.56	(6.57)	12.07	(5.98)	8.12	(5.69)	11.38	(6.76)	10.36	(6.81)	10.16	(5.44)
PREVM	.02	(.14)	.05	(.21)	.17	(.38)	.01	(.10)	.02	(.12)	.01	(.08)	.13	(.34)
CLOSS	.23	(.42)	.36	(.48)	.38	(.49)	.14	(.34)	.14	(.34)	.04	(.20)	.05	(.21)
LBOY	.10	(1.54)	-.00	(1.71)	.01	(1.56)	.19	(1.71)	.11	(1.49)	.06	(1.65)	.07	(1.95)
LIMB	1.05	(1.13)	1.22	(1.19)	1.07	(1.13)	1.24	(1.19)	1.01	(1.10)	1.16	(1.17)	1.52	(1.22)
PINC	2.62	(.48)	1.86	(.30)	1.89	(.22)	2.01	(.26)	4.70	(1.13)	1.39	(.20)	11.85	(1.62)
CINC	2.44	(.77)	1.74	(.56)	1.72	(.32)	1.92	(.39)	4.91	(1.81)	1.36	(.36)	10.47	(3.54)
WEDUC	7.78	(3.48)	3.41	(3.55)	4.37	(3.74)	7.32	(3.93)	4.70	(3.10)	2.90	(1.32)	12.21	(2.22)
URBAN	.20	(.40)	.81	(.39)	.20	(.40)	.63	(.48)	.51	(.50)	.77	(.42)	.74	(.44)
MEDIA	5.97	(2.17)	5.85	(2.78)	4.56	(2.66)	6.87	(2.38)	5.27	(2.87)	7.78	(2.12)	8.78	(1.49)
CHYNG	2.21	(2.55)	3.70	(3.81)	3.05	(3.25)	2.79	(2.86)	4.48	(4.30)	4.86	(3.74)	4.34	(3.87)
WFAGE	29.89	(5.65)	29.10	(6.27)	28.71	(5.59)	30.32	(4.98)	31.60	(6.65)	32.34	(5.55)	29.64	(5.46)
HEDUC	8.17	(3.69)	5.67	(3.53)	5.82	(4.27)	9.92	(4.09)	6.73	(3.86)	3.50	(1.26)	12.55	(2.73)
AWAY	.34	(.47)	.31	(.46)	.34	(.48)	.26	(.44)	.42	(.49)	.00	(.00)	.41	(.49)
N[a]	1409-1498		1358-1492		1736-1848		1263-1399		1667-1976		755-881		1090-1217	

Husbands														
DAC	.36	(.48)	.28	(.45)	.40	(.49)	.24	(.43)	.20	(.40)	.26	(.44)	.36	(.48)
IFS	13.97	(3.52)	11.45	(3.54)	14.45	(2.91)	17.08	(2.78)	18.41	(2.61)	18.97	(2.87)	17.48	(3.90)
ACD	.58	(1.12)	.05	(1.87)	.70	(1.34)	-.06	(1.16)	.06	(1.01)	.31	(.85)	.48	(1.21)
LNLC	1.30	(.51)	1.18	(.48)	1.34	(.52)	1.16	(.43)	1.27	(.40)	1.15	(.48)	.97	(.41)
NLC	3.67	(2.04)	3.15	(1.85)	3.85	(2.16)	2.97	(1.45)	3.33	(1.45)	3.04	(1.72)	2.39	(1.30)
ROLD	2.72	(1.09)	3.05	(1.17)	3.19	(1.03)	2.70	(1.03)	2.98	(1.14)	2.93	(1.01)	2.81	(1.04)
AGFB	21.27	(3.73)	16.67	(4.92)	18.16	(3.61)	22.29	(3.76)	21.77	(3.33)	23.21	(4.06)	20.97	(4.40)
MDUR	9.80	(7.12)	13.10	(7.90)	13.27	(7.45)	8.66	(6.00)	11.73	(7.21)	10.65	(6.95)	10.79	(6.35)
PREVM	.04	(.19)	.07	(.26)	.23	(.42)	.04	(.20)	.03	(.18)	.01	(.09)	.14	(.34)
CLOSS	.21	(.41)	.37	(.48)	.39	(.49)	.16	(.36)	.13	(.33)	.04	(.20)	.05	(.21)
LBOY	.11	(1.60)	.06	(1.66)	-.00	(1.54)	.09	(1.62)	.14	(1.51)	.09	(1.66)	.02	(1.89)
LIMB	1.12	(1.15)	1.16	(1.18)	1.05	(1.13)	1.13	(1.17)	1.03	(1.12)	1.16	(1.19)	1.44	(1.22)
PINC	2.56	(.46)	1.72	(.43)	1.81	(.25)	2.02	(.26)	4.75	(1.18)	1.41	(.24)	12.02	(1.76)
CINC	2.43	(.74)	1.72	(.55)	1.74	(.33)	1.97	(.38)	4.95	(1.80)	1.40	(.37)	10.95	(3.54)
WEDUC	7.68	(3.42)	3.63	(3.56)	4.55	(3.76)	7.79	(3.91)	4.87	(3.00)	3.55	(1.30)	11.76	(3.19)
URBAN	.20	(.40)	.81	(.40)	.20	(.40)	.60	(.49)	.50	(.50)	.78	(.41)	.75	(.43)
MEDIA	6.30	(2.38)	8.30	(2.04)	5.62	(2.84)	8.29	(2.09)	7.00	(2.75)	8.51	(1.86)	8.99	(1.39)
CHYNG	2.13	(2.72)	4.14	(4.81)	3.05	(3.19)	2.88	(2.76)	4.50	(4.22)	4.64	(3.71)	4.25	(3.82)
WFAGE	29.39	(5.89)	29.42	(6.37)	28.68	(5.64)	30.59	(4.87)	31.60	(6.76)	32.40	(5.57)	29.77	(5.22)
HEDUC	8.13	(3.58)	5.86	(3.47)	5.96	(4.35)	9.37	(4.27)	6.85	(3.87)	3.00	(1.39)	12.55	(2.82)
AWAY	.39	(.49)	.33	(.47)	.34	(.47)	.29	(.45)	.41	(.49)	.00	(.00)	.43	(.50)
N[a]	321-335		318-470		857-898		383-440		845-917		372-447		303-346	

[a] Because of missing data, not all means are based on the same number of cases. This line gives the minima and maxima.

in the Philippines, Turkey, and Indonesia, but this is only because a different transformation was used in these cases.

As one might expect, the U.S. respondents had the lowest mean number of children at the time of the interview. Korean respondents also had relatively few children and had been married, on the average, from a year and a half up to as much as five years less than the other groups. They were not any younger, however: mean ages across groups were quite close, and the Korean respondents were about average. The Philippine respondents had also been married a relatively short time. As should be expected, Korean respondents were relatively old when they first gave birth, but Singapore respondents were even older. At the other end of the distribution, Indonesian and Turkish respondents had been married the longest and had had their first births at the youngest mean age. These variations are consistent with variations in age at marriage: the singulate mean is slightly higher in Korea and Singapore than in the majority of these countries and clearly lower in Indonesia and probably in Turkey than in the other countries (Smith, 1978; Henry and Piotrow, 1979).

Variation across groups in times married and child loss might also be noted. Those married more than once were 17 to 23 percent in Indonesia and 13 to 14 percent in the United States; the next closest, at 5 to 7 percent, was Turkey. Child loss, on the other hand, showed a gradient from very high in Indonesia and Turkey (36 to 39 percent) and high in the Philippines (21 to 23 percent) to moderate in Korea and Taiwan (13 to 16 percent) and low in Singapore and the United States (4 to 5 percent).

Values and Disvalues of Children

Mean scores for the value and disvalue indices are given in Table 2. Variations in the parity-specific values and disvalues were analyzed in Bulatao (1981b) and will be discussed here only when comparisons with the general indices are useful. The general indices have not been presented before and deserve some attention. Means are given for these indices by country, sex, and parity. Because each is scaled differently, inferences about the relative importance of different values cannot be drawn from these indices (e.g., economic values cannot be compared with psychosocial values). For the same reason, differences between groups on one index are not necessarily comparable to differences on another index.

For most of the survey questions that go into these general indices, variations across countries and between the sexes have been discussed elsewhere (Bulatao, 1979a); variations in the indices are consistent with the patterns for their components. To summarize briefly, the perceived economic value of children is highest in the Philippines and Indonesia, followed by Turkey, Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea; the lowest economic value is found in the United States. The value of continuing the family name is strongest in Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore, as would be expected based on Sino-Confucian cultural influences. Husbands usually give greater importance to this dimension. The gender preference value, which measures a one-sided preference for either sex but not a preference for balance, is highest in Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey (where it reflects a preference for sons); mid-range scores are noted for the Philippines, Indonesia, and the United States; the lowest scores are for Singapore; a surprising result that may reflect the government's explicit campaign to eliminate gender preference as a factor in fertility decisions (Chung et al., 1981). No systematic differences between husbands and wives are shown. The companionship value of children is highest in the two most developed countries in the study–the United States and Singapore; middle-level scores are shown for Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey; at the bottom of this scale are the Philippines and Indonesia.

Among the disvalues, financial costs of children are given greatest weight in Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia; a moderate level of concern is expressed in the United States, Taiwan, and the Philippines; low concern is shown in Turkey. Husbands are nearly always more concerned than wives about the costs of children, presumably reflecting their responsibilities as family breadwinners. The measure of restrictions on freedom shows interesting patterns. Differences between the sexes are large. Among the groups expressing the greatest feeling of constraint, all are women (Turkey, the United States, Indonesia, Taiwan), except for males in the United States; the lowest-scoring groups are all males in countries with Sino-Confucian influence (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). The higher scores for women presumably reflect their traditional childcare role. The high score for U.S. men may reflect the greater opportunities in that country for leisure activities involving couples without children. Interference with the wife's work is shown to be a relatively important disvalue in the Philippines, Turkey, and the United States; the lowest levels appear for Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

TABLE 2. Mean value and disvalue scores, by country and sex

Value or Disvalue	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.
Parity-specific														
ECO	.12	.11	-.00	-.06	.16	.09	-.23	-.21	-.09	-.12	-.01	-.08	-.48	-.47
NAM	-.07	.10	.07	.26	.11	.07	.22	.18	.46	.46	.19	.30	-.27	-.14
GPR	-.01	-.00	.29	.28	-.13	-.01	.54	.49	.35	.33	-.13	-.12	.01	.00
COM	.11	.08	.15	.13	.18	.12	.12	.11	.09	.12	.26	.28	.53	.51
SIB	-.10	-.12	-.00	-.09	-.14	-.96	.19	.15	.02	-.01	.11	.11	.30	.22
FIN	.08	.16	.14	.10	.30	.36	.64	.69	.28	.35	.50	.60	.63	.56
FRE	-.12	-.15	.07	-.04	-.09	-.15	.02	-.13	.12	-.18	.01	-.30	.17	.14
WRK	.09	.08	.08	.09	-.01	-.06	-.32	-.48	-.31	-.57	-.46	-.57	.06	-.11
General, by number of living children[a]														
ECOV	2.56	2.53	2.32	2.24	2.57	2.50	2.15	2.07	2.21	2.15	2.20	2.10	1.64	1.62
0	2.45	2.36	2.22	2.22	2.50	2.55	1.93	1.71	2.00	1.97	1.98	1.78	1.64	1.52
1	2.50	2.51	2.20	2.04	2.49	2.52	2.04	1.92	2.06	1.96	2.08	1.95	1.56	1.59
2	2.54	2.50	2.23	2.16	2.54	2.50	2.09	2.04	2.11	2.04	2.09	2.00	1.64	1.66
3	2.55	2.54	2.34	2.26	2.59	2.50	2.18	2.08	2.21	2.16	2.19	2.12	1.70	1.63
4	2.57	2.50	2.44	2.37	2.58	2.50	2.26	2.15	2.30	2.53	2.35	2.26	1.72	1.70
5+	2.62	2.61	2.53	2.43	2.62	2.48	2.35	2.28	2.35	2.30	2.43	2.35	1.77	1.77

NAMV	1.63	1.81	1.71	2.03	1.77	1.80	2.11	2.06	2.39	2.44	1.96	2.06	1.20	1.36
0	1.66	1.81	1.79	1.98	1.71	1.79	2.14	2.30	2.24	2.20	1.64	1.58	1.24	1.33
1	1.62	1.80	1.67	2.18	1.76	1.87	2.14	1.86	2.31	2.46	1.75	1.87	1.12	1.30
2	1.65	1.83	1.70	2.08	1.72	1.77	2.08	1.93	2.31	2.28	1.81	1.90	1.22	1.34
3	1.63	1.80	1.70	2.00	1.73	1.73	2.06	2.12	2.38	2.43	1.99	2.03	1.22	1.43
4	1.61	1.77	1.73	1.99	1.77	1.80	2.15	2.14	2.44	2.44	2.16	2.26	1.30	1.56
5+	1.61	1.82	1.75	1.89	1.83	1.84	2.12	2.21	2.48	2.52	2.27	2.50	1.15	1.39
GPRV	3.86	3.88	4.03	4.02	3.78	3.85	4.19	4.16	4.09	4.08	3.75	3.73	3.83	3.86
0	3.88	4.01	3.98	3.98	3.98	3.93	3.96	4.09	4.11	4.07	3.87	3.82	3.82	3.92
1	3.93	3.93	4.12	4.13	3.94	3.96	4.16	4.14	4.11	4.10	3.85	3.88	3.80	3.78
2	3.91	3.94	4.04	4.05	3.91	3.96	4.29	4.23	4.45	4.09	3.75	3.73	3.83	3.83
3	3.88	3.90	4.07	4.00	3.80	3.88	4.26	4.22	4.08	4.09	3.70	3.71	3.92	3.91
4	3.85	3.79	3.95	3.92	3.78	3.85	4.14	4.09	4.08	4.04	3.73	3.73	3.85	3.88
5+	3.76	3.84	3.95	3.98	3.61	3.74	4.04	4.04	4.08	4.07	3.67	3.58	3.79	3.88
COMV	2.96	2.89	3.21	3.01	2.80	2.84	3.19	3.18	3.12	3.09	3.30	3.29	3.59	3.52
0	3.09	2.92	3.47	3.11	2.79	2.65	3.35	3.28	3.25	3.31	3.53	3.68	3.53	3.48
1	3.01	2.92	3.35	3.11	2.73	2.83	3.23	3.24	3.24	3.18	3.47	3.44	3.55	3.50
2	3.01	2.98	3.30	3.04	2.80	2.80	3.20	3.18	3.23	3.23	3.45	3.45	3.66	3.52
3	2.98	2.93	3.15	2.98	2.79	2.82	3.21	3.19	3.16	3.13	3.34	3.40	3.58	3.55
4	2.91	2.97	3.10	3.03	2.77	2.79	3.12	3.15	3.05	3.00	3.08	3.01	3.51	3.55
5+	2.91	2.75	2.93	2.82	2.86	2.88	3.08	3.05	2.93	2.90	2.98	2.89	3.58	3.55

TABLE 2. *(continued)*

Value or Disvalue	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.	Wives	Husbs.
FIND	2.71	2.81	2.49	2.53	2.93	3.07	3.06	3.09	2.87	2.92	2.96	3.15	2.92	2.91
0	2.65	2.38	2.15	2.31	2.63	3.33	2.57	2.50	2.31	2.27	2.46	2.22	2.75	2.77
1	2.64	2.48	2.19	2.27	2.84	2.97	2.61	2.61	2.46	2.32	2.62	2.94	2.64	2.83
2	2.60	2.82	2.41	2.45	2.85	3.05	3.02	2.85	2.56	2.72	2.79	3.01	2.98	2.94
3	2.81	3.03	2.56	2.71	2.96	3.11	3.22	3.32	2.87	2.94	3.06	3.29	2.97	2.99
4	2.73	3.13	2.72	2.59	2.99	3.01	3.34	3.42	3.05	3.08	3.28	3.62	3.07	3.12
5+	2.77	2.76	2.91	2.81	3.02	3.12	3.33	3.47	3.27	3.37	3.33	3.31	3.09	2.93
FRED	2.29	2.18	2.69	2.18	2.56	2.13	2.36	1.92	2.52	1.78	2.47	1.72	2.66	2.65
0	2.16	2.09	2.72	2.39	2.38	2.07	2.35	2.33	2.62	1.61	2.66	2.01	3.11	3.11
1	2.29	2.12	2.78	2.33	2.46	2.09	2.43	2.20	2.50	1.88	2.43	1.70	2.66	2.59
2	2.30	2.18	2.64	2.11	2.52	2.08	2.41	1.91	2.55	1.86	2.47	1.75	2.61	2.62
3	2.26	2.18	2.68	2.25	2.61	2.09	2.27	1.80	2.53	1.78	2.55	1.64	2.50	2.52
4	2.26	2.16	2.64	2.10	2.65	2.18	2.29	1.76	2.50	1.71	2.46	1.74	2.38	2.12
5+	2.34	2.23	2.67	1.96	2.55	2.16	2.38	1.86	2.51	1.75	2.39	1.66	2.27	2.33
WRKD	2.91	2.93	2.69	2.91	2.82	2.77	2.59	2.47	2.55	2.34	2.51	2.42	2.91	2.75
0	2.78	2.88	2.90	2.90	2.75	2.77	2.74	2.57	2.44	2.26	2.64	2.54	3.00	2.72
1	2.90	2.85	2.92	3.02	2.77	2.72	2.67	2.54	2.49	2.30	2.69	2.50	2.97	2.75
2	2.91	2.88	2.89	2.90	2.83	2.85	2.57	2.44	2.51	2.32	2.50	2.40	2.87	2.76
3	2.94	3.00	2.87	2.86	2.79	2.77	2.58	2.47	2.57	2.36	2.51	2.44	2.85	2.77
4	2.91	2.97	2.89	2.90	2.87	2.80	2.56	2.49	2.55	2.36	2.42	2.32	2.81	2.77
5+	2.91	2.96	2.83	2.90	2.82	2.74	2.44	2.33	2.58	2.36	2.37	2.36	2.81	2.59

[a] The first line for each general value or disvalue gives the means across all parities.

Variations across parities in these general value indices require more careful attention. A straightforward interpretation would suggest that a higher rating for a value would be associated with higher fertility and a higher rating for a disvalue with lower fertility. However, this does not take into account variations in the availability of alternatives to children in providing specific values, or the clustering of particular values and disvalues and tradeoffs among them. In addition, a value or disvalue may affect preferred timing of births rather than intended parity progression. Means across parities will therefore be interpreted here as indicating the stages at which individual values and disvalues are more or less prominent, touching on their fertility impacts only indirectly.

The patterns across parities for these general value indices generally show agreement with the patterns for parity-specific values reported in Bulatao (1981b), though there are exceptions. Precise comparisons are not possible because the earlier study interpreted the patterns with regard to the specific values and disvalues that were most important at each parity, requiring comparisons among values and disvalues that are not possible here. One thing to keep in mind in reading Table 2 is that the earlier study related values to the next child, whereas the table gives values by number of living children, which is one number lower.

There is a clear trend in economic contributions (ECOV) across parities, with those having more children assigning greater importance to their economic contributions. This trend is consistent with the pattern for the parity-specific measure (Bulatao, 1981b) and with the earlier prediction that perceived economic benefits are related to high fertility preferences. There is no apparent trend in the relationship between family name and parity; in contrast to the parity-specific measure, family name (NAMV) does not stand out in relation to the first birth, except in a few cases. For gender preference (GPRV), peaks are apparent at low parities, generally at one or two children (referring, therefore, to having the second or third child); peaks for the parity-specific measure appeared more often in relation to the third and fourth child. Comparing companionship (COMV) scores across parities shows some tendency for scores to be higher at lower parities, as also shown by the parity-specific measure. This is consistent with the earlier prediction that psychosocial values would exert their influence at the early stages of family formation.

Financial costs (FIND) shows a fairly consistent increase across parity levels, as does the parity-specific measure. In most situations, there is of course a real increase in costs with each successive child, although the marginal costs tend to get smaller. The greatest difference in restrictions on freedom (FRED) was expected between no children and one child. A number of groups do show the highest concern about restrictions before the first child is born, but others show a higher level with one child; there is no clear trend beyond this parity. The data most consistent with the prediction are those for the United States (which has the largest sample of respondents with no children), where concern about restrictions declines substantially from no children to one child and continues to decline at successive parities. Restrictions on work (WRKD) does not show a consistent pattern across parities, although for some groups of women—in Korea, Singapore, and the United States—there is a definite decline. The prediction of a greater effect for this dimension early in the fertility career was not supported by either the parity-specific or the general indices.

Basic regressions for all parities combined

Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results for desire for another child and ideal family size are given in Table 3. (The reduced-form results appear in Appendix C.) For comparison, the results of logit regressions for desire for another child and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for ideal family size, in each case excluding the other measure from the set of predictors, are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The results are roughly similar across methods of estimation, though they differ in details; the 2SLS results will be discussed, with reference to the other results where appropriate.

Desire for Another Child

Desire for another child and ideal family size affect each other positively. Which effect is greater varies from case to case, but in most cases both effects are significant. The predictors of each are similar in some respects and different in others.

For the variables affecting desire for another child, the most significant effect is that of number of living children. LNLC is significant in each of the 14 regressions in Table 3; NLC is positive in each regression and significant in all but two cases. The logit results are largely similar, though a few effects are not significant. A typical case is Korean wives, for whom the coefficients for LNLC and NLC are about average. In this case, if the other variables are fixed at their means, the equation represents the proportion wanting another child as dropping from 94 percent of those with one child to 46 percent with two children to 18 percent with three, 9 percent with four, 6 percent with five, bottoming out at 5 percent with six to eight children, and rising slightly thereafter. At low and moderate parities, having an additional child makes one less likely to want to continue childbearing, but this does not hold at high parities.

Three other variables are related to the duration of the fertility career: the age of the oldest child, age at first birth, and marital duration. As expected, each of these three variables almost always has negative effects on the desire for another child. However, in both the 2SLS and logit regressions, these effects are significant only in some cases.

Of the two other experience variables, having been married more than once has significant positive effects among wives in Turkey and the United States in both the 2SLS and logit results, and also in a few other cases; having lost a child has no significant effects.

The family composition variables have various significant effects. Imbalance (LIMB) affects desire for another child positively, significantly in over half the cases, more often among wives than husbands. The proportion boys (LBOY), by contrast, has significant negative effects in Korea and Taiwan only. An unbalanced sex ratio in the family is overall a stronger predictor of the desire for another child than is a low proportion of sons.

Income and education have weak and inconsistent effects. The two significant effects for permanent income (PINC) are of opposite sign in the 2SLS results, as are the two significant effects for wife's education (WEDUC). More PINC effects are significant in the logit regressions, but all of these are inverse, contrary to the theoretical expectation. The logit results do show the effects of WEDUC to be negative with slightly greater consistency.

For the values and disvalues, the most consistent effects are for gender preference: its influence is positive and significant in the majority of cases. As expected, the other values usually affect the desire for another child positively. Few of these effects are significant, but sibling companionship does have significant effects in two cases. Of the disvalues, the only significant effects are for restrictions on freedom among U.S. wives. The logit results are roughly similar, in that

TABLE 3. Two-stage least squares regressions for desire for another child and ideal family size, by country and sex

Desire for Another Child: Wives

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	-8.98**	(1.56)	-9.85**	(.79)	-10.42**	(1.16)	-10.94**	(1.14)	-10.53**	(.74)	-13.71**	(1.13)	-9.13**	(1.24)
NLC	.87**	(.21)	1.53**	(.23)	.57*	(.19)	1.76**	(.35)	1.53**	(.22)	1.89**	(.34)	1.70**	(.44)
ROLD	-.10	(.32)	-.20	(.27)	.31	(.31)	-.36	(.32)	-1.65**	(.25)	-.25	(.38)	-.44	(.32)
AGFB	-.03	(.03)	-.07	(.04)	.00	(.04)	-.12*	(.04)	-.10**	(.02)	-.06	(.04)	.02	(.05)
MDUR	-.01	(.05)	-.07	(.04)	-.12*	(.05)	-.09	(.05)	.10*	(.04)	-.11*	(.05)	-.19*	(.06)
PREVM	.50	(.76)	1.33*	(.47)	.70*	(.32)	-.60	(1.07)	1.04	(.55)	[illegible]	(1.55)	1.19*	(.39)
CLOSS	-.11	(.30)	-.29	(.24)	-.38	(.21)	-.07	(.31)	.16	(.20)	.26	(.58)	-.09	(.56)
LBOY	.05	(.07)	-.10	(.06)	-.06	(.06)	-.22*	(.06)	-.31**	(.05)	-.10	(.07)	.00	(.06)
LIMB	.54**	(.12)	.36*	(.11)	.14	(.11)	.47**	(.10)	.45**	(.08)	.41*	(.13)	.03	(.12)
PINC	-.65	(.33)	-1.24*	(.63)	1.90	(1.01)	-.51	(.82)	.12	(.10)	-.50	(.87)	.14	(.11)
WEDUC	.11*	(.05)	.03	(.06)	-.04	(.06)	-.00	(.05)	-.02	(.03)	-.16	(.14)	-.18*	(.09)
IFS	.76*	(.23)	.60*	(.29)	1.28**	(.32)	.80**	(.21)	.75**	(.16)	.94*	(.26)	.30	(.16)
ECO	.07	(.56)	.18	(.33)	.19	(.46)	.08	(.40)	.10	(.28)	-.75	(.42)	-.58	(.61)
NAM	.08	(.24)	.23	(.16)	.41	(.24)	.46*	(.17)	-.05	(.12)	.33	(.21)	-.62*	(.24)
GPR	.97**	(.24)	.49*	(.19)	1.12**	(.22)	.35*	(.17)	.42*	(.13)	.28	(.23)	.84**	(.21)
COM	-.21	(.49)	.47	(.32)	.04	(.51)	.06	(.39)	.21	(.24)	-.77	(.46)	.52	(.51)
SIB	.68*	(.26)	.24	(.20)	.34	(.24)	.41*	(.18)	-.02	(.14)	.08	(.25)	.18	[illegible]
FIN	.15	(.19)	.02	(.16)	.03	(.18)	-.34	(.17)	.08	(.14)	-.25	(.22)	-.08	(.16)
FRE	-.12	(.19)	.07	(.17)	-.21	(.18)	.02	(.15)	-.03	(.15)	.16	(.22)	-.64*	(.21)
WRK	-.13	(.22)	.01	(.14)	.29	(.20)	-.03	(.15)	-.19	(.11)	-.05	(.20)	.02	(.17)
Constant	2.59	(2.59)	6.86*	(3.32)	-6.29	(4.76)	.77	(4.21)	1.24	(2.98)	-1.01	(5.15)	6.23*	(2.63)
R^2 (F)	.32	(30.70)	.40	(40.73)	.41	(56.12)	.47	(53.71)	.54	(109.16)	.56	(43.51)	.39	(33.01)

Desire for Another Child: Husbands

LNLC	-4.38*	(1.82)	-7.22*	(2.35)	-11.16**	(1.53)	-10.43**	(2.26)	-12.66**	(1.06)	-12.64**	(1.75)	-13.86**	(3.14)
NLC	.11	(.40)	1.41*	(.49)	.68*	(.26)	1.61*	(.65)	2.15**	(.29)	1.75*	(.58)	1.69	(1.39)
ROLD	-.98*	(.43)	-1.75*	(.77)	.03	(.34)	-.61	(.59)	-1.12**	(.29)	-.72	(.43)	-.34	(.68)
AGFB	-.03	(.06)	-.15*	(.07)	-.10	(.05)	-.08	(.08)	-.04	(.03)	-.11	(.06)	-.07	(.12)
MDUR	.04	(.05)	.08	(.09)	-.06	(.04)	.03	(.11)	.04	(.04)	-.04	(.05)	-.03	(.10)
PREVM	-1.10	(1.23)	-1.65	(1.21)	1.03*	(.44)	-1.82	(1.22)	-.85	(.67)	2.71	(1.91)	-.12	(.89)
CLOSS	.83	(.60)	.07	(.71)	-.10	(.33)	-.52	(.62)	.53	(.30)	.33	(1.05)	.57	(1.38)
LBOY	.09	(.14)	-.31	(.17)	-.10	(.10)	-.36*	(.15)	-.30**	(.07)	-.05	(.11)	-.00	(.13)
LIMB	.96*	(.26)	-.15	(.33)	-.01	(.18)	.61*	(.22)	.43*	(.12)	.17	(.20)	-.14	(.29)
PINC	.13	(.63)	1.02	(1.07)	.91	(1.37)	-1.84	(1.35)	.29*	(.14)	.58	(1.14)	.03	(.25)
WEDUC	.04	(.08)	-.10	(.14)	-.10	(.09)	-.02	(.09)	-.06	(.05)	-.42	(.22)	.06	(.17)
IFS	.42	(.26)	-.44	(.54)	1.53**	(.35)	.87*	(.41)	.74**	(.19)	.53	(.28)	.94*	(.47)
ECO	.36	(1.02)	.28	(.95)	.49	(.70)	-.80	(.84)	-.20	(.44)	.34	(.75)	1.29	(1.46)
NAM	-.13	(.51)	.42	(.47)	.66	(.36)	-.42	(.37)	-.11	(.17)	.27	(.32)	-.56	(.53)
GPR	.97	(.51)	.76	(.57)	1.48**	(.35)	.54	(.35)	.37	(.21)	.63	(.33)	1.19*	(.54)
COM	.45	(1.00)	.06	(.93)	1.02	(.70)	.26	(.82)	-.04	(.35)	.31	(.78)	.27	(1.14)
SIB	.35	(.49)	.88	(.51)	.61	(.35)	.43	(.44)	-.28	(.23)	.09	(.38)	.17	(.52)
FIN	-.14	(.44)	-.22	(.40)	.16	(.28)	-.65	(.37)	-.16	(.20)	-.13	(.32)	-.32	(.34)
FRE	.11	(.44)	.15	(.45)	-.57	(.30)	.29	(.35)	-.03	(.16)	.03	(.33)	-.29	(.40)
WRK	-.12	(.46)	-.05	(.47)	-.14	(.28)	.23	(.39)	-.09	(.16)	-.05	(.36)	-.74	(.43)
Constant	4.18	(3.75)	17.14*	(6.02)	-4.94	(5.04)	1.34	(6.61)	-.57	(3.77)	7.34	(5.79)	-1.03	(6.99)
R^2 (F)	.47	(12.42)	.37	(6.37)	.38	(24.11)	.42	(12.11)	.53	(47.16)	.55	(18.28)	.34	(7.10)

TABLE 3. *(continued)*

	Ideal Family Size: Wives													
	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	4.08**	(.40)	2.40**	(.38)	4.85**	(.42)	2.90**	(.37)	2.79**	(.23)	5.07**	(.38)	5.61**	(.49)
AGFB	.06*	(.02)	.05*	(.02)	.01	(.02)	.03	(.02)	.04*	(.01)	.01	(.02)	.02	(.04)
MDUR	-.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.03*	(.02)	.05*	(.02)	.02	(.01)	.04*	(.02)	.05	(.04)
PREVM	.02	(.59)	-.44	(.41)	-.48*	(.17)	-.79	(.69)	-.24	(.36)	-.16	(1.04)	-1.31*	(.36)
CLOSS	.52*	(.20)	.37*	(.19)	.19	(.13)	.44*	(.20)	.08	(.13)	.17	(.40)	.38	(.53)
PINC	.28	(.27)	-.44	(.53)	-.32	(.71)	-.60	(.55)	-.10	(.07)	-.23	(.60)	-.02	(.11)
WEDUC	-.10*	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	-.01	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	-.02	(.02)	.14	(.10)	.04	(.08)
URBAN	-.74*	(.21)	.54*	(.22)	-.24	(.17)	.10	(.14)	-.42**	(.11)	-.28	(.20)	-.25	(.26)
MEDIA	-.00	(.04)	-.09*	(.04)	-.04	(.03)	-.02	(.03)	-.07*	(.02)	-.05	(.05)	.04	(.08)
DAC	.22*	(.08)	.22*	(.07)	.45**	(.08)	.24**	(.05)	.18**	(.03)	.33**	(.05)	.51**	(.10)
ECOV	.12	(.30)	-.22	(.28)	-.07	(.23)	.56*	(.24)	.63*	(.18)	.58*	(.24)	-.52	(.36)
NAMV	-.05	(.21)	-.17	(.16)	-.34*	(.15)	.19	(.11)	.20*	(.07)	.07	(.11)	.37	(.26)
GPRV	-.42	(.27)	-.01	(.23)	-.65*	(.26)	.30*	(.15)	.05	(.13)	-.04	(.22)	-.73*	(.31)
COMV	-.11	(.20)	-.36*	(.18)	-.30	(.16)	.62**	(.15)	-.24*	(.11)	-.05	(.19)	.52*	(.27)
FIND	-.27*	(.10)	-.20*	(.09)	-.15*	(.07)	-.15*	(.07)	-.07	(.05)	-.03	(.09)	-.30*	(.11)
FRED	-.18	(.13)	-.14	(.11)	-.04	(.10)	.03	(.07)	-.03	(.06)	-.35*	(.10)	-.59**	(.15)
WRKD	.25	(.17)	-.02	(.14)	-.22	(.13)	.03	(.12)	-.01	(.08)	.09	(.15)	-.31	(.19)
Constant	8.46**	(2.03)	9.87**	(2.06)	12.06**	(1.91)	9.31**	(1.65)	13.51**	(1.06)	11.88**	(1.92)	13.37**	(2.38)
R^2 (F)	.26	(28.12)	.15	(12.24)	.25	(32.17)	.23	(21.14)	.32	(50.27)	.49	(37.45)	.20	(15.50)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands

LNLC	5.30**	(.83)	2.64**	(.66)	3.10**	(.80)	.98	(.93)	2.24**	(.38)	5.58**	(.79)	6.84**	(.85)
AGFB	-.03	(.05)	.02	(.04)	.04	(.03)	.08	(.05)	.01	(.02)	-.03	(.04)	.08	(.06)
MDUR	.01	(.03)	.04	(.03)	.01	(.02)	.09*	(.04)	.01	(.02)	.03	(.03)	.03	(.05)
PREVM	.18	(1.03)	-.57	(.70)	-.50*	(.23)	.21	(.84)	.11	(.45)	.15	(1.44)	.10	(.69)
CLOSS	.22	(.50)	.54	(.42)	.12	(.19)	.07	(.43)	-.20	(.22)	1.10	(.71)	-.17	(1.07)
PINC	.26	(.61)	.69	(.66)	.27	(.91)	1.02	(1.01)	.01	(.11)	-.57	(.87)	-.08	(.18)
WEDUC	-.05	(.07)	-.13	(.07)	.02	(.05)	-.04	(.06)	-.02	(.04)	.14	(.17)	-.09	(.13)
URBAN	-.50	(.49)	-.50	(.48)	-.21	(.28)	-.06	(.32)	-.57*	(.17)	-.06	(.34)	.04	(.52)
MEDIA	-.15	(.09)	.04	(.11)	-.03	(.05)	-.13	(.09)	-.10*	(.03)	-.05	(.08)	-.03	(.16)
DAC	.49*	(.14)	.26*	(.12)	.20	(.14)	.09	(.11)	.07	(.05)	.41**	(.10)	.58**	(.12)
ECOV	.54	(.72)	.78	(.55)	.80	(.41)	.66	(.47)	.97*	(.27)	.86*	(.41)	-.95	(.61)
NAMV	-.29	(.44)	.30	(.29)	.24	(.24)	.50*	(.22)	.12	(.11)	.06	(.17)	.66	(.42)
GPRV	-.83	(.56)	.51	(.47)	-.08	(.47)	.11	(.38)	.44*	(.20)	-.05	(.32)	-.38	(.56)
COMV	.09	(.48)	.00	(.38)	.02	(.23)	.18	(.31)	-.08	(.18)	.03	(.33)	.58	(.50)
FIND	.36	(.24)	-.30	(.18)	-.10	(.12)	.27	(.16)	-.14	(.08)	-.30*	(.14)	.10	(.19)
FRED	-.50	(.26)	.10	(.22)	.29*	(.14)	.10	(.18)	-.17*	(.09)	-.25	(.18)	-.09	(.24)
WRKD	.10	(.37)	-.28	(.32)	.17	(.19)	.29	(.33)	.14	(.13)	-.42	(.31)	.64	(.39)
Constant	8.45	(4.45)	2.62	(3.88)	5.50*	(2.62)	7.31*	(3.23)	12.62**	(1.61)	13.19**	(3.12)	7.37	(4.58)
R^2 (F)	.28	(6.63)	.21	(3.48)	.17	(9.19)	.15	(3.54)	.25	(16.58)	.44	(14.03)	.30	(6.91)

*t significant at .05.
**t significant at .001.

TABLE 4. Logit regressions for desire for another child, by country and sex

	Wives													
	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	-2.82**	(.69)	-5.80**	(.71)	-4.14**	(.72)	-5.14**	(1.25)	-7.94**	(1.06)	-6.89**	(1.53)	-5.04**	(.83)
NLC	.28	(.17)	.99**	(.19)	.34	(.18)	.73	(.43)	1.49**	(.30)	1.16*	(.52)	1.17**	(.26)
ROLD	-.19	(.22)	.10	(.22)	-.21	(.19)	-.24	(.28)	-1.09*	(.33)	-1.00*	(.35)	-.22	(.21)
AGFB	.01	(.02)	.01	(.03)	-.04	(.03)	-.06	(.04)	-.03	(.03)	-.12*	(.04)	.02	(.03)
MDUR	-.01	(.04)	-.11*	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	-.11*	(.05)	-.06	(.06)	-.08	(.05)	-.13*	(.04)
PREVM	.52	(.53)	.94*	(.39)	.09	(.19)	-1.44	(1.42)	1.99*	(.69)	-27.50	(.22x10^6)	.50*	(.25)
CLOSS	.29	(.19)	-.11	(.22)	-.27	(.15)	.60	(.31)	.56	(.29)	1.70*	(.80)	.01	(.39)
LBOY	.01	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	.02	(.04)	-.17*	(.05)	-.23**	(.05)	-.08	(.07)	-.00	(.04)
LIMB	.24*	(.07)	.18*	(.09)	.06	(.07)	.25*	(.09)	.24*	(.08)	.25	(.14)	-.01	(.08)
PINC	-.56*	(.23)	-1.48*	(.57)	1.06	(.70)	-1.74*	(.81)	-.24*	(.12)	-1.38	(1.04)	.13	(.08)
WEDUC	.03	(.03)	-.03	(.05)	-.06	(.04)	-.02	(.05)	-.08	(.04)	-.13	(.17)	-.13*	(.06)
ECO	-.79*	(.34)	.18	(.31)	-.72*	(.29)	.12	(.38)	.72*	(.36)	-.17	(.48)	-.78*	(.38)
NAM	-.17	(.16)	.18	(.15)	-.05	(.17)	.40*	(.16)	.03	(.17)	.70*	(.25)	-.43*	(.17)
GPR	.79**	(.19)	.62*	(.16)	.98**	(.15)	.66**	(.17)	.83**	(.17)	.67*	(.27)	.51*	(.14)
COM	-.68*	(.33)	.28	(.29)	-1.10*	(.30)	.36	(.36)	.51	(.30)	-.96	(.57)	.37	(.35)
SIB	.41*	(.19)	.29	(.15)	.34*	(.17)	.51*	(.17)	.12	(.18)	.14	(.30)	.09	(.15)
FIN	-.01	(.13)	-.12	(.13)	.13	(.12)	-.43*	(.16)	.13	(.18)	-.12	(.27)	-.07	(.10)
FRE	-.18	(.13)	-.10	(.14)	-.13	(.13)	.06	(.15)	.07	(.19)	-.24	(.24)	-.53**	(.12)
WRK	-.02	(.15)	-.03	(.13)	.01	(.13)	.03	(.14)	-.23	(.14)	.13	(.23)	-.04	(.11)
Constant	2.92*	(.75)	5.08**	(1.27)	4.06*	(1.44)	7.87**	(1.59)	8.12**	(1.02)	10.99**	(2.00)	2.48*	(.95)
LR (df)	452.47	(19)	509.26	(19)	885.27	(19)	636.24	(19)	1069.58	(19)	464.88	(19)	437.90	(19)

	Husbands													
LNLC	-.79	(1.63)	-6.07*	(2.00)	-3.31*	(1.15)	-6.11*	(2.11)	-8.66**	(1.89)	-5.34*	(2.28)	-9.49**	(1.63)
NLC	-.33	(.46)	.85	(.50)	.06	(.30)	.87	(.66)	1.67*	(.58)	.48	(.78)	2.20**	(.46)
ROLD	-.62	(.33)	-1.03*	(.42)	-.38	(.21)	-.70	(.42)	-.98*	(.43)	-.98*	(.41)	.27	(.35)
AGFB	-.03	(.05)	-.17*	(.07)	-.07*	(.03)	.04	(.07)	.02	(.04)	-.09	(.05)	.06	(.05)
MDUR	.03	(.04)	.02	(.06)	-.02	(.03)	.10	(.08)	-.07	(.08)	-.04	(.06)	-.12*	(.06)
PREVM	-1.34	(1.41)	-1.17	(1.05)	.14	(.26)	-2.48	(1.47)	.30	(1.36)	3.57*	(1.63)	.16	(.56)
CLOSS	.96*	(.46)	-.36	(.61)	.08	(.22)	-.20	(.68)	.86	(.46)	1.91*	(.97)	.63	(.82)
LBOY	.09	(.10)	-.27*	(.13)	-.02	(.06)	-.18	(.11)	-.19*	(.07)	-.02	(.10)	-.02	(.08)
LIMB	.47*	(.16)	-.17	(.23)	.10	(.10)	.44*	(.18)	.07	(.12)	.06	(.18)	-.23	(.17)
PINC	.14	(.51)	.94	(.79)	.41	(.87)	-2.32	(1.29)	-.04	(.17)	1.74	(1.21)	-.13	(.13)
WEDUC	-.01	(.06)	-.05	(.10)	-.09	(.06)	-.06	(.08)	-.08	(.07)	-.65*	(.25)	-.03	(.10)
ECO	-.25	(.78)	-.24	(.80)	-.18	(.44)	-.80	(.74)	.52	(.56)	1.65*	(.76)	-.29	(.68)
NAM	-.14	(.42)	.36	(.39)	.28	(.24)	-.29	(.34)	-.21	(.24)	.44	(.34)	-.37	(.33)
GPR	.75	(.40)	.58	(.43)	1.03**	(.23)	.78*	(.32)	1.18**	(.27)	1.02*	(.36)	1.03*	(.32)
COM	.16	(.75)	-.48	(.79)	-.29	(.42)	-.33	(.74)	.35	(.44)	.95	(.83)	.77	(.66)
SIB	.28	(.38)	.90*	(.40)	.22	(.22)	.04	(.35)	.13	(.26)	.54	(.41)	.33	(.30)
FIN	.03	(.35)	.11	(.35)	-.21	(.16)	-.57	(.32)	-.24	(.27)	-.31	(.33)	-.28	(.21)
FRE	.05	(.31)	.15	(.38)	.05	(.17)	.22	(.34)	-.28	(.21)	-.04	(.33)	-.40	(.24)
WRK	-.33	(.32)	.01	(.40)	-.04	(.18)	.38	(.35)	.02	(.23)	.04	(.37)	-.17	(.23)
Constant	2.47	(1.52)	7.40*	(2.24)	5.85*	(1.75)	7.59*	(2.67)	6.35**	(1.39)	7.93*	(2.14)	4.16*	(1.85)
LR (df)	151.27	(19)	125.37	(19)	427.37.	(19)	186.15	(19)	468.48	(19)	206.08	(19)	121.57	(19)

*Likelihood ratio (LR) significant at .05.
**Likelihood ratio (LR) significant at .001.

TABLE 5. OLS regressions for ideal family size, by country and sex

	Wives													
	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	3.14**	(.24)	1.45**	(.26)	2.68**	(.16)	1.53**	(.24)	1.85**	(.16)	3.34**	(.27)	3.89**	(.36)
AGFB	.07*	(.02)	.04	(.02)	.00	(.02)	.01	(.02)	.03*	(.01)	-.03	(.02)	.04	(.04)
MDUR	-.02	(.02)	.00	(.02)	.00	(.01)	.03	(.02)	-.01	(.01)	-.00	(.02)	-.10*	(.03)
PREVM	.35	(.61)	.10	(.42)	-.42*	(.17)	-1.02	(.72)	.11	(.36)	-.43	(1.08)	-.71*	(.36)
CLOSS	.56*	(.21)	.25	(.19)	.05	(.13)	.53*	(.20)	.17	(.13)	.59	(.41)	.32	(.55)
PINC	.13	(.28)	-.86	(.53)	.98	(.67)	-.84	(.57)	-.14	(.07)	-.80	(.62)	.05	(.12)
WEDUC	-.08*	(.04)	-.06	(.04)	-.07	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	-.02	(.02)	.17	(.10)	-.04	(.09)
URBAN	-.82*	(.22)	.55*	(.23)	-.35*	(.17)	-.06	(.14)	-.48**	(.11)	-.42*	(.21)	-.07	(.27)
MEDIA	-.02	(.05)	-.09*	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	-.05	(.04)	-.08**	(.02)	-.12*	(.05)	.02	(.09)
ECOV	.23	(.31)	-.10	(.29)	.28	(.22)	.62*	(.25)	.74**	(.18)	.79*	(.25)	-.72	(.38)
NAMV	.00	(.22)	-.05	(.16)	-.41*	(.15)	.39*	(.10)	.23*	(.07)	.22	(.11)	-.02	(.26)
GPRV	.04	(.22)	.27	(.22)	.55*	(.15)	.51*	(.15)	.32*	(.12)	.47*	(.22)	-.02	(.29)
COMV	-.06	(.21)	-.36	(.19)	-.29	(.16)	.65**	(.16)	-.20	(.11)	-.09	(.20)	.58*	(.28)
FIND	-.31*	(.10)	-.25*	(.09)	-.15*	(.07)	-.22*	(.07)	-.08	(.05)	-.09	(.09)	-.31*	(.11)
FRED	-.28*	(.13)	-.17	(.12)	-.04	(.10)	.05	(.08)	-.02	(.06)	-.48**	(.10)	-1.00**	(.14)
WRKD	.24	(.18)	-.06	(.15)	-.26*	(.13)	.02	(.12)	-.05	(.09)	.08	(.15)	-.27	(.20)
Constant	8.75**	(2.13)	11.52**	(2.11)	9.91**	(1.88)	11.69**	(1.62)	14.49**	(1.09)	15.23**	(1.93)	17.27**	(2.39)
R^2 (F)	.24	(26.52)	.13	(11.54)	.24	(31.82)	.20	(19.76)	.29	(47.86)	.45	(34.07)	.17	(13.35)

	Husbands													
LNLC	2.91**	(.46)	1.37**	(.45)	1.97**	(.24)	.31	(.51)	2.09**	(.28)	2.67**	(.42)	3.81**	(.62)
AGFB	-.03	(.05)	-.02	(.03)	.01	(.03)	.06	(.04)	.01	(.03)	-.07*	(.03)	.06	(.06)
MDUR	-.01	(.04)	.00	(.03)	-.01	(.02)	.10*	(.04)	-.01	(.02)	-.00	(.03)	.00	(.04)
PREVM	-.18	(1.06)	-.50	(.72)	-.42	(.25)	.09	(.83)	.12	(.50)	2.43	(1.34)	-.12	(.69)
CLOSS	.55	(.49)	.14	(.40)	.07	(.20)	.10	(.42)	.08	(.25)	2.08*	(.67)	-.04	(1.09)
PINC	.53	(.62)	.66	(.67)	.44	(.96)	.97	(.99)	-.08	(.13)	.06	(.87)	-.17	(.17)
WEDUC	-.05	(.07)	-.13	(.07)	-.01	(.06)	-.06	(.06)	-.01	(.04)	-.08	(.17)	-.12	(.14)
URBAN	-.76	(.50)	.25	(.49)	-.34	(.28)	-.15	(.30)	-.55*	(.19)	.11	(.34)	.83	(.50)
MEDIA	-.18	(.10)	-.19	(.10)	-.02	(.05)	-.12	(.09)	-.11*	(.04)	-.01	(.08)	-.04	(.16)
ECOV	1.28	(.72)	.48	(.55)	1.11*	(.35)	.56	(.45)	1.11*	(.29)	1.40*	(.39)	-1.47*	(.61)
NAMV	-.17	(.46)	.53	(.28)	.35	(.23)	.53*	(.21)	.11	(.12)	.10	(.18)	.45	(.42)
GPRV	.35	(.47)	.68	(.45)	.43	(.25)	.27	(.34)	.47*	(.21)	.34	(.30)	.08	(.54)
COMV	.27	(.49)	-.00	(.37)	.13	(.24)	.24	(.30)	-.08	(.20)	-.25	(.32)	.52	(.50)
FIND	.05	(.23)	-.23	(.18)	-.19	(.11)	.23	(.15)	-.20*	(.09)	-.34*	(.14)	-.03	(.19)
FRED	-.46	(.27)	-.14	(.22)	.30*	(.15)	.16	(.17)	-.13	(.10)	-.41*	(.18)	-.39	(.23)
WRKD	-.15	(.38)	-.37	(.31)	.18	(.20)	.33	(.32)	.18	(.15)	-.46	(.31)	.35	(.39)
Constant	7.26	(4.57)	7.57*	(3.61)	5.25*	(2.62)	8.24*	(3.11)	13.22**	(1.79)	17.03**	(2.98)	15.64*	(4.44)
R^2(F)	.25	(5.91)	.11	(2.82)	.13	(7.63)	.14	(3.70)	.23	(16.30)	.41	(13.30)	.24	(5.47)

*t significant at .05.
**t significant at .001.

gender preference again has the most significant effects. Economic contributions of children does have a few more significant effects, but they are generally negative.

Ideal Family Size

Whereas desire for another child decreases with number of living children, ideal family size increases significantly with the log (LNLC) in every case but one. Adding a linear term (NLC) does not improve the prediction; the OLS results are similar. As previously observed, ideal family size rises with number of children, but not sufficiently to cover all the children in a large family.

Somewhat contrary to expectations, age at first birth has significant positive effects in a few cases; marital duration also has positive effects, again significant in a few cases.

Having been married more than once has some negative effects on ideal family size, significant for Indonesian and U.S. wives, contrasting with its occasional positive effects on desire for another child. Having lost a child has a positive effect on ideal family size, significant in a few cases (especially for Philippine and Korean wives); this contrasts with the absence of consistent effects on desire for another child.

Income and education have inconsistent and weak effects. Generally, PINC is positively related to ideal family size among wives, but the relationship is more often negative among husbands. The patterns are weakly consistent, with a more positive effect at lower levels of development and a more negative effect at higher levels. The effects of wife's education are predominantly negative, but they are significant only among Philippine wives. Urban residence and media exposure both generally depress ideal family size; these effects are significant in a few cases.

The values and disvalues of children have a more complex pattern of effects on ideal family size than on desire for another child. Economic contributions has significant positive effects in several regressions, especially in Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea. The other three values, including gender preference, are variable in their effects. Among the disvalues, financial costs is fairly consistently related to lower ideal family size, the effects being frequently significant among wives. Restrictions on freedom has significant negative effects among U.S. and Singapore wives; among husbands the effects are less consistent, being negative in Taiwan but positive in Indonesia. Restrictions on work, finally, has no significant effects and variable sign.

Regressions results with changes in predictors

This section examines the results obtained by replacing some measures in the previous regressions with measures of other variables. Given the weak and inconsistent results for permanent income, the current income measure (CINC) was tried in its place. However, as Table 6 shows, the results with CINC (when it was included with all the other predictors in Table 3) were also mostly insignificant, with inconsistent signs across groups. On ideal family size, CINC does not show the tendency noted for PINC of being more negative at higher levels of development. Replacing PINC with CINC also did not improve the results for wife's education.

Another substitute variable was wife's age (WFAGE), tried in place of marriage duration. In the same regressions (which also included the predictors from Table 3), three additional variables were added: the age of the youngest child (CHYNG), husband's education (HEDUC), and whether the wife was working away from the home (AWAY). The results for these specific variables only are presented in Table 7. The pattern of effects for WFAGE is roughly similar to that for marriage duration. It has a few significant effects: for desire for another child, there are some positive and negative effects; for ideal family size, positive effects, generally small, predominate. The other three variables added show inconsistent effects across countries, few of which are significant. None of the alternate or additional variables tested appears to significantly improve prediction of fertility intentions.

Regressions by subgroup

To determine the stability of the regression results, additional 2SLS regressions were run for subgroups. These were urban and rural residents for most country-sex groups. Given the special design of the Indonesian sample, the Indonesian subgroups were Javanese and Sundanese (this particular Javanese sample was less educated and poorer than the Sundanese sample [Darroch et al., 1981]); the subgroups for Singapore, which is essentially all urban, were ethnic Chinese and ethnic Malay.

The results for these subgroup regressions largely parallel those in Table 3. A majority of the significant effects in Table 3 are still significant in these regressions, or are of roughly the same magnitude but not significant because of smaller sample sizes. Table 8 provides only those results in which the coefficients for subgroups diverged from

TABLE 6. Effects of current household income and wife's education in 2SLS regressions for desire for another child and ideal family size, by country and sex

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives													
CINC	-.17	(.16)	-.16	(.19)	.22	(.40)	.06	(.29)	.07	(.05)	-.18	(.40)	-.04	(.04)
WEDUC	.06	(.04)	-.04	(.05)	.03	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	-.01	(.03)	-.21	(.12)	-.06	(.06)
R^2 (F)	.31	(31.21)	.41	(41.08)	.45	(67.86)	.45	(55.74)	.56	(102.93)	.54	(34.86)	.39	(34.95)
	Desire for Another Child: Husbands													
CINC	.24	(.34)	.27	(.44)	1.97*	(.74)	1.14	(.77)	.19*	(.07)	-.04	(.59)	-.09	(.08)
WEDUC	.07	(.08)	-.04	(.09)	-.13*	(.06)	-.14*	(.06)	-.03	(.04)	-.33	(.18)	.13	(.17)
R^2 (F)	.46	(11.88)	.47	(9.93)	.35	(21.49)	.39	(12.71)	.53	(45.32)	.55	(16.74)	.36	(8.09)

	Ideal Family Size: Wives													
CINC	-.03	(.12)	-.06	(.17)	.14	(.28)	-.12	(.20)	-.05	(.03)	.10	(.27)	.03	(.04)
WEDUC	-.07*	(.03)	-.07*	(.03)	-.01	(.03)	-.06*	(.02)	-.04*	(.02)	.10	(.10)	.01	(.06)
R^2 (F)	.26	(28.40)	.15	(11.90)	.25	(32.50)	.21	(20.91)	.32	(44.48)	.47	(30.82)	.21	(17.12)
	Ideal Family Size: Husbands													
CINC	.08	(.30)	-.25	(.39)	-.82	(.47)	-1.04*	(.43)	-.06	(.05)	-.03	(.46)	.05	(.07)
WEDUC	-.09	(.06)	-.11	(.06)	.05	(.04)	.05	(.05)	-.01	(.03)	.10	(.14)	-.17	(.10)
R^2 (F)	.28	(6.50)	.24	(4.25)	.17	(9.48)	.17	(4.81)	.25	(15.70)	.43	(12.53)	.29	(7.17)

*t significant at .05.

**t significant at .001.

Note: All other variables in Table 3 are controlled, except permanent income (PINC).

TABLE 7. Effects of additional predictors in 2SLS regressions for desire for another child and ideal family size, by country and sex

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
Desire for Another Child: Wives														
WFAGE	-.09	(.11)	.02	(.06)	-.41**	(.09)	.16	(.11)	.33**	(.06)	-.18	(.18)	-.09	(.11)
CHYNG	.04	(.06)	-.06	(.04)	-.10	(.06)	-.09	(.06)	-.06	(.04)	.02	(.05)	.05	(.05)
HEDUC	.04	(.04)	.03	(.04)	-.04	(.05)	.05	(.05)	-.00	(.03)	.04	(.16)	-.02	(.07)
AWAY	.26	(.23)	.31	(.23)	.16	(.22)	.12	(.22)	.06	(.14)	--	--	-.21	(.27)
R^2 (F)	.32	(27.12)	.42	(39.19)	.42	(50.73)	.47	(46.88)	.55	(97.42)	.56	(38.73)	.39	(27.98)
Desire for Another Child: Husbands														
WFAGE	-.22	(.23)	.41*	(.16)	-.09	(.11)	.04	(.30)	.39**	(.10)	.07	(.23)	-.09	(.25)
CHYNG	.02	(.13)	-.08	(.09)	-.04	(.08)	-.04	(.14)	-.09	(.06)	-.10	(.08)	.11	(.17)
HEDUC	.04	(.09)	.08	(.11)	-.08	(.08)	.04	(.10)	-.01	(.04)	-.13	(.21)	-.11	(.14)
AWAY	.57	(.45)	-.04	(.57)	.39	(.34)	-.86	(.46)	.07	(.20)	--	--	.09	(.63)
R^2 (F)	.47	(10.97)	.43	(7.19)	.39	(21.89)	.41	(10.35)	.54	(42.98)	.55	(16.64)	.36	(6.61)

	Ideal Family Size: Wives													
WFAGE	-.01	(.03)	-.02	(.03)	.05*	(.02)	.02	(.03)	.00	(.02)	.03	(.03)	.13*	(.05)
CHYNG	-.06	(.04)	.08*	(.03)	-.07*	(.03)	.04	(.04)	.03	(.02)	-.01	(.04)	-.11*	(.05)
HEDUC	-.04	(.03)	-.06	(.03)	.01	(.03)	-.02	(.03)	-.03	(.02)	.05	(.11)	.06	(.06)
AWAY	-.13	(.17)	.44*	(.20)	.03	(.13)	.01	(.15)	-.09	(.09)	--	--	-.13	(.25)
R^2 (F)	.26	(23.99)	.15	(11.20)	.27	(30.67)	.22	(17.70)	.32	(43.31)	.49	(33.58)	.21	(13.69)
	Ideal Family Size: Husbands													
WFAGE	.12	(.08)	.00	(.06)	.00	(.03)	.10	(.08)	.02	(.03)	.01	(.06)	.20*	(.08)
CHYNG	-.07	(.11)	-.01	(.06)	-.04	(.04)	-.04	(.10)	-.02	(.04)	.05	(.06)	-.18	(.09)
HEDUC	-.04	(.08)	.01	(.08)	-.01	(.05)	.01	(.07)	.02	(.03)	.11	(.15)	.09	(.11)
AWAY	-.11	(.41)	.16	(.38)	-.20	(.20)	.11	(.33)	.08	(.15)	--	--	-.22	(.45)
R^2 (F)	.28	(5.52)	.20	(2.77)	.17	(8.17)	.14	(2.86)	.26	(14.43)	.44	(12.53)	.32	(6.46)

*t significant at .05.
**t significant at .001.
Note: All other variables in Table 3 are controlled, except marriage duration (MDUR).

those in Table 3: either the combined results (in Table 3) are significant, while the results for at least one subgroup are not significant and at least one standard error greater or less than the combined results; or the combined results are not significant, and the results for at least one subgroup are significant. These particular subgroup differences in Table 8 will now be discussed, first as regards the prediction of desire for another child and then as regards the prediction of ideal family size.

Desire for Another Child

Although the effects of number of living children (LNLC and NLC) on desire for another child are weaker for a couple of rural subgroups and for Singapore Malay wives, even in these cases the effects are in the same direction. The strong influence of number of living children is essentially confirmed.

The next three variables (ROLD, AGFB, and MDUR), which reflect the duration of the fertility career, were shown to have generally negative effects on desire for another child in Table 3, though few of the effects were significant. The subgroup results support this finding. A few of the significant results apply to only one or the other subgroup, but in most cases the effects of each variable are still negative. The notable exception is a significant positive effect of MDUR among Taiwan rural wives.

For having been married more than once (PREVM), one reversal of results is important: for Indonesian wives as well as husbands, the combined results are significantly positive, but the subgroup results are uniformly negative. The last experience variable, child loss, does have two significant effects in the subgroup regressions (there were none in Table 3), but in opposite directions.

The effects of gender composition (LBOY and LIMB) are generally consistent across subgroups, being slightly weaker only in the few cases shown in Table 8. The effects of LIMB seem to be weaker among rural (or Malay) respondents in the table, but this generalization does not hold across the other cases not shown.

As in the combined regressions, the effects of income and education are inconsistent for a few subgroups, where they may have opposite signs.

Results for the effects of ideal family size (which is endogenous in this system) on desire for another child indicate somewhat more diver-

TABLE 8. Differences between subgroup 2SLS regressions for desire for another child and ideal family size, by country and sex

Variable and Group	Desire for Another Child					
	Combined		Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a]		Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a]	
	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC						
Singapore, Wives	-13.71**	(1.13)	-14.04**	(1.17)	-5.50	(4.32)
Turkey, Husbands	-7.22*	(2.35)	-8.09*	(2.60)	-3.26	(4.61)
Korea, Husbands	-10.43**	(2.26)	-13.44**	(2.58)	-5.23	(4.79)
NLC						
Turkey, Wives	1.53**	(.23)	1.71**	(.26)	.54	(.50)
Singapore, Wives	1.89**	(.34)	2.09**	(.42)	1.14	(.85)
Turkey, Husbands	1.41**	(.49)	1.17*	(.45)	.36	(1.22)
ROLD						
Korea, Wives	-.36	(.32)	-.89*	(.38)	.14	(.57)
Philippines, Husbands	-.98*	(.43)	-.50	(1.82)	-.91	(.47)
Taiwan, Husbands	-1.12**	(.29)	-.66	(.49)	-1.51**	(.37)
AGFB						
Turkey, Wives	-.07	(.04)	-.08*	(.04)	-.02	(.12)
Korea, Wives	-.12*	(.04)	-.19**	(.05)	-.00	(.07)
Taiwan, Husbands	-.15*	(.07)	-.12	(.07)	-.26	(.17)
MDUR						
Indonesia, Wives	-.12*	(.05)	-.17*	(.08)	-.06	(.05)
Korea, Wives	-.09	(.05)	-.00	(.06)	-.20*	(.09)
Turkey, Wives	-.10**	(.04)	.02	(.05)	.22**	(.06)
PREVM						
Indonesia, Wives	.70*	(.32)	-.66	(.52)	-.77*	(.36)
United States, Wives	1.19*	(.39)	1.16	(.44)	.79	(.90)
Indonesia, Husbands	1.03*	(.44)	-.76	(.55)	-.68	(.52)
CLOSS						
Indonesia, Wives	-.38	(.21)	.02	(.32)	-.83*	(.27)
United States, Wives	-.09	(.56)	-.79	(.63)	3.52*	(1.43)

TABLE 8. *(continued)*

Variable and Group	Combined		Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a]		Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a]	
	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LBOY						
Turkey, Wives	-.10	(.06)	-.13*	(.06)	.11	(.17)
Korea, Wives	-.22*	(.06)	-.12	(.08)	-.39*	(.11)
LIMB						
Singapore, Wives	.41*	(.13)	.57**	(.14)	.13	(.48)
Philippines, Husbands	.96*	(.26)	1.25	(.67)	.86*	(.30)
Taiwan, Husbands	.43*	(.12)	.56*	(.19)	.14	(.17)
PINC						
Turkey, Wives	-1.24*	(.63)	-1.36	(.78)	1.02	(1.88)
Indonesia, Wives	1.90	(1.01)	2.99*	(1.51)	-.35	(1.48)
Taiwan, Husbands	.29*	(.14)	.43	(.23)	-.13	(.19)
WEDUC						
Singapore, Husbands	.06	(.17)	-.48*	(.23)	-.29	(.86)
IFS						
Korea, Wives	.80**	(.21)	.36	(.28)	.99**	(.24)
Singapore, Wives	.94*	(.26)	.98*	(.27)	-.17	(.45)
United States, Wives	.30	(.16)	.40*	(.15)	-.08	(.36)
Turkey, Husbands	-.44	(.54)	.15	(.43)	.53*	(.24)
Taiwan, Husbands	.74**	(.19)	.93*	(.37)	.40	(.24)
United States, Husbands	.94*	(.47)	.27	(.30)	.26	(.23)
NAM						
Singapore, Wives	.33	(.21)	.47*	(.23)	-1.18	(.75)
Indonesia, Husbands	.66	(.36)	-.18	(.50)	1.49*	(.48)
GPR						
Philippines, Wives	.97**	(.24)	-.10	(.57)	1.25**	(.28)
Turkey, Wives	.49*	(.19)	.45	(.21)	.72	(.51)
Indonesia, Wives	1.12**	(.22)	.35	(.39)	1.62**	(.26)
Philippines, Husbands	.97	(.51)	.61	(1.38)	1.19*	(.58)
COM						
Singapore, Wives	.77	(.46)	-.30	(.50)	-5.76*	(1.88)

TABLE 8. *(continued)*

Variable and Group	Combined		Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a]		Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a]	
	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
SIB						
Korea, Wives	.41*	(.18)	.11	(.22)	1.03*	(.32)
Turkey, Husbands	.88	(.51)	1.21*	(.44)	-.75	(1.15)
FIN						
Turkey, Husbands	-.22	(.40)	-.43	(.38)	1.51*	(.67)
Korea, Husbands	-.65	(.37)	-.06	(.39)	-2.12*	(.85)
WRK						
Taiwan, Wives	-.19	(.11)	-.02	(.15)	-.36*	(.16)
	Ideal Family Size					
LNLC						
Turkey, Wives	2.40**	(.38)	2.62**	(.41)	.95	(.76)
Korea, Husbands	.98	(.93)	3.27*	(1.22)	-.45	(1.34)
AGFB						
Turkey, Wives	.05**	(.02)	.06*	(.02)	.09	(.07)
MDUR						
Turkey, Wives	.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.14*	(.05)
Korea, Wives	.05*	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.10*	(.03)
Taiwan, Wives	.02	(.01)	.00	(.01)	.03*	(.01)
Singapore, Wives	.04*	(.02)	.04*	(.02)	.07	(.06)
United States, Wives	.05	(.04)	.02	(.05)	.16*	(.08)
Korea, Husbands	.09*	(.04)	-.01	(.05)	.22*	(.08)
PREVM						
Indonesia, Wives	-.48*	(.17)	.61*	(.22)	.56	(.29)
Indonesia, Husbands	-.50*	(.23)	.57	(.33)	.30	(.33)
CLOSS						
Turkey, Wives	.37*	(.19)	.11	(.21)	1.09*	(.46)
Indonesia, Wives	.19	(.13)	.04	(.18)	.48*	(.23)

TABLE 8. *(continued)*

Variable and Group	Combined B	(S.E.)	Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a] B	(S.E.)	Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a] B	(S.E.)
PINC						
Turkey, Husbands	.69	(.66)	-.04	(.73)	4.79*	(1.81)
Singapore, Husbands	-.57	(.87)	-.95	(.98)	6.62*	(2.57)
WEDUC						
Philippines, Wives	-.10*	(.04)	-.04	(.07)	-.11*	(.04)
Turkey, Husbands	-.13	(.07)	-.07	(.08)	-.73*	(.29)
URBAN						
Singapore, Wives	-.28	(.20)	-.57*	(.20)	.60	(.81)
DAC						
Philippines, Wives	.22*	(.08)	.11	(.11)	.33*	(.09)
Indonesia, Husbands	.20	(.14)	.27*	(.12)	.29	(.20)
Korea, Husbands	.09	(.11)	.26*	(.13)	.16	(.16)
Singapore, Husbands	.41**	(.10)	.40*	(.11)	.04	(.18)
ECOV						
Singapore, Wives	.58*	(.24)	.20	(.25)	1.01	(.107)
NAMV						
Taiwan, Wives	.20*	(.07)	.09	(.09)	.31*	(.10)
Korea, Husbands	.50*	(.22)	.58*	(.25)	.27	(.44)
United States, Husbands	.66	(.42)	1.35*	(.52)	-.25	(.86)
GPRV						
Philippines, Wives	-.42	(.27)	-.22	(.49)	-.75*	(.31)
Indonesia, Wives	-.65*	(.26)	.16	(.28)	-1.53*	(.45)
COMV						
Turkey, Wives	-.36*	(.18)	-.44*	(.19)	.17	(.47)
Indonesia, Wives	-.30	(.16)	-.50*	(.21)	-.06	(.25)
United States, Husbands	.58	(.50)	.28	(.55)	2.85*	(1.16)

TABLE 8. *(continued)*

Variable and Group	Combined B	Combined (S.E.)	Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a] B	Urban, Sundanese, or Chinese[a] (S.E.)	Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a] B	Rural, Javanese, or Malay[a] (S.E.)
FIND						
Turkey, Wives	-.20*	(.09)	-.25*	(.10)	.15	(.23)
Indonesia, Wives	-.15*	(.07)	-.06	(.10)	-.20	(.11)
Philippines, Husbands	.36	(.24)	2.15*	(.91)	.16	(.24)
Singapore, Husbands	-.30*	(.14)	-.22	(.17)	.33	(.60)
FRED						
Philippines, Wives	-.18	(.13)	-.70*	(.26)	-.04	(.14)
Singapore, Wives	-.35*	(.10)	-.14	(.11)	-.30	(.35)
United States, Wives	-.59**	(.15)	-.87**	(.19)	.17	(.26)
Singapore, Husbands	-.25	(.18)	.01	(.20)	-1.25*	(.52)
WRKD						
United States, Husbands	.64	(.39)	-.03	(.46)	2.11*	(.79)

Note: This table gives coefficients only for those cases where the subgroup results differ from the combined results in either of two ways: either the combined results are significant and the results for at least one subgroup are nonsignificant and at least one standard deviation away from the combined results, or the combined results are not significant and either of the subgroup results are significant.

*t significant at .05.
**t significant at .001.

[a] The Indonesian subgroups are Sundanese and Javanese; the Singapore subgroups are Chinese and Malay; subgroups in all the other cases are urban and rural.

gence between subgroups than exists for other variables. There are two cases where the coefficient is negative, though negligible; on the other hand, in the only case where the combined coefficient is negative, both subgroup coefficients are positive and one of them is significant. Thus the subgroup results indicate variability in the strength of these effects, but confirm that they are positive.

Like the results for other variables, the subgroup results for values and disvalues are generally consistent with the combined results, though there are exceptions. For family name, for instance, Table 3 shows one significant positive and one significant negative result. Table 8 is consistent in showing that the sign for this variable is sometimes negative and sometimes positive, though the two significant effects shown are both positive. The results for gender preference do require further comment. Table 8 suggests a slight tendency for the impact of this variable to be more strongly positive among rural residents, though it is also generally positive for urban residents. However, the other cases not shown are evenly divided between those where the effects are greater for urban residents and those where the effects are greater for rural residents, and the differences are typically small.

Ideal Family Size

For ideal family size, the regression results are also generally similar between subgroups. Table 8 notes the exceptions. It shows only two cases where the effects of number of living children (LNLC) are appreciably weaker than in the combined regressions. It also shows one case where the effects of age at first birth (AGFB) differ, not being significant for one subgroup only because of a smaller sample size.

There is greater variation in the effects of marriage duration (MDUR), which are significantly positive for several rural subgroups despite the combined nonsignificant results. There is some tendency for these effects to be stronger among rural residents (but not in the Philippines), Indonesian Javanese, and Singapore Malays.

As was the case in the prediction of desire for another child, having been married more than once has unexpected results for the Indonesian subgroups, among wives as well as husbands: whereas the combined results are negative and significant, all the subgroup results are positive, and one is significant.

For child loss, two subgroup differences are noted in Table 8: this variable has greater impact among rural than urban Turkish wives and among Javanese than Sundanese Indonesian wives. This impact is also more strongly positive among rural than urban Philippine wives and among rural than urban Turkish husbands, though in neither case did the differences meet the criteria for inclusion in the table.

For the income and education measures, the cases listed in Table 8 suggest that both variables may have more consistent results among rural than urban residents. For a couple of other cases not listed, the effects of PINC are more strongly positive and the effects of WEDUC more strongly negative among rural than urban residents; however, this is true overall in fewer than half the comparisons.

Urban residence was used only in the subgroup regressions for Indonesia and Singapore, where one instance of differential effects is noted. For media exposure, no differential effects are noted.

Desire for another child shows stronger or more significant effects in some subgroups and weaker effects in others, but the coefficients are consistently positive.

The four general value indices show some differences in effects between subgroups, but not consistent ones. The effects of economic contributions (ECOV) essentially do not vary. The other values have scattered effects in the combined regressions; subgroup differences are similarly scattered and do not indicate any consistent pattern.

For the three disvalues, some patterns do appear. Financial costs (FIND), which generally had negative effects in the combined regressions, has slightly stronger negative effects among urban than rural residents where wives are concerned; only Singapore and the United States are exceptions. However, among husbands this generalization does not hold. In the combined regressions, FRED was important in reducing ideal family size mainly in Singapore and the United States; it seems to be more important among Singapore Malays than Chinese and among U.S. urban than rural residents. Work restrictions (WRKD), not significant in any of the combined regressions, significantly increased ideal family size among U.S. rural husbands.

In summary, the subgroup regressions suggest few consistent differentials between groups across countries. This may be partly due to differences in the way subgroups are defined, in some cases by residence and in others by ethnic affiliation; even where residence is the criterion, there are variations in the definition of urban and rural areas that could make consistent results difficult to obtain. The results have been interpreted with a view to identifying cross-national variations. It is also possible to interpret the results for each country individually in relation to country-specific circumstances, but this is not attempted here.

The subgroup regressions largely reinforce the combined results. Of the variations from these results, the following may be highlighted: (1) the reversal of the impact of having a previous marriage in Indonesia; (2) the variability in the strength of the influence of ideal family size on desire for another child, though this influence is consistently positive; (3) a slightly stronger link between marriage duration and ideal family size among rural than urban residents; and (4) a somewhat stronger negative impact of perceived financial costs on ideal family size among urban than rural wives (but somewhat more consistent results for income and education among a few rural subgroups).

Regressions to predict recent childbearing

The regression results for desire for another child may also be compared with results from regressions to predict recent childbearing. The important predictors should be similar since desire for another child is in theory a major reason for having one. However, results should not be expected to be identical: recent fertility also involves such supply factors as a couple's fecundity and their use of fertility-regulation methods, including method availability and cost, that usually do not enter into the determination of fertility desires (McClelland, 1983). In addition, of course, recent fertility reflects conditions in an earlier period during which the structure of incentives and disincentives for childbearing may have been different.

The measure of recent fertility used was whether a child had been born within the two years preceding the interview. As noted earlier, only live births were counted, and children who had died since birth could not be included. This introduces possible biases, but different ones from those involved in the analysis of fertility intentions, and may therefore make the results less comparable.

The measures used to predict recent fertility were also more limited than those used in the earlier regressions. The value and disvalue measures could not be used because they reflected conditions at the time of the interview rather than those two years previously. In addition, the family composition measures used to test the impact of gender preference could not be used because the sex of the last child was not determined. Except for PINC and WEDUC, the remaining predictors were adjusted for conditions two years previously.

Table 9 presents the results of the logit regressions for having had a child in the past two years. Despite the limitations of this analysis, results are parallel though not identical to those in the regressions for desire for another child. In a typical case (Taiwanese wives), the equation indicates that the proportion having another child in the period goes from 0.48 of those who started with one child to 0.28 at two

TABLE 9. Logit regressions for having had a child in the last two years, by country and sex

	Wives													
	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	.48	(1.03)	-.97	(.93)	-1.28	(.94)	-3.42*	(1.20)	-1.81	(1.12)	.05	(1.53)	-5.82**	(1.35)
NLC	-.32	(.36)	.09	(.35)	.52	(.34)	.83	(.45)	.41	(.40)	-.54	(.63)	1.89*	(.53)
ROLD	-.20	(.16)	-.26	(.18)	-.18	(.13)	-.50*	(.24)	-.74*	(.26)	-.33	(.26)	.19	(.20)
AGFB	-.03	(.02)	.00	(.03)	-.00	(.02)	.00	(.03)	-.02	(.02)	-.01	(.03)	.02	(.03)
MDUR	-.05	(.03)	-.06	(.03)	-.07*	(.02)	-.07	(.04)	-.12*	(.05)	-.12*	(.05)	-.15*	(.04)
PINC	-.75**	(.18)	-.93*	(.42)	.82	(.53)	-1.56*	(.65)	-.22*	(.09)	-2.37*	(.93)	-.10	(.08)
WEDUC	.04	(.08)	-.06	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	-.01	(.04)	-.04	(.03)	.04	(.14)	-.02	(.06)
Constant	3.48**	(.58)	2.82*	(.94)	-.96	(1.03)	5.35**	(1.26)	4.47**	(.68)	4.59*	(1.47)	1.53	(.88)
LR (df)	109.61	(7)	129.84	(7)	102.31	(7)	253.54	(7)	602.64	(7)	121.60	(7)	121.50	(7)
	Husbands													
LNLC	-.52	(1.68)	1.34	(1.85)	-1.86	(1.38)	-4.72*	(2.35)	-1.77	(1.59)	1.41	(2.48)	-6.58*	(2.54)
NLC	-.04	(.64)	-.87	(.73)	.74	(.49)	1.31	(.89)	.30	(.58)	-1.18	(.99)	2.07*	(.99)
ROLD	-.35	(.24)	-.04	(.34)	-.60*	(.16)	-1.01*	(.40)	-1.02*	(.26)	-.59	(.33)	-.24	(.36)
AGFB	-.03	(.04)	-.00	(.05)	-.06*	(.03)	-.11*	(.06)	.00	(.03)	-.00	(.04)	-.06	(.05)
MDUR	-.01	(.03)	-.08	(.05)	-.01	(.02)	.01	(.06)	-.04	(.04)	-.01	(.05)	-.06	(.06)
PIN	-.75*	(.37)	-.42	(.51)	.53	(.66)	-.43	(.94)	-.07	(.13)	-1.77	(1.00)	-.02	(.14)
WEDUC	-.05	(.05)	-.08	(.07)	.01	(.04)	-.08	(.07)	-.07	(.05)	.13	(.20)	-.07	(.11)
Constant	4.45*	(1.21)	1.72	(1.43)	1.12	(1.26)	7.12*	(2.09)	3.53*	(.94)	3.29*	(1.53)	3.48*	(1.67)
LR (df)	29.62	(7)	30.83	(7)	57.69	(7)	68.16	(7)	273.81	(7)	64.84	(7)	43.25	(7)

Note: The independent variables in this table have been adjusted to reflect conditions two years prior to the interview.

*Likelihood ratio (LR) significant at .05.
**Likelihood ratio (LR) significant at .001.

children to 0.22 at three children, reaching its lowest point of 0.20 at four children and rising gradually beyond that. There is some variation across countries, however, and the coefficients for living children are only occasionally significant. Effects in these regressions appear to be weaker than those in Table 3, as might be expected given the earlier caveats.

The three duration variables, reflecting age of the oldest child, age at first birth, and marriage duration, generally have negative effects, occasionally significant, on having had a child. These are similar to their effects on desire for another child. In contrast to the results with fertility intentions, the effects of these variables, as well as those of number of living children, may partly reflect the decline of fecundity with age.

Most of the time, permanent income relates negatively to having had a child, and its effects are significant in almost half the cases. The effects of wife's education are also usually negative, but are typically small. The effects of education are similar to its effects on desire for another child, but the income effects are not: in Table 3, the sign of the latter was positive slightly more often than negative, though it was seldom significant.

Regressions by number of living children

The combined regressions were rerun adding interaction terms with number of living children. In roughly half the cases–more often for desire for another child than for ideal family size–the interaction terms did add significantly to the variance explained. Therefore, regressions were run for subgroups defined by number of living children. It should be noted that the subgroups with larger numbers of children are in a sense progressively selective, including only those who, for whatever reason, reach higher parities. Subgroups with fewer children, on the other hand, may include some who would stop at small families and some who would eventually have larger families. This must be taken into account in interpreting results. Also, subgroups were defined without reference to child mortality (though the child loss variable is included in the regressions). For convenience, these will nevertheless be referred to as parity-specific regressions.

The regressions for respondents with no children excluded several variables that are defined only among those with at least one child. Similarly, one gender composition variable, LIMB, was excluded from regressions for those with one child. Some regressions could not be run because of lack of variance in the dependent variable (especially at no children, where desire for another child is most often positive) or because of the small number of cases. Some variables (having a previous marriage, for instance) were also left out of particular regressions because they lack variance in the specific group.

The parity-specific results, which are quite voluminous, are given in full in Appendix D. For those variables that show interesting results, median regression coefficients across countries (for wives and husbands separately) and quartiles (for both sexes combined) are diagrammed in Figure 3, for desire for another child, and Figure 4, for ideal family size. However, the discussion here focuses not only on these summary figures but also on specific differences between countries.

Desire for Another Child

The effects on desire for another child in Figure 3 show considerable variability; no identifiable pattern appears to be without at least one exception. Nevertheless, it is these patterns that require attention. The effects of age and experience may be considered first. As in Table 3, the age of the oldest child is significant mainly in Taiwan, at several parities. However, neither in Taiwan nor in the other countries is there any pattern to these effects across parities. Similarly, for age at first birth, no pattern in the effects across parities is evident. For those with one living child, marriage duration (Figure 3a) most often has significant negative effects among wives. Among husbands, the negative effects are stronger at two children relative to the other parities, but this pattern is not entirely consistent.

Having been married more than once has effects of variable sign; in absolute terms, the coefficients seem to be largest at one and two children among wives and at four among husbands (but this variable was left out in several regressions for the latter because of a lack of variance). Having lost a child has variable effects: its largest positive coefficient is at two children in Singapore, but at different parities elsewhere.

As noted earlier, the proportion boys (LBOY, in Figure 3b) has significant negative effects on desire for another child mainly in Korea and Taiwan. In these countries, as well as in Singapore, Turkey, and Indonesia, it generally has the largest effects at either three or four



FIGURE 3. Regression coefficients for selected predictors of desire for another child, by sex and number of living children



FIGURE 3. *(continued)*



FIGURE 3. *(continued)*



FIGURE 3. *(continued)*

children. Gender imbalance (LIMB, in Figure 3c), on the other hand, leads to an increase in desire for another child in most countries. Overall, its effects seem to be slightly stronger at the higher parities, particularly at four children among wives and at five or more children among husbands.

For income, the pattern observed in previous studies was positive effects at low parities and negative effects at high parities. Such a pattern does appear for permanent income among U.S. wives; for Indonesian and Taiwanese husbands, the pattern is arguably similar, though not marked. The other cases do not substantiate this pattern, however. For instance, for Korean and U.S. husbands, the stronger effects seem to be at higher parities. For education, the effects observed in other studies were more negative at lower parities. Again, the results for U.S. wives seem generally confirmatory, but are not supported by the results in other groups (except possibly Indonesian husbands). For most of these groups, the effects of education vary, with no linear pattern, or, in the case of Philippine wives, move from more positive at lower parities to less positive at higher.

The effects of ideal family size (Figure 3d) on desire for another child are positive in most of these regressions and significant in the majority of cases. Overall, the effects of IFS seem to be strongest at two children; the Indonesian sample is an exception, with stronger effects showing at three and four children.

Economic contributions from children (Figure 3e) was expected to be more important at higher parities. This variable does not have its strongest positive effects in the five-and-above group, however, but at three or four children, though the pattern is somewhat uneven. Family name only occasionally affects desire for another child significantly; the significant effects, both positive and negative, are confined to the lower parities. Gender preference (Figure 3f) has its strongest effects generally at intermediate parities, principally at two children and sometimes at three. Companionship rewards has scattered effects, though there are two cases where it has most importance at no children. Sibling companionship (Figure 3g) seems to be important principally at one and three children.

Financial costs of children does not affect desire for another child consistently. Its effects are not always negative and show no tendency to increase or decrease across parities. In the combined regressions, restrictions on parents (Figure 3h) was important chiefly in the more advanced countries. In Singapore, restrictions affects desire for another child most among those with no children; in the United States, its greatest effects are at three children and one child. Restrictions on work, finally, is significant in only two regressions and shows no clear pattern across parities.

Ideal Family Size

Somewhat different variations in the effects of predictors on ideal family size--often equally inconsistent--may be noted (Figure 4 and Appendix D). Some pattern appears for the first two age-experience variables, though the differences are minor and hardly noticeable. Age at first birth shows a slight tendency to have larger positive effects at five children, but the differences in coefficients are small, and effects are significant at five children only once. Marriage duration is somewhat similar, but the pattern is even weaker.

For having been married more than once, the direction of the effects is quite inconsistent. For instance, two of the largest negative coefficients are obtained at the two highest parities among U.S. wives, but two of the largest positive coefficients are obtained at the same parities among U.S. husbands. For child loss (Figure 4a), the coefficients seem to be more generally positive. There may be a slight tendency toward larger positive effects at lower parities among wives, but the results for husbands run in the other direction.

Income (Figure 4b) was expected to increase in negative impact at higher parities. This does seem to be the case among Korean and Taiwanese wives and Indonesian husbands; however, it is not the case in the other groups. For wife's education, no pattern to the effects appears. Urban residence and media exposure both show scattered effects, predominantly but not exclusively negative. There is no evident pattern to these effects across parities.

Desire for another child (Figure 4c) is one variable that does show a clear pattern of effects on ideal family size: at lower parities, from 0 to 2, its effects are significant much more often than at higher parities, and the coefficients are generally larger as well.

Of the values of children, economic contributions (Figure 4d) is the most interesting. In particular groups, its effects are most positive at no children, but in other groups they are most positive at four or more children. The first condition holds for all the female groups except in Korea and Taiwan, where the second condition holds. The male groups



FIGURE 4. Regression coefficients for selected predictors of ideal family size, by sex and number of living children



FIGURE 4. *(continued)*



FIGURE 4. *(continued)*

are harder to characterize because of the number of times regressions could not be run at no children. However, the first condition comes closer to characterizing husbands in Singapore and the United States and the second condition husbands in the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, and possibly Taiwan. For family name, the signs of the effects are occasionally negative and occasionally positive, with no pattern, although the few significant positive effects are mainly at low parities. Gender preference, similarly, lacks any clear pattern: among husbands, especially in Korea and the United States, it seems to have increasingly positive effects on ideal family size at higher parities, but this pattern does not appear in the majority of groups. Companionship, the last of the values in these regressions, similarly shows no clear pattern.

Among the disvalues, financial costs (Figure 4e) has its most negative effects on ideal family size in a few cases at higher parities, as in the United States and Singapore. Again, however, this does not hold for all or even the majority of groups. Restrictions on freedom (Figure 4f), which was important mainly in Singapore and the United States, has its greatest effects at five or more children in these cases, except among U.S. husbands. For restrictions on work, significant negative effects are also at highest parity for both Turkish groups, but this does not hold for other groups.

DISCUSSION

Some of the predictions appear supported in the analysis, but others do not, and in a number of cases the evidence is unclear. The results relevant to each prediction will now be reviewed. Where coefficients are not significant, attention will still be paid to their signs to determine if these agree with the predictions. In the comparisons of coefficients across parities, differences in magnitude will be addressed even when it is not clear whether these are significant. There is, of course, some danger of overinterpretation here.

Age and experience

Although it was not determined whether any pregnancies were unintended, it was expected that such pregnancies would raise preferences because of rationalization or cognitive balance, or the adjustment of fertility preferences to agree with number of living children. Such a process may be suggested by the fact that desire for another child declines as number of children increases, but at a decreasing rate. Ideal family size increases with number of children, also suggesting some rationalization; however, this increase gradually tapers off. One interpretation of these results is a partial but not complete adjustment of number preferences to include some but not all existing children, although other interpretations are of course possible. For instance, individuals may be essentially attaining their original preferences, but with some tendency to overshoot because of the psychosocial and economic costs involved in regulating fertility; or individuals who reach higher parities may be a selected group that continually wants more children in spite of exceeding their ideals. However, these interpretations do not account for the positive dependence of ideal family size on desire for another child, even after the reverse relationship is accounted for.

Age at first birth was expected to have a negative impact on fertility intentions. Its effects on desire for another child are in fact fairly uniformly negative—though only occasionally significant—and essentially similar across subgroups of each sample. The same predominantly negative effects are observed when an attempt is made to predict recent childbearing (within the last two years). The prediction therefore seems to be supported, though not strongly. However, the effects of age at first birth on ideal family size are unexpected: these effects are predominantly positive, and again a few are significant. Thus it appears that those who first give birth later are more likely to intend to stop childbearing earlier, but still express a preference for larger families. The reasons for this apparent contradiction are not evident.

The prediction for marriage duration was, similarly, that it would have a negative influence on preferences. Besides marriage duration, the age of the oldest child was included in the regressions as another and perhaps a better measure of the length of the fertility career. Both variables had the predicted effects on desire for another child, as well as on recent childbearing: almost uniformly negative and occasionally significant. The effects were slightly larger among those with only one or two children, possibly suggesting that, after having attained these minimum numbers of children, couples are more ready to stop. However, the effects of marriage duration on ideal family size (age of oldest was not used in these regressions) were the reverse, being generally positive. This can be interpreted as a cohort effect, older women preferring larger families. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that when wife's age replaces marriage duration, the effects on ideal family size are similar; it is also supported by the greater strength of the positive effects for rural women, among whom cohort differences should be more pronounced (given greater discontinuities between generations).

Having a previous marriage was expected to reduce childbearing intentions within the current marriage. As with the two preceding predictions, there were contrary results for desire for another child and ideal family size, and other complications as well. Having been married previously was important for fertility preferences mainly in the countries where divorce was more common: Indonesia, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. In these countries, it generally had significant positive effects on desire for another child and significant negative effects on ideal family size. When the Indonesian sample was broken into subgroups, however, both of these results were reversed for all the subgroups. It is possible to rationalize the results for the United States and Turkey: perhaps the negative effects on ideal family size represent the predicted reduction in fertility preferences, whereas the positive effects on desire for another child reflect the fact that previously married respondents count among their living children some from the previous marriage and therefore are more likely to want to continue childbearing in order to have children in the current marriage. However, the reverse results for Indonesia suggest caution with such interpretations and indicate that culturally specific factors may also be at work.

It was predicted that having experienced child loss would lead to lower preferences for surviving children (though higher preferences for births). The effects of child loss on desire for another child are variable in sign and essentially negligible; since number of living children is controlled, the implication seems to be that those who have experienced child loss are on average content when they have made up for the loss. Again, however, the results for ideal family size tell a somewhat different story: where child loss is more common, personal experience of it is related to larger ideal family sizes. In several cases, these effects are stronger for rural subgroups, among whom child loss should also be more common. This could be interpreted as an "insurance" effect against child loss, affecting ideals only, where mortality is higher; when couples have actually made up for a loss, there is no further impetus to have more. There is a slight suggestion in the data that the insurance effect may be stronger, as Heer (1983) predicts, among wives who still have few children, though not among husbands.

Gender composition was expected to have some impact, probably positive. Gender composition was represented by two variables: the proportion of boys among the respondent's children and the imbalance, in either direction, between sons and daughters. It was not expected that either of these variables would affect ideal family size directly (though indirect effects through desire for another child are possible), and they were therefore included only in the regressions for desire for another child. In these regressions, imbalance had consistently strong, positive effects. The U.S., Indonesian, and Turkish males appear to be the only exceptions; however, the parity-specific results show that, even in these groups, substantial positive effects are obtained at higher parities. On the other hand, the negative effects of the proportion boys on desire for another child are limited to particular countries, appearing as significant mainly in Korea and Taiwan, and in some of the regressions for Turkey and Singapore. This is consistent with expectations for the countries that should show son preference (Williamson, 1976; Arnold and Kuo, 1982). It therefore appears that those with an imbalance between sons and daughters, and in some countries those with a smaller proportion of sons, are more likely to continue childbearing. This suggests either that couples are more often optimistic about the likelihood of having a child of the sex they want, or that they value positive outcomes more strongly than they fear negative outcomes. It does not indicate, however, that couples with an unfavorable gender composition will therefore seek to exceed the family size they would have otherwise; the possibility cannot be ruled out that those with a more favorable composition will instead stop childbearing prematurely. No predictions were made for the impact of gender composition at different parities; however, it was predicted that the gender preference value should have greater impact at intermediate parities. It may be noted that gender composition does seem to have larger effects among those with three to five children, rather than among those with fewer, which is consistent with the prediction for values. Overall, some results for the age and experience variables are very much in line with the predictions, though not all the predictions are supported.

Socioeconomic characteristics

For the predictions relating to the socioeconomic measures, the results are less supportive. It was expected that income would have a positive influence on fertility preferences at low parities and a negative influence at high parities. The measure of income was somewhat unsatisfactory: it depended, for some countries, on a fairly limited category system and was not strictly comparable across countries. A permanent income measure was derived from this, but the original measure of current income was also used as an alternate. The results were not as expected. With all the parities combined, permanent income generally had positive effects on desire for another child and ideal family size among husbands, but among wives the effects were generally negative. Few of the effects were significant. Results were no better with the current income measure; in fact, the effects on ideal family size appeared to be more negative among husbands. The effects of permanent income on ideal family size appeared to be more strongly positive among rural husbands, but not among the other groups. Finally, when an attempt was made to predict recent childbearing, permanent income was shown to have almost uniform negative effects, significant in several cases. A coherent interpretation of these apparently contradictory results is not possible here. For the results for recent childbearing, which are the strongest, it might be noted that indirect effects of income, such as its relation to husband's education or to contraceptive availability, might be responsible (e.g., Mueller and Short, 1983), but this does not account for the other results. Since opposite effects at different parities were predicted, the possibility that these cancel out in the combined regressions should be considered next as a possible explanation.

Regressions for a few scattered country-sex groups conform to the predicted pattern of positive income effects at low parities and negative effects at high parities. Notable among these are the regressions for desire for another child for U.S. wives. Most of the groups do not conform to this pattern, however, or to any recognizable alternative. Since most of the previous work on income effects across parities has been with U.S. women, the confirmatory results for this group provide some confidence in the procedures used here. However, the negative results for the other groups are damaging to the hypotheses. Problems with the measurement of income may be at the root of the failure to confirm the predictions. It is also possible, however, that income has such different meanings in each country, being linked to other social characteristics in quite different ways, that the predictions are simply not viable cross-culturally.

Education, the other socioeconomic variable used in these regressions, was expected to have negative impact on preferences at lower parities. It might also be expected to have a negative effect in the combined regressions. The effects of wife's education are generally weak and nonsignificant, though negative more often than not, on both desire for another child and ideal family size. Its effects on ideal family size seem to be stronger among rural residents. In the prediction of recent childbearing, its effects are essentially negligible. Husband's education, which was used in a few regressions, has even weaker effects. Across parities, no stronger effects are noted among those with fewer children. Again, however, there is one important exception: in regressions for desire for another child among U.S. wives, the largest and only significant effects occur among those with one child. Thus the pattern found in a few previous studies, mainly with U.S. women, appears to be confirmed for this group, but the analysis fails to extend it to other groups.

Values and disvalues of children

For values and disvalues of children, the predictions are fairly specific, usually referring to the particular parity or parities at which specific values or disvalues will be important. Following previous research, the predictions refer to the values involved in having the next child; the parity-specific regressions, on the other hand, were run by number of living children, which is one below the number of the next child.

It was predicted that economic contributions of children would influence preferences positively at higher parities. Economic contributions usually has positive effects on desire for another child, but these are not significant, and the sign is less consistent in the logit regressions. On ideal family size, on the other hand, stronger and more often significant positive effects are observed. Contradictory negative effects on both preference measures appear mainly in the U.S. and in some Singapore regressions—as one would expect, these are the cases where children's economic contributions are negligible. Across parities, patterns are roughly supportive of the prediction: no effect or even a negative effect is observed in the more-developed countries, but in the other countries the effects on desire for another child are stronger for those with three and four children (i.e., in relation to having the fourth or fifth child) than for those at lower parities. For some unexplained reason, the effects are not stronger among the groups with five or more children. In the regressions for ideal family size, the patterns are clearer: the effects of economic contributions seem to be greatest among those with four or five or more children. There are some anomalies here too, however: for a few groups, the strongest effect is observed among those with no children. Therefore, some support can be claimed for the prediction relating to economic contributions, but there are unexplained departures from the expected pattern.

It was predicted that family name would have positive impact, mainly in relation to the first child. There is little support for this in the data. The effect of family name seems more often positive than negative, but is typically weak and often inconsistent; the only notable effect is on desire for another child among Korean husbands. All the significant effects that emerge in the subgroup regressions are positive, but nonsignificant negative effects also appear. Across parities, the few notable effects on desire for another child appear at lower parities, but these are both positive and negative. The only significant positive effects on ideal family size appear at one child; however, these are few and scattered. Thus no real support appears for family name, which seems at least less important than economic contributions. Because continuing the family name depends in most of these countries not specifically on the first child, but on the first son, an emphasis on family name is generally strongly linked to a preference for sons. Perhaps, then, the weak effects of family name may be partly due to its operating through the effects of gender composition and gender preference, which are also in the regressions.

The influence of gender composition on fertility intentions has already been noted. It was predicted that gender preference as a value would also contribute to intentions, raising them particularly at intermediate parities. The measures of gender preference used combine preferences for sons and daughters; since they are based on ratings of reasons for wanting another child, those who express a strong preference for one or the other may be motivated by an absolute preference for children of a specific sex or by a desire for balance. The effects of gender preference on desire for another child are clearly positive and usually significant. Since gender composition is also included in these regressions, this result appears to confirm that, with reference to these variables at least, subjective values contribute to fertility intentions over and above the effect of objective circumstances. The effects of gender preference on ideal family size, by contrast, are inconsistent, whether in the combined regressions, the subgroup regressions, or the parity-specific regressions: they are alternately positive and negative, hinting again that ideals may not adjust completely to actual fertility intentions. This also provides further justification for the omission of gender composition from the regressions for ideal family size. Across parities, the pattern of effects on desire for another child is just as predicted, the greatest effects being observed principally at two and occasionally at three children (i.e., in relation to having a third or fourth child).

For the companionship value of children—the main psychosocial value included here—the results are less supportive. The expectation was that this value would have positive impact on preferences at low parities. In the combined regressions, it generally has positive effects, significant in a couple of cases, on desire for another child. On ideal family size, however, there are a few significant effects in both directions. One possible interpretation for these contradictory results is this: as a value parents obtain from children, companionship may be positively related to wanting children; however, as a value that educated, urban couples are more likely to emphasize, it may be associated perforce with smaller family-size preferences and a greater desire for child quality. The parity-specific regressions also show a mix of positive and negative effects and no clear priority for this value at lower parities.

Companionship for siblings is an aspect of the companionship value treated separately because of its specific importance in relation to the second child. The prediction, based on several other studies, was that this value would be of great positive significance for intentions to have a second child. Used only in the regressions for desire for another child, sibling companionship usually has positive effects, significant in two cases. The parity-specific regressions are more interesting. Though significant only in one case, the greatest positive effects of sibling companionship were most often among those with one child, i.e., those contemplating a second. Where this was not the case, the greatest effects were among those with three children, contemplating a fourth. Thus, although there is support here for the original prediction, there is also an indication that some consider having a fourth child as a companion for the previous three.

Of the disvalues, financial costs are the most often cited in studies of the value of children (Fawcett, 1983). It was expected that this disvalue would be of significance primarily in societies undergoing rapid economic transformation, and probably mainly at high parities. No such neat results appear. The effects of financial costs on desire for another child are of variable sign, though more often negative. Its effects on ideal family size are more consistently negative, and significant about half the time. The suggestion in these results is that financial costs are an important factor in the development of ideal preferences, but do not strongly influence actual intentions. Contrary to the prediction, no stronger effects appear for the newly industrializing countries of Korea and Taiwan. From the subgroup results, it may also be noted that financial costs has stronger effects on ideal family size among urban wives (Singapore and the United States being the exceptions). The import of this is not clear: it may relate to proportionally greater child costs or greater internalization of them within the nuclear household in urban areas; it may also relate to the greater exposure of urban wives in the less-developed countries to population-control propaganda, and the consequently greater likelihood that they would express preferences, at least in ideal terms, for small families because of the cost of large ones. Across parities, there is little pattern in the effects of financial costs on desire for another child. Among the effects on ideal family size, the largest do appear at the highest parity in the United States, as well as for Singapore husbands and Indonesian wives. However, this is not true in the remaining cases.

The next disvalue, restrictions on parents, was expected to have impact only in the more-developed countries. This was borne out: the significant negative effects, on both desire for another child and ideal family size, were largely confined to the United States and Singapore (and largely among wives, though Taiwanese husbands also showed some impact). There were subgroup variations, the effects being stronger among U.S. urban women and Singaporean Malays. It was also expected that this disvalue would be of greater consequence at low parities; however, the results in this regard were less clear. On desire for another child, the effects were strongest in Singapore among those with no children, but in the United States they were stronger among those with one and three children. On ideal family size, the effects seemed to be stronger in these two countries at the highest parities. Feeling tied down by children is not consistently associated primarily with the first child; given somewhat longer spacing between children and alternate forms of childcare past infancy, later children may restrict parents' activities equally severely.

The final disvalue, restrictions on the wife's work, like restrictions on parents, was expected to be of significance mainly at low parities, not necessarily only in more-developed countries. The evidence seems to be that this value is of less consequence for fertility intentions. Its effects on desire for another child and ideal family size are variable and inconsistent, and no patterns are noted across parities, the only possible exception being a stronger negative effect on ideal family size at the highest parity in Turkey. As in previous research on the value of children (Bulatao, 1979a), work restrictions appear less important than broader restrictions on the parents' freedom and ability to dispose of their own time.

Other factors

Although no predictions were made about normative thresholds and the homogenization process, the results can still be examined for their relevance to these other factors. The effects of age and experience, socioeconomic characteristics, and values and disvalues are not confined to either high or low parities, nor are they uniformly accentuated at any specific parity in between. Examination of the parity-specific regressions by country fails to turn up any "normative thresholds" that apply to the majority of variables. Perhaps these thresholds can only be observed among more narrowly defined groups within which there is more normative consensus. Neither is there any evidence that fertility intentions are less predictable at higher parities. Perhaps, again, one has to observe still higher parities.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made here to explain fertility intentions cross-culturally, taking special account of sequential factors within the fertility career. The data analyzed were for seven countries—mainly in East and Southeast Asia, but also including Turkey and the United States—covered in the Value of Children surveys. Fertility intentions or preferences were represented by two measures—the desire for another child and ideal family size. These measures were assumed to be mutually interdependent, and two-stage least squares regressions were run to predict them, including among the predictors age and experience variables, socioeconomic measures, and indices of the values and disvalues attached to children. Separate regressions were run for wives and husbands in each country; further regressions were run, within each of these groups, for urban and rural or for ethnic subgroups; and regressions were run, finally, for those with different numbers of living children within each country-sex group. (Additional regressions with alternate predictors, as well as with a measure of actual fertility–childbearing within the last two years–were also reported.)

Measures of fertility intentions: a contrast

The results reported here indicate important differences between the desire for another child and ideal family size, though the two are strongly interdependent. At higher parities, many of those who want to continue childbearing would do so despite having attained their ideals; ideals appear to be somewhat more restricted in range or more clustered, perhaps reflecting social norms to a greater extent than personal predilections (Mason, 1983). Nevertheless, ideals are influenced by desires, especially in the early stages of childbearing when ideals are presumably more fluid. Desires are also affected by ideals, particularly when the individual considers whether to go beyond two children.

The predictors of the two measures are substantially different. Desire for another child falls, though at a decreasing rate, as parity rises and couples attain their childbearing goals. Ideal family size rises with parity, also at a decreasing rate, either because of heterogeneity or because couples rationalize having had additional children. Age and experience variables influence the measures in opposite ways: the expected effects of delay on reducing childbearing intentions and of gender preference on increasing them given particular gender compositions are observed only for desire for another child and not for ideal family size. Although marriage duration also affects ideal family size, this effect is the reverse of that expected and appears to reflect cohort differences rather than duration itself. Ideal family size thus seems less susceptible than desire for another child to reshaping in the course of the fertility career and more predictable from enduring characteristics of the individual or couple. An apparent exception to this generalization is the effect of child loss, which is negligible on desires but positive on ideals. It may be argued, however, that the positive response of ideals to child loss is a gross, probably one-time adjustment that is not modulated by later experience in making up for the loss, as desires might be.

The two preference measures also differ in their responsiveness to "economic" variables–income, perceived economic contributions of children, and their perceived financial costs. These variables, especially the last, affect ideal family size more strongly than desire for another child. Since a number of the economic costs and benefits of a child are incurred or accrue years after birth, it may not be surprising that specific birth intentions are less responsive to them than are preferences for total number of children over the fertility career.

The predictors of ideal family size in these regressions, it is important to note, resemble more closely the standard predictors of fertility and fertility preferences (but see Pullum, 1983) than do the predictors of desire for another child, among which sequential factors figure more prominently.

Predictors of fertility intentions, confirmed and unconfirmed

The variables used as predictors in the regressions were chosen on the basis of previous studies, which suggested a number of factors that would have "sequential" effects on preferences. Predictions about the effects of the age and experience variables could be taken per se as reflecting sequentiality. For the other variables, sequentiality was indicated in predictions that socioeconomic and psychosocial measures would have different effects at different parities. Cross-sectional tests of these predictions do not, of themselves, establish sequentiality; other explanations are possible, like the increasing selectivity of the sample at higher parities. However, confirmation of particular predictions does complicate any simple-minded approach to fertility intentions.

The age and experience variables mostly had the expected effects, though primarily on desire for another child rather than ideal family size. Of these variables, gender composition, particularly imbalance between number of sons and daughters, appeared to have the strongest effect (not counting the influence of number of living children).

For the socioeconomic variables, predictions were more specific, and results overall less satisfactory. Income and education did not show the sequential effects expected, except among U.S. wives, calling into question the generality of results previously obtained mostly with

U.S. samples. However, the income measure had various drawbacks; a better measure might have produced different results.

For the value and disvalue indices, some predictions were supported, and others were not. Those values or disvalues that appeared to have a stronger influence in regressions with all parities combined were also generally those that produced the expected sequential effects. This was the case for economic contributions, gender preference, sibling companionship, and restrictions on parents: each had some effect in the combined regressions and also appeared to have a greater effect, in the parity-specific regressions, at or around the parities predicted. Of these values, the results for gender preference again were clearly the strongest; for the others, the results were in line with predictions but sometimes relatively weak. By contrast, for family name, companionship, and restrictions on the wife's work, neither general effects on preferences nor the predicted parity-specific pattern was obtained. The last disvalue, financial costs, did affect ideal family size, but had no parity-specific pattern. It is possible that, where the effects are inconsistent or absent, the value or disvalue is inadequately measured, or these effects may simply be too weak in comparison to those of the other variables in the equations to stand out.

Country variations: a general hypothesis

None of these results was perfectly uniform across countries. Some did appear most of the time, like the effects of number of living children, imbalance between numbers of sons and daughters, and gender preference. Others seemed to be specific to particular countries or groups of countries, reflecting either distinctive cultural features or varying levels of development.

Having been previously married affected preferences mainly where divorce was more common, i.e., in Indonesia, the United States, and Turkey. Even among these countries, the influence of a previous marriage varied, for reasons that may be largely specific to each country. Cultural factors similarly appeared to dictate where the proportion of sons among one's children would raise fertility intentions—namely, where high son preference was an established pattern, as in Korea and Taiwan.

Like having been married previously, child loss was of significance where it was more common, i.e., essentially in the less-developed countries in the sample. Its effect was more consistent than that of a previous marriage, however: it increased ideal family size. Also limited to less-developed countries (but including, in this case, some newly industrializing countries) was the effect of children's economic contributions, which may be assumed to be minimal in developed societies. The financial costs of children, on the other hand, appeared to have impact on ideal family size across the board, but with stronger effects among urban wives in the less-developed countries. The main effect confined to more-developed countries was the effect on fertility intentions of restrictions on freedom, which was not salient in less-developed countries.

A possible hypothesis to explain these localized effects is that particular factors have to attain some minimum level of frequency or importance in order to have an impact on fertility intentions. Whether there are in fact such thresholds, what they are for each factor, whether thresholds apply to other variables also, and what cultural and developmental factors are related to crossing each threshold may all deserve further study.

In the attempt to test predictions cross-culturally in this paper, no special attention has been paid to the pattern of results for each specific country. The major variations among countries, as just noted, appear reasonable; there are of course many other variations in the magnitudes of specific coefficients. These may warrant further attention, as well as further analysis introducing factors specific to each country, but the similarities across countries have been particularly notable.

Single and successive decisions

The perspective adopted at the start of this study was that the initial fertility decision early in the marriage and changes in intentions throughout the couple's fertility career are both important, though the relative weight of each is unknown. The results are generally in line with this perspective, indicating that some factors have the same effect on fertility preferences regardless of family size, whereas others have differential effects and are more relevant to fertility intentions at particular points in the fertility career.

As suggested at the outset, the distinction between ideal family size and desire for another child appears to reflect the distinction between the single initial decision made by a couple about their fertility and the successive decisions they make as the family grows. The interdependence of the two measures, and the differences between their predictors, suggest that the single-decision and the successive-decision perspectives are not conflicting, but rather complementary in explaining different aspects of the complex process by which fertility intentions are determined.

The data used here have been cross-sectional, of course; the study has not followed individuals through their fertility careers to see how preferences actually change. Longitudinal analyses, particularly if results could be compared cross-culturally, would provide important additional evidence on the degree of such changes and the factors involved in them.

APPENDIX A. ESTIMATION OF PERMANENT INCOME

Household income with husband at age 40 was chosen as an indicator of permanent income. This indicator includes household income from all sources, since sources are not distinguished in the Value of Children survey data. In these data, household income was coded in fairly broad categories–as few as 8 in one country, but as many as 18 in other countries.

Current household income was regressed on husbands' and wives' characteristics, including whether the wife was working, and, in some cases, dummy variables for household composition. Separate regressions were run for respondents of each sex in each country, with other specific predictors varying slightly. Table A1 lists these, and Table A2 gives means and standard deviations; the regression results appear in Table A3. R^2 for these equations was generally between 0.35 and 0.47.

The equations were used to estimate household income when husband's age was set at 40. (In two groups–wives in Turkey and in Indonesia–husband's age was not available, and wife's age was set at 40 instead.) If a household composition variable was included in the equation, it was set, for purposes of this estimation, to indicate that there were no extra adults in the household beyond the couple, or that the household was nuclear. The reason for this was that the presence of extra adults appeared to be a function of the family life cycle.

TABLE A1. Variable definitions

CINC	total household income, expressed annually for the Philippines and the United States and monthly for the other countries; coded in various numbers of categories, ranging from 8 to 18
HSAGE	husband's age in years
HSAGESQ	husband's age squared
AGE20,] AGE25,] AGE30,] AGE35,] AGE40,] AGE45]	dummy variables indicating husband's age, used if exact age was not available (e.g., AGE25 = 1 if husband is between 25 and 29)
HEDUC	husband's education; in years for the Philippines, Turkey, and the U.S.; by level for the other countries
OCC1	first dummy variable for husband's occupational class: upper professional and technical workers[a]
OCC2	administrative, executive, managerial workers
OCC3	lower professional and technical workers (used for the Philippines and Turkey; for the other countries, included in OCC1)
OCC4	sales workers (for the U.S., this variable represents sales and clerical workers)
OCC5	clerical workers
OCC6	upper skilled workers (for the U.S., represents craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers and protective service workers)
OCC7	upper service workers (for Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore, includes OCC11)
OCC8	transport and communication workers
OCC9	lower skilled workers (for Indonesia, includes OCC6 and OCC10; for the U.S., represents operatives and kindred workers)
OCC10	unskilled workers (for Korea, includes OCC6 and OCC9; for the U.S., represents laborers, including farm)
OCC11	lower service workers (for the U.S., includes OCC7)

TABLE A1. *(continued)*

OCC12	farm owners and farmers
OCC13	farm tenants
OCC14	fishermen
OCC15	farm laborers
WFAGE	wife's age in years
WFAGESQ	wife's age squared
AGW20, AGW25, AGW30, AGW35	dummy variables indicating wife's age, used if exact age was not available
EARN	whether wife is currently earning (dummy variable)
WEDUC	wife's education; in years for the Philippines, Turkey, and the United States; by level for the other countries
EXAD	number of extra adults in the household besides the couple
HH1, HH2, HH3	dummy variables for whether household is nuclear (HH1), extended (HH2), or multicouple (with more than one couple, HH3)
URB4, URB3, URB2, URB1,	dummy variables for residence, from most urban (URB4) to most rural (URB1)
REG1 to REG10	dummy variables for region of residence within country; regions are, in order: Philippines--Cagayan, llocos, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Bicol, West Visayas, East Visayas, Central Visayas, Mindanao, and City of Manila; Indonesia--Salatiga, Solo, Bandung, and Tasikmalaya; U.S.--Northeast, North Central, South, and West.

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[a] Some occupation variables were used only in specific countries because of differences in classification. The category left out in regressions was either all farmers, farm laborers specifically, or, for the U.S., all laborers.

TABLE A2. Means and standard deviations, by country and sex

Variable	Wives		Husbands	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
	Philippines (1,552 wives, 359 husbands)			
CINC	6.127	3.894	6.025	3.841
HSAGE	33.209	7.145	32.621	7.431
HSAGESQ	1153.841	518.541	1119.201	549.154
HEDUC	8.104	3.640	8.136	3.469
OCC1	.034	.182	.042	.200
OCC2	.013	.113	---	---
OCC3	.010	.098	.008	.091
OCC4	.071	.257	.050	.218
OCC5	.061	.240	.072	.259
OCC6	.068	.252	.061	.240
OCC7	.041	.197	.031	.173
OCC8	.105	.307	.123	.328
OCC9	.137	.344	.143	.355
OCC10	.045	.208	.033	.180
OCC11	.011	.107	.005	.074
OCC12	.007	.084	.011	.105
OCC13	.300	.458	.315	.465
OCC14	.055	.229	.061	.240
EARN	.525	.499	.571	.496
WEDUC	7.733	3.475	7.646	3.316
HH2	.183	.387	.170	.376
HH3	.125	.331	.117	.322
URB3	.205	.404	.192	.395
URB2	.208	.406	.192	.395
REG1	.049	.216	.058	.236
REG2	.042	.202	.033	.180

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
REG3	.121	.326	.100	.301
REG4	.318	.466	.298	.458
REG5	.079	.269	.092	.289
REG6	.137	.344	.175	.381
REG7	.039	.194	.033	.180
REG8	.109	.312	.095	.293
REG10	.028	.164	.033	.180
	Turkey (1,475 wives, 341 husbands)			
CINC	5.648	3.532	5.138	3.418
AGE20	---	---	.100	.293
AGE25	---	---	.261	.428
AGE30	---	---	.212	.398
AGE35	---	---	.200	.390
AGE40	---	---	.127	.325
HEDUC	5.250	3.246	5.309	3.205
OCC1	.064	.237	.076	.259
OCC2	.109	.303	.106	.300
OCC3	.027	.158	.028	.160
OCC4	.124	.320	.111	.306
OCC5	---	---	---	---
OCC6	.102	.293	.088	.275
OCC7	.085	.270	.061	.234
OCC8	---	---	---	---
OCC9	.061	.233	.053	.218
OCC10	.085	.271	.068	.244
OCC11	.033	.173	.037	.184

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
OCC12	.238	.413	.316	.453
AGW25	.227	.406	---	---
AGW30	.178	.371	---	---
AGW35	.250	.420	---	---
EARN	.310	.449	.319	.454
WEDUC	3.093	3.267	3.082	3.325
EXAD	1.750	2.717	1.904	2.495
URB4	.138	.335	.144	.342
URB3	.285	.438	.231	.411
URB2	.304	.447	.317	.454
	Indonesia (1,912 wives, 938 husbands)			
CINC	5.339	2.032	5.417	2.071
HSAGE	---	---	35.221	7.370
HEDUC	5.625	4.248	5.707	4.373
OCC1	.062	.241	.065	.247
OCC2	.107	.309	.119	.324
OCC3	---	---	---	---
OCC4	.107	.309	.094	.292
OCC5	.053	.224	.049	.216
OCC6	---	---	---	---
OCC7	.044	.206	.034	.182
OCC8	.018	.134	.016	.125
OCC9	.108	.310	.097	.296
WFAGE	28.761	5.736	---	---
EARN	.390	.488	.401	.490
WEDUC	4.249	3.749	4.333	3.772

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
URB2	.806	.395	.809	.393
REG1	.258	.438	.252	.434
REG2	.252	.434	.245	.430
REG3	.241	.428	.248	.432
	Korea (1,411 wives, 427 husbands)			
CINC	3.458	1.538	3.626	1.513
HSAGE	--	--	34.478	5.933
HEDUC	10.018	4.067	9.525	4.323
OCC1	.049	.216	.060	.238
OCC2	.044	.206	.031	.174
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	.143	.351	.142	.350
OCC5	.136	.344	.124	.331
OCC6	--	--	--	--
OCC7	.084	.278	.091	.290
OCC8	--	--	--	--
OCC9	--	--	--	--
OCC10	.046	.210	.050	.219
OCC11	.105	.308	.101	.303
OCC12	--	--	--	--
OCC13	--	--	--	--
OCC14	.010	.101	.017	.131
WFAGE	29.936	5.309	--	--
EARN	.338	.475	.363	.483
WEDUC	7.477	3.950	8.005	4.029
EXAD	.814	1.535	.852	1.559

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
URB3	.292	.456	.294	.458
URB2	.213	.411	.207	.407
	Taiwan (1,797 wives, 912 husbands)			
CINC	4.932	1.793	4.969	1.798
HSAGE	37.717	7.982	36.819	7.993
HEDUC	6.889	3.975	6.933	3.913
OCC1	.065	.246	.071	.257
OCC2	.174	.379	.213	.409
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	.044	.205	.048	.214
OCC5	.093	.290	.086	.280
OCC6	.140	.347	.137	.344
OCC7	.087	.282	.080	.271
OCC8	.059	.236	.048	.214
OCC9	.064	.245	.065	.246
OCC10	.091	.287	.071	.257
OCC11	--	--	--	--
OCC12	.141	.348	.149	.356
OCC13	--	--	--	--
OCC14	.025	.156	.015	.123
EARN	.410	.490	.397	.490
WEDUC	4.851	3.185	4.957	3.039
EXAD	1.289	2.489	1.425	2.645
URB4	.317	.465	.305	.461
URB3	.161	.368	.164	.371
URB2	.213	.409	.229	.421

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

Variable	Wives Mean	Wives S.D.	Husbands Mean	Husbands S.D.
	Singapore (814 wives, 419 husbands)			
CINC	3.656	1.533	3.854	1.662
AGE20	.027	.162	.026	.160
AGE25	.177	.382	.186	.390
AGE30	.210	.408	.210	.408
AGE35	.227	.419	.243	.430
AGE40	.195	.397	.186	.390
HEDUC	3.532	1.260	3.050	1.392
OCC1	.015	.121	.017	.128
OCC2	.054	.226	.048	.213
OCC3	.021	.143	.021	.145
OCC4	.195	.397	.191	.393
OCC5	.112	.315	.129	.335
OCC6	--	--	--	--
OCC7	.571	.495	.554	.498
HH2	.457	.498	.489	.500
EARN	.248	.432	.272	.446
WEDUC	2.957	1.323	3.582	1.296
URB3	.371	.483	.344	.475
URB2	.388	.488	.408	.492
	United States (1,324 wives, 390 husbands)			
CINC	10.698	3.430	11.133	3.429
HSAGE	31.461	6.813	31.510	6.519
HSAGESQ	1036.211	461.048	1035.279	445.686

TABLE A2. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
HEDUC	12.925	2.669	12.969	2.846
OCC1	.191	.393	.203	.402
OCC2	.153	.360	.131	.338
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	.093	.290	.092	.290
OCC5	--	--	--	--
OCC6	.258	.437	.259	.439
OCC7	--	--	--	--
OCC8	--	--	--	--
OCC9	.181	.385	.208	.406
OCC10	--	--	--	--
OCC11	.023	.151	.021	.142
OCC12	.032	.175	.031	.173
EARN	.539	.499	.574	.495
WEDUC	12.524	2.245	12.633	2.325
URB4	.063	.244	.056	.231
URB3	.164	.370	.159	.366
URB2	.415	.493	.441	.497
REG1	.189	.392	.187	.391
REG3	.337	.473	.346	.476
REG4	.175	.380	.182	.386

Note: Dash indicates variables not defined for a subgroup, or categories with too few cases.

TABLE A3. OLS regressions for household income, by country and sex

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Philippines			
HSAGE	.179*	(.055)	.069	(.107)
HSAGESQ	-.002*	(.001)	-.000	(.001)
HEDUC	.144*	(.030)	.051	(.067)
OCC1	3.221*	(.590)	4.495*	(1.218)
OCC2	3.739*	(.769)	--	--
OCC3	2.729*	(.856)	-.062	(1.956)
OCC4	1.866*	(.488)	3.734*	(1.115)
OCC5	1.579*	(.486)	2.946*	(1.026)
OCC6	2.365*	(.479)	4.316*	(1.080)
OCC7	1.068*	(.532)	1.827	(1.204)
OCC8	.977*	(.438)	.712	(.935)
OCC9	1.168*	(.423)	1.400	(.923)
OCC10	.563	(.503)	.129	(1.154)
OCC11	-.267	(.780)	.100	(2.306)
OCC12	2.021*	(.952)	3.877*	(1.659)
OCC13	-.059	(.391)	.404	(.848)
OCC14	.336	(.478)	-.425	(1.012)
EARN	.590*	(.152)	.477	(.332)
WEDUC	.255*	(.029)	.107	(.065)
HH2	.429*	(.198)	.564	(.435)
HH3	-.279	(.236)	.007	(.540)
URB3	.450	(.253)	.264	(.550)
URB2	1.279*	(.222)	1.749*	(.488)
REG1	-.619	(.427)	.023	(.845)
REG2	.204	(.447)	-.347	(1.023)
REG3	.017	(.344)	-.237	(.751)

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
REG4	1.403*	(.317)	1.248	(.646)
REG5	.169	(.376)	.292	(.759)
REG6	-.752*	(.349)	-.568	(.688)
REG7	.366	(.454)	-.642	(1.002)
REG8	-.498	(.352)	-.243	(.755)
REG10	2.979*	(.567)	4.893*	(1.137)
Constant	-3.101*	(1.109)	.328	(2.250)
R^2	.465		.486	
	Turkey			
AGE20	--	--	-2.517*	(.608)
AGE25	--	--	-1.701*	(.483)
AGE30	--	--	-1.564*	(.493)
AGE35	--	--	-.761	(.507)
AGE40	--	--	-1.302*	(.539)
HEDUC	.146*	(.035)	.262*	(.063)
OCC1	1.689*	(.512)	2.208*	(.831)
OCC2	.627	(.418)	1.307	(.704)
OCC3	.063	(.602)	1.416	(1.001)
OCC4	1.389*	(.386)	1.969*	(.675)
OCC5	--	--	--	--
OCC6	.832*	(.403)	1.486*	(.691)
OCC7	.293	(.418)	1.942*	(.763)
OCC8	--	--	--	--
OCC9	.454	(.452)	1.704*	(.783)
OCC10	.143	(.410)	1.719*	(.729)
OCC11	-.742	(.542)	-.067	(.866)

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
OCC12	.802*	(.350)	1.485*	(.595)
AGW25	.403	(.224)	--	--
AGW30	.172	(.244)	--	--
AGW35	.981*	(.225)	--	--
EARN	-.501*	(.182)	-1.002*	(.289)
WEDUC	.295*	(.033)	.298*	(.053)
EXAD	.291*	(.030)	.178*	(.058)
URB4	2.094*	(.298)	2.437*	(.484)
URB3	1.227*	(.229)	2.001*	(.395)
URB2	1.196*	(.223)	1.257*	(.354)
Constant	1.576*	(.393)	1.489*	(.708)
R^2	.293		.463	
	Indonesia			
HSAGE	--	--	.063*	(.006)
HEDUC	.124*	(.012)	.135*	(.018)
OCC1	.816*	(.151)	.858*	(.218)
OCC2	.570*	(.114)	.301	(.159)
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	.659*	(.107)	.608*	(.167)
OCC5	.571*	(.151)	.128	(.227)
OCC6	--	--	--	--
OCC7	.683*	(.157)	1.125*	(.252)
OCC8	-.488*	(.228)	-.546	(.348)
OCC9	-.010	(.107)	-.285	(.161)
WFAGE	.079*	(.005)	--	--
EARN	.162*	(.061)	.138*	(.088)

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
WEDUC	.166*	(.014)	.153*	(.020)
URB2	-.441*	(.091)	-.615*	(.132)
REG1	-.094	(.089)	-.163	(.128)
REG2	.095	(.090)	.099	(.130)
REG3	.928	(.850)	.993*	(.122)
Constant	1.490*	(.215)	1.806*	(.305)
R^2	.601		.615	
	Korea			
HSAGE	--	--	.026*	(.010)
HEDUC	.085*	(.012)	.117*	(.019)
OCC1	.986*	(.167)	1.078*	(.281)
OCC2	.398*	(.162)	.440	(.340)
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	.557*	(.104)	.589*	(.197)
OCC5	.226	(.119)	.132	(.234)
OCC6	--	--	--	--
OCC7	.316*	(.132)	.245	(.240)
OCC8	--	--	--	--
OCC9	--	--	--	--
OCC10	-.399*	(.159)	-.570*	(.272)
OCC11	.497*	(.112)	.299	(.209)
OCC12	--	--	--	--
OCC13	--	--	--	--
OCC14	-.162	(.311)	.592	(.436)
WFAGE	.027*	(.006)	--	--
EARN	.159*	(.071)	.099	(.123)

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
WEDUC	.125*	(.012)	.086*	(.021)
EXAD	.168*	(.021)	.124*	(.037)
URB3	.270*	(.087)	.332*	(.162)
URB2	-.092	(.087)	-.150	(.159)
Constant	.364	(.223)	.491	(.431)
R^2	.432		.450	
	Taiwan			
HSAGE	.003	(.004)	.006	(.006)
HEDUC	.087*	(.012)	.106*	(.016)
OCC1	1.305*	(.294)	1.654*	(.405)
OCC2	1.827*	(.262)	1.859*	(.367)
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	1.083*	(.292)	1.052*	(.404)
OCC5	.974*	(.274)	1.311*	(.387)
OCC6	1.042*	(.263)	1.349*	(.371)
OCC7	.582*	(.274)	.706	(.388)
OCC8	1.453*	(.282)	1.590*	(.404)
OCC9	1.061*	(.277)	1.222*	(.390)
OCC10	.485	(.267)	.372	(.384)
OCC11	--	--	--	--
OCC12	.281	(.259)	.510	(.366)
OCC13	--	--	--	--
OCC14	.744*	(.318)	.462	(.498)
EARN	.280*	(.066)	.239*	(.092)
WEDUC	.100*	(.014)	.093*	(.021)
EXAD	.143*	(.014)	.146*	(.018)

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
URB4	.959*	(.089)	.961*	(.123)
URB3	.655*	(.103)	.532*	(.142)
URB2	.331*	(.091)	.116	(.124)
Constant	1.955*	(.313)	1.644*	(.439)
R^2	.434		.462	
	Singapore			
AGE20	-1.291*	(.296)	-1.134*	(.424)
AGE25	-.559*	(.164)	-.425	(.231)
AGE30	-.629*	(.153)	-.427	(.218)
AGE35	-.470*	(.147)	-.355	(.208)
AGE40	-.308*	(.147)	-.258	(.216)
HEDUC	.256*	(.051)	.264*	(.061)
OCC1	1.640*	(.459)	1.014	(.603)
OCC2	.476	(.327)	.303	(.447)
OCC3	2.001*	(.407)	1.790*	(.553)
OCC4	.258	(.273)	.092	(.350)
OCC5	-.049	(.292)	-.511	(.371)
OCC6	--	--	--	--
OCC7	-.270	(.258)	-.647	(.327)
HH2	.400*	(.094)	.469*	(.132)
EARN	.709*	(.105)	.823*	(.145)
WEDUC	.180*	(.046)	.264*	(.070)
URB3	-.114	(.118)	-.220	(.167)
URB2	-.183	(.115)	-.256	(.160)
Constant	2.423*	(.289)	2.499*	(.375)
R^2	.353		.456	

TABLE A3. *(continued)*

	Wives		Husbands	
Variable	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	United States			
HSAGE	.707*	(.083)	.720*	(.178)
HSAGESQ	-.008*	(.001)	-.009*	(.003)
HEDUC	.166*	(.043)	.167*	(.080)
OCC1	1.743*	(.393)	2.783*	(.801)
OCC2	2.294*	(.373)	3.526*	(.776)
OCC3	--	--	--	--
OCC4	1.974*	(.402)	2.894*	(.810)
OCC5	--	--	--	--
OCC6	1.721*	(.333)	2.149*	(.691)
OCC7	--	--	--	--
OCC8	--	--	--	--
OCC9	1.306*	(.343)	2.491*	(.695)
OCC10	--	--	--	--
OCC11	-.152	(.579)	.299	(1.169)
OCC12	2.654*	(.526)	4.261*	(1.058)
EARN	.750*	(.156)	.696*	(.303)
WEDUC	.304*	(.046)	.243*	(.090)
URB4	.866*	(.341)	.502	(.694)
URB3	1.572*	(.246)	1.740*	(.487)
URB2	.733*	(.182)	.878*	(.347)
REG1	-.597*	(.228)	-.298	(.446)
REG3	-.468*	(.196)	-.527	(.381)
REG4	-.819*	(.231)	-1.041*	(.445)
Constant	-11.031*	(1.431)	-10.713*	(3.079)
R^2	.363		.360	

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

APPENDIX B. GENERAL INDICES OF VALUES AND DISVALUES OF CHILDREN

The Value of Children data provide a number of measures of the importance placed by the respondent on many of the values and disvalues attached to children. These measures were combined to provide general indices for specific values and disvalues, chosen partly on the basis of prior empirical analysis (especially Arnold et al., 1975; Bulatao, 1975) and factor analysis of some of the measures themselves, and partly on the basis of theoretical interest. This appendix briefly describes the general indices used in this paper, as well as a few other general indices constructed concurrently but not used here.

The indices were based on the following types of value and disvalue measures: (a) ratings of reasons for wanting and not wanting another child; (b) separate rankings of these two sets of reasons; (c) ratings of reasons for having children; (d) advantages and disadvantages of having children cited in response to several open-ended questions (on general advantages and disadvantages, reasons for preferring a particular family size, reasons for wanting sons and daughters, restrictions imposed by children, and changes in a person's life from having children; (e) rankings of general disvalues of children; and (f) several miscellaneous ratings of specific values and disvalues. Table B1 lists the indices and the measures used to construct each one.

Each constituent measure was scaled so that it ranged, theoretically, from zero to one, in the process roughly equalizing the variances. The measures were then added up. The sums were checked for heteroscedasticity across all countries combined, and natural logs or roots taken where indicated. For convenience, each resulting index was scaled so that it ranged, theoretically, from 0 to 5. These calculations are summarized in Table B2.

The resulting indices were unimodal (except for GPRV) and roughly normal in distribution. The internal consistency of each index among wives in each country is indicated by an alpha coefficient in Table B3. A number of coefficients are respectable, but not as high as those sometimes obtained for psychological scales. It should be noted that each index included measures obtained by different methods, not simply by different questions using the same method. Internal consistency might be improved by selecting only those measures that correlate best with each other, but this could reduce validity.

When indices were first calculated, any index was defined as missing

TABLE B1. General value and disvalue indices and constituent measures

---

ECOV economic contributions from children

E1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for these three items (averaged):
- to have a child to help around the house
- to be sure that in your old age you will have someone to help you
- so that there will be one more person to help your family economically

E2 rank assigned to above items (2 points if any item is ranked first, 1 additional point if any item is ranked second)

E3 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for having children, for these two items:
- because children can work and help the family
- to have someone to depend on when you are old

E4 number of open-ended questions to which "children help" is given in response, for these questions: advantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have fewer than desired number of children, reasons for wanting a son, reasons for wanting a daughter, and changes in a person's life from having children

E5 mean rating across ten items of expected support from sons and daughters (from 3 = expects help to 1 = no help expected)

HOWV help with housework

H1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for this item:
- to have a child to help around the house

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

H2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
H3	number of open-ended questions to which "help with housework" is given in response, for these questions: advantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have fewer than desired number of children, reasons for wanting a son, reasons for wanting a daughter, and changes in a person's life from having children
H4	whether sons are expected to "help around the house" (from 3 = expects help to 1 = no help expected)
H5	whether daughters are expected to "help around the house" (from 3 = expects help to 1 = no help expected)
NAMV	carrying on the family name
N1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for this item: o to help carry on your family name
N2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
N3	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for having children, for this item: o so that the family line will continue
N4	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all values important in one's life, for this item: o passing on the family name
N5	number of open-ended questions to which "family name or line" is given in response, for these questions: advantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have fewer than desired number of children, reasons for wanting a son, reasons for wanting a daughter, and changes in a person's life from having children

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

RELV religious obligations

R1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for this item:
- o because of your religion

R2 number of open-ended questions to which "religious duty" or "religious rituals" is given in response, for these questions: advantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have fewer than desired number of children, reasons for wanting a son, reasons for wanting a daughter, and changes in a person's life from having children

GPRV gender preference

G1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for these two items (in this case only, the higher of the two deviations rather than their average was used):
- o because you want to have another boy
- o because you want to have another girl

G2 rank assigned to above items (2 points if either is ranked first, 1 additional point if either is ranked second)

SIBV sibling companionship

S1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for this item:
- o to provide a companion for your children

S2 rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

S3 How important is it for a child to have brothers and sisters for companionship: very important (4), somewhat important (3), slightly important (2), or not important at all (1)?

COMV companionship provided by children

C1 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for wanting another child, for these items:
- because of the pleasure you get out of watching children grow
- to bring your spouse and yourself closer together
- because it is fun to have young children around the house

C2 rank assigned to above items (2 points if any is ranked first, 1 additional point if any is ranked second)

C3 deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for having children, for these items:
- so that you will not be lonely
- because children are needed to complete the family
- because children are fun

C4 number of open-ended questions to which "companions, playmates" is given response, for these questions: advantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have fewer than desired number of children, reasons for wanting a son, reasons for wanting a daughter, and changes in a person's life from having children

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

FIND	financial costs of children
F1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for not wanting another child, for this item: o because having another child would be a financial burden for your family
F2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
F3	number of open-ended questions to which "financial demands" is given in response, for these questions: disadvantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have more than desired number of children, and changes in a person's life from having children
F4	rank assigned to "financial problems connected with children" among four general disvalues (from 3 = most important, to 0 = least important)
AGED	being too old to have children
A1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for not wanting another child, for this item: o because your spouse and you are too old for another child
A2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
FRED	restriction of parents' freedom
R1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for not wanting another child, for this item: o because you would not be as free to do what you want to do

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

R2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
R3	number of open-ended questions to which "restrictions on parents" (excluding "wife can't work") is given in response, for these questions: disadvantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have more than desired number of children, changes in a person's life from having children, and things children interfere with or prevent one from doing
R4	rank assigned to "children keeping you from other things you might want to do" among four general disvalues (from 3 = most important, to 0 = least important)
R5	Would you say that having children prevents you from doing other things you want to do very often (3), sometimes (2), or not at all (1)?
WRKD	interference with wife's work
W1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for not wanting another child, for this item: o because it would be harder for the wife to have a job
W2	rank assigned to above item (2 points if ranked first, 1 point if ranked second)
W3	number of open-ended questions to which "wife can't work" is given in response, for these questions: disadvantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have more than desired number of children, changes in a person's life from having children, and things children interfere with or prevent one from doing

TABLE B1. *(continued)*

BURD	childbearing burdens
B1	deviation of item rating from mean rating across all reasons for not wanting another child, for these items: o because another child would be a lot of work and bother for you o because you would not be able to give enough care and attention to all your children o because children would be hard to discipline and control
B2	rank assigned to above items (2 points if any is ranked first, 1 additional point if any is ranked second)
B3	number of open-ended questions to which "concerns about childbearing" is given in response, for these questions: disadvantages of having children, reasons for preferring not to have more than desired number of children, and changes in a person's life from having children
B4	rank assigned to "the worry and strain of childrearing" among four general disvalues (from 3 = most important, to 0 = least important)
B5	Some people say that children cause a lot of worry and emotional strain. Would you say that they cause a lot of worry and emotional strain (4), or a moderate amount of worry and strain (3), or only a little worry and strain (2), or none at all (1)?

TABLE B2. Calculation of general indices

ECOV	First calculate E: $E = \frac{E1 + 1.5}{3} + \frac{E2}{3} + \frac{19}{68}\left(E3 + \frac{34}{19}\right) + \frac{E4}{5} + \frac{E5-1}{2} - 2.4$ Then, if E is positive, $ECOV = \frac{5(E^{1.8} + 2.4^{1.8})}{2.6^{1.8} + 2.4^{1.8}}$ If E is negative, $ECOV = \frac{5[-(-E)^{1.8} + 2.4^{1.8}]}{2.6^{1.8} + 2.4^{1.8}}$
HOWV	$\frac{6}{22}\left(H1 + \frac{11}{6}\right) + \frac{H2}{2} + \frac{H3}{5} + \frac{H4}{3} + \frac{H5}{3}$
NAMV	$\frac{6}{22}\left(N1 + \frac{11}{6}\right) + \frac{N2}{2} + \frac{19}{72}\left(N3 + \frac{36}{19}\right) + \frac{9}{32}\left(N4 + \frac{16}{9}\right) + \frac{N5}{5}$
RELV	$\frac{5}{2}\left[\frac{19}{72}\left(R1 + \frac{36}{19}\right) + \frac{R2}{3}\right]$
GPRV	$5\left\{\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{6}{22}\left(G1 + \frac{11}{6}\right) + \frac{G2}{3}\right]\right\}^{1/5}$
SIBV	$\frac{5}{\log 6} \log \left\{\frac{5}{3}\left[\frac{6}{22}\left(S1 + \frac{11}{6}\right) + \frac{S2}{2} + \frac{S3-1}{3}\right] + 1\right\}$
COMV	$\frac{5}{\log 6} \log \left\{\frac{5}{4}\left[\frac{C1 + 1.5}{3} + \frac{C2}{3} + \frac{19}{64}\left(C3 + \frac{32}{19}\right) + \frac{C4}{5}\right] + 1\right\}$
FIND	$\frac{5}{4}\left(\frac{F1 + 1.8}{3.6} + \frac{F2}{2} + \frac{F3}{3} + \frac{F4}{3}\right)$
AGED	$5\left[\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{A1 + 1.8}{3.6} + \frac{A2}{2}\right)\right]^{1/3}$
FRED	$\frac{5}{\log 6} \log \left(\frac{R1 + 1.8}{3.6} + \frac{R2}{2} + \frac{R3}{4} + \frac{R4}{3} + \frac{R5-1}{2} + 1\right)$
WRKD	$5\left[\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{W1 + 1.8}{3.6} + \frac{W2}{2} + \frac{W3}{4}\right)\right]^{1/3}$
BURD	$\frac{B1 + 1.4}{2.8} + \frac{B2}{3} + \frac{B3}{3} + \frac{B4}{3} + \frac{B5-1}{3}$

if one or more of its constituent measures were missing. The proportion of cases with missing data was variable—from essentially 0 percent for a number of measures to around 10 percent for a few measures. Estimates for the missing measures, based on regressions for all countries combined to predict each index from subsets of its constituent measures, were used to fill in the missing index scores.

TABLE B3. Reliability of general indices (alpha coefficients among wives, by country)

	Philippines	Turkey	Indonesia	Korea	Taiwan	Singapore	United States
ECOV	.45	.64	.48	.58	.62	.72	.53
HOWV	.35	.44	.39	.40	.56	.59	.45
NAMV	.44	.58	.36	.58	.46	.77	.69
RELV	.02	.01	.00	.07	.02	-.02	.12
GPRV	.43	.57	.49	.75	.64	.58	.64
SIBV	.23	.36	.25	.50	.27	.44	.43
COMV	.22	.42	.21	.32	.45	.45	.24
FIND	.32	.52	.37	.58	.53	.57	.69
AGED	.41	.61	.57	.50	.33	.61	.85
FRED	.15	.40	.26	.57	.35	.52	.75
WRKD	.27	.48	.32	.50	.23	.46	.60
BURD	.15	.31	.44	.31	.31	.42	.46

TABLE C1. Reduced-form regressions for desire for another child, by country and sex

Desire for Another Child: Wives

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	-6.64**	(.92)	-10.20**	(.79)	-7.15**	(.73)	-10.70**	(1.13)	-10.70**	(.75)	-12.10**	(1.03)	-9.40**	(1.33)
NLC	.97**	(.20)	1.84**	(.19)	.76**	(.17)	2.14**	(.33)	2.02**	(.19)	2.55**	(.28)	2.18**	(.40)
ROLD	-.47	(.31)	-.08	(.27)	-.40	(.25)	-.69*	(.31)	-1.94**	(.24)	-1.07**	(.29)	-.50	(.35)
AGFB	.01	(.03)	-.02	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	-.12*	(.04)	-.08**	(.02)	-.12**	(.03)	.02	(.05)
MDUR	.02	(.05)	-.08	(.04)	-.03	(.04)	-.04	(.05)	.14**	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	-.21**	(.06)
PREVM	.60	(.78)	1.30*	(.47)	.09	(.26)	-1.33	(1.05)	.90	(.55)	-1.53	(1.49)	.95*	(.39)
CLOSS	.29	(.27)	-.14	(.22)	-.34	(.20)	.36	(.29)	.23	(.20)	.49	(.56)	.05	(.60)
LBOY	.02	(.07)	-.06	(.06)	.03	(.06)	-.30**	(.06)	-.27**	(.05)	-.11	(.07)	-.02	(.06)
LIMB	.44**	(.12)	.27*	(.10)	.06	(.11)	.39**	(.10)	.38**	(.08)	.47**	(.13)	.04	(.13)
PINC	-.53	(.36)	-1.23*	(.61)	1.90	(1.02)	-.56	(.83)	.01	(.11)	-.69	(.85)	.16	(.12)
WEDUC	.07	(.05)	.01	(.05)	-.10	(.06)	-.01	(.05)	-.04	(.03)	-.06	(.14)	-.14	(.09)
URBAN	-.55*	(.27)	-.28	(.26)	-.03	(.26)	-.55*	(.21)	-.38*	(.17)	-.13	(.29)	.30	(.29)
MEDIA	-.09	(.06)	-.06	(.05)	.05	(.05)	-.09	(.05)	-.06*	(.03)	-.09	(.06)	-.03	(.09)
ECOV	1.27**	(.44)	.91*	(.40)	1.68**	(.38)	.81	(.42)	.75*	(.30)	1.19*	(.47)	1.04*	(.52)
NAMV	.60	(.35)	.46	(.27)	-.14	(.27)	.67*	(.24)	.32*	(.15)	.35	(.25)	.35	(.42)
GPRV	2.13**	(.52)	1.91**	(.50)	3.26**	(.45)	.73	(.52)	1.32**	(.34)	.15	(.72)	1.09	(1.00)
COMV	.56	(.29)	-.24	(.26)	.47	(.27)	.22	(.30)	.19	(.21)	.70*	(.32)	-.23	(.37)
FIND	-.28	(.16)	-.16	(.14)	-.06	(.13)	.13	(.14)	-.09	(.08)	-.00	(.16)	.06	(.21)
FRED	-.34	(.18)	.11	(.15)	.05	(.16)	-.10	(.13)	-.00	(.10)	-.37*	(.17)	-.54*	(.19)
WRKD	.15	(.35)	-.32	(.32)	-.17	(.35)	.38	(.51)	.55	(.31)	-.67	(.43)	.46	(.51)
ECO	-1.32*	(.54)	-.16	(.38)	-1.60**	(.42)	-.42	(.43)	.00	(.30)	-1.02*	(.49)	-1.60*	(.68)
NAM	-.50	(.27)	-.09	(.23)	.13	(.25)	-.07	(.25)	-.17	(.17)	.24	(.30)	-.97*	(.35)
GPR	-.51	(.40)	-.39	(.32)	-.85*	(.35)	.06	(.35)	-.14	(.22)	.35	(.46)	.22	(.57)
COM	-.91	(.51)	.73	(.38)	-1.39**	(.42)	.15	(.45)	.17	(.28)	-1.50*	(.51)	.80	(.63)
SIB	.53*	(.25)	.52*	(.17)	.43*	(.22)	.51*	(.18)	.04	(.14)	.38	(.23)	.13	(.24)
FIN	.16	(.23)	.03	(.19)	.19	(.19)	-.70*	(.23)	.15	(.16)	-.16	(.26)	-.21	(.28)
FRE	-.08	(.21)	-.14	(.17)	-.25	(.18)	.09	(.18)	-.00	(.16)	.14	(.23)	-.38	(.25)
WRK	.11	(.33)	.24	(.28)	.21	(.31)	-.27	(.41)	-.63*	(.25)	.64	(.36)	-.41	(.41)
Constant	-2.83	(3.54)	3.55	(3.46)	-6.98	(3.57)	7.15*	(3.43)	5.45*	(2.26)	13.62*	(4.22)	3.96	(4.84)
R^2 (F)	.32	(22.73)	.41	(30.00)	.46	(48.81)	.48	(39.47)	.54	(77.65)	.59	(33.93)	.37	(21.21)

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LNLC	-3.24	(1.86)	-7.55*	(1.91)	-6.79**	(1.03)	-10.66**	(1.96)	-12.42**	(1.07)	-12.37**	(1.83)	-17.00**	(2.43)
NLC	.20	(.43)	1.25*	(.42)	.53*	(.23)	1.85**	(.54)	2.47**	(.28)	2.21**	(.52)	4.02**	(.69)
HOLD	-1.03*	(.46)	-1.21*	(.47)	-.31	(.28)	-.94*	(.47)	-1.26**	(.29)	-.88*	(.43)	.16	(.54)
AGFB	.06	(.07)	-.14*	(.06)	-.07	(.04)	-.02	(.07)	-.04	(.03)	-.14*	(.05)	.08	(.08)
MDUR	.03	(.05)	.02	(.06)	-.04	(.03)	.17*	(.08)	.06	(.04)	-.03	(.05)	-.11	(.08)
PREVM	-1.09	(1.30)	-1.30	(.94)	.23	(.35)	-1.96	(1.05)	-.98	(.67)	3.96*	(1.98)	-.27	(.83)
CLOSS	1.15	(.60)	-.22	(.55)	.01	(.28)	-.23	(.54)	.37	(.30)	1.34	(.98)	.48	(1.28)
LBOY	.19	(.14)	-.28*	(.14)	-.03	(.08)	-.24*	(.12)	-.24**	(.06)	.02	(.11)	-.00	(.13)
LIMB	.88*	(.27)	.00	(.28)	.13	(.16)	.66*	(.19)	.22*	(.11)	.16	(.21)	-.25	(.26)
PINC	.58	(.75)	.48	(.88)	.93	(1.35)	-.92	(1.24)	-.19	(.15)	1.50	(1.25)	-.23	(.21)
WEDUC	.02	(.09)	-.03	(.10)	-.11	(.08)	-.09	(.08)	-.05	(.05)	-.53*	(.24)	-.00	(.16)
URBAN	-.69	(.61)	.45	(.62)	-.64	(.39)	-.67	(.38)	-.10	(.23)	.41	(.49)	1.35*	(.58)
MEDIA	-.04	(.12)	-.04	(.15)	.03	(.07)	-.05	(.11)	-.03	(.04)	.07	(.12)	.03	(.19)
ECOV	1.71	(.95)	-.39	(.86)	2.34**	(.54)	-.62	(.68)	1.31**	(.38)	1.56*	(.75)	.56	(1.03)
NAMV	.44	(.67)	.39	(.60)	.58	(.39)	1.25*	(.39)	.50*	(.22)	.24	(.41)	.43	(.75)
GPRV	3.04*	(1.01)	.12	(1.38)	3.38**	(.66)	1.48	(.99)	.97	(.50)	.47	(1.32)	3.48	(1.94)
COMV	.14	(.66)	.01	(.62)	.68	(.38)	.56	(.50)	-.32	(.31)	-.90	(.59)	-.23	(.71)
FIND	-.59	(.34)	.35	(.34)	-.32	(.19)	-.50	(.27)	-.09	(.13)	.39	(.27)	-.18	(.46)
FRED	.35	(.35)	.19	(.35)	.22	(.23)	.24	(.24)	.24	(.14)	-.64*	(.30)	-.31	(.39)
WRKD	-.26	(.69)	.14	(.80)	.43	(.54)	.26	(1.13)	.25	(.45)	1.17	(1.27)	-1.38	(1.45)
ECO	-1.15	(1.10)	.28	(.92)	-1.11	(.64)	-.34	(.80)	-.39	(.45)	-.28	(.86)	-.56	(1.30)
NAM	-.48	(.64)	.01	(.63)	.20	(.37)	-1.05*	(.42)	-.46	(.25)	-.16	(.51)	-.79	(.73)
GPR	-1.14	(.84)	.51	(.85)	-.73	(.53)	-.20	(.61)	.11	(.32)	.50	(.81)	3.48*	(1.23)
COM	.29	(1.13)	-.05	(.93)	-.51	(.61)	-.73	(.77)	.37	(.41)	1.27	(.92)	1.39	(1.15)
SIB	.49	(.52)	.90*	(.43)	.32	(.30)	.21	(.35)	.05	(.21)	.27	(.37)	.49	(.47)
FIN	.29	(.57)	-.42	(.46)	-.06	(.27)	.26	(.42)	-.22	(.24)	-.73	(.41)	-.24	(.63)
FRE	-.27	(.47)	-.11	(.43)	-.20	(.26)	.10	(.34)	-.34	(.19)	.34	(.39)	-.36	(.49)
WRK	-.19	(.66)	-.20	(.73)	-.39	(.46)	.22	(.91)	-.24	(.39)	-1.00	(1.04)	.72	(1.11)
Constant	-7.03	(7.02)	10.75	(7.90)	-9.99*	(4.64)	4.94	(6.22)	5.21	(3.10)	9.06	(7.64)	28.11*	(10.46)
R^2 (F)	.47	(8.55)	.47	(6.6[illegible])	.47	(24.33)	.51	(12.29)	.54	(34.42)	.56	(13.07)	.40	(6.14)

TABLE C2. Reduced-form regressions for ideal family size, by country and sex

Ideal Family Size: Wives

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
LNLC	3.16**	(.73)	-.35	(.70)	2.67**	(.48)	.27	(.77)	-.01	(.50)	1.82*	(.74)	-.61	(1.25)
NLC	.10	(.16)	.49*	(.16)	.12	(.11)	.52*	(.23)	.61**	(.13)	.65*	(.20)	1.60**	(.38)
ROLD	-.44	(.25)	.05	(.24)	-.53*	(.16)	-.45*	(.21)	-.40*	(.16)	-.86**	(.21)	-.05	(.33)
AGFB	.05*	(.03)	.06	(.03)	-.05	(.02)	-.01	(.03)	.03*	(.02)	-.07*	(.02)	.05	(.05)
MDUR	.03	(.04)	-.00	(.04)	.07*	(.02)	.07*	(.03)	.05	(.03)	.08*	(.03)	-.10	(.06)
PREVM	.15	(.62)	-.15	(.42)	-.50*	(.17)	-.77	(.72)	-.12	(.36)	-.66	(1.07)	-.85*	(.36)
CLOSS	.56*	(.21)	.34	(.19)	.01	(.13)	.54*	(.20)	.12	(.13)	.23	(.40)	.44	(.56)
LBOY	-.04	(.05)	.05	(.05)	.05	(.04)	-.10*	(.04)	[illegible]	(.03)	-.01	(.05)	-.02	(.06)
LIMB	-.00	(.10)	-.09	(.09)	.02	(.07)	-.10	(.07)	[illegible]	(.05)	.09	(.09)	.07	(.12)
PINC	.11	(.29)	-.72	(.54)	.58	(.67)	-.62	(.57)	-.11	(.07)	-.45	(.61)	.06	(.12)
WEDUC	-.08*	(.04)	-.06	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	-.04	(.04)	-.03	(.02)	.11	(.10)	-.04	(.09)
URBAN	-.80**	(.22)	.51*	(.23)	-.24	(.17)	-.04	(.14)	-.47**	(.11)	-.36	(.21)	-.15	(.28)
MEDIA	-.02	(.05)	-.10*	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	-.04	(.04)	-.08**	(.02)	-.07	(.05)	.01	(.09)
ECOV	.77*	(.35)	-.11	(.35)	.80*	(.25)	.74*	(.29)	.82**	(.20)	.93*	(.33)	.13	(.49)
NAMV	.30	(.28)	.02	(.24)	-.33	(.18)	.84**	(.17)	.41**	(.10)	.45*	(.18)	.29	(.39)
GPRV	-.11	(.42)	.28	(.44)	.29	(.29)	1.19**	(.35)	.42	(.23)	.15	(.52)	-1.40	(.94)
COMV	.11	(.23)	-.30	(.23)	-.07	(.18)	.73**	(.20)	-.21	(.14)	.18	(.23)	.72*	(.34)
FIND	-.29*	(.13)	-.18	(.12)	-.23	(.08)	-.12	(.10)	-.10	(.06)	-.15	(.12)	-.43*	(.20)
FRED	-.27	(.14)	-.05	(.13)	-.06	(.10)	-.04	(.09)	-.04	(.07)	-.40*	(.12)	-.99**	(.18)
WRKD	.31	(.28)	-.09	(.28)	-.10	(.23)	-.04	(.35)	.11	(.20)	-.50	(.31)	.01	(.48)
ECO	-1.52**	(.43)	.20	(.34)	-1.17**	(.28)	-.45	(.29)	-.16	(.20)	-.11	(.35)	-1.59*	(.64)
NAM	-.55*	(.22)	-.05	(.20)	-.12	(.17)	-.63**	(.17)	-.26*	(.11)	-.21	(.21)	.30	(.33)
GPR	-.13	(.32)	.12	(.28)	-.06	(.23)	-.48*	(.34)	-.06	(.15)	.06	(.33)	.60	(.53)
COM	-.75	(.41)	.07	(.33)	-.94**	(.28)	-.27	(.31)	.10	(.19)	-.39	(.36)	-.72	(.59)
SIB	-.24	(.20)	.36*	(.15)	.08	(.14)	.16	(.12)	.10	(.09)	.30	(.16)	-.18	(.23)
FIN	-.01	(.18)	-.09	(.17)	.26*	(.13)	-.16	(.15)	.11	(.11)	.27	(.19)	.21	(.27)
FRE	-.01	(.17)	-.21	(.15)	.04	(.12)	-.01	(.12)	.08	(.11)	-.02	(.17)	.09	(.23)
WRK	-.02	(.26)	.05	(.25)	-.10	(.21)	.06	(.28)	-.11	(.17)	.58*	(.26)	-.25	(.39)
Constant	7.55*	(2.82)	10.95**	(3.07)	10.87**	(2.36)	8.34**	(2.34)	14.15**	(1.50)	17.95*	(3.03)	19.52**	(4.55)
R^2 (F)	.25	(16.04)	.14	(7.24)	.26	(20.58)	.23	(13.24)	.31	(29.45)	.49	(22.62)	.20	(8.84)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands

LNLC	2.17	(1.54)	1.98	(1.62)	3.13**	(.74)	-.75	(1.61)	.29	(.80)	.18	(1.25)	-3.94*	(1.99)
NLC	.35	(.36)	.08	(.35)	-.13	(.16)	.42	(.44)	.45*	(.21)	1.15*	(.35)	2.51**	(.57)
ROLD	.05	(.38)	-1.09*	(.40)	-.28	(.20)	-.40	(.39)	-.19	(.22)	-.19	(.29)	.70	(.45)
AGFB	-.05	(.05)	-.04	(.05)	.01	(.03)	.07	(.06)	.00	(.02)	-.06	(.04)	.16*	(.07)
MDUR	-.04	(.04)	.12*	(.05)	.02	(.02)	.13*	(.06)	.02	(.03)	-.01	(.04)	-.10	(.07)
PREVM	.19	(1.08)	-.97	(.79)	-.52*	(.25)	.01	(.87)	-.10	(.50)	1.26	(1.35)	.19	(.68)
CLOSS	.76	(.50)	.49	(.47)	.09	(.20)	.19	(.44)	-.16	(.23)	1.58*	(.67)	.14	(1.05)
LBOY	.21	(.12)	-.08	(.12)	.04	(.06)	.14	(.10)	.09	(.05)	.15	(.08)	-.04	(.10)
LIMB	.25	(.23)	-.18	(.23)	.17	(.11)	-.03	(.16)	-.28**	(.08)	.25	(.14)	-.12	(.21)
PINC	.46	(.62)	.85	(.75)	.23	(.97)	1.25	(1.02)	-.00	(.12)	-.10	(.86)	-.25	(.17)
WEDUC	-.00	(.07)	-.12	(.09)	.00	(.05)	-.06	(.06)	-.02	(.04)	-.06	(.16)	-.05	(.13)
URBAN	-.82	(.50)	-.42	(.53)	-.22	(.28)	-.15	(.31)	-.57*	(.18)	-.02	(.34)	.77	(.48)
MEDIA	-.21*	(.10)	.03	(.12)	-.03	(.05)	-.13	(.09)	-.10*	(.03)	-.03	(.08)	-.01	(.15)
ECOV	1.94*	(.78)	.49	(.73)	1.50**	(.39)	.35	(.56)	1.16**	(.29)	1.53*	(.51)	.09	(.84)
NAMV	.13	(.56)	.30	(.51)	.60*	(.28)	.73*	(.32)	.23	(.17)	.62*	(.28)	.88	(.61)
GPRV	1.06	(.84)	.15	(1.17)	.50	(.48)	.58	(.82)	.56	(.37)	.75	(.90)	.43	(1.59)
COMV	.45	(.55)	-.18	(.52)	.36	(.27)	.56	(.41)	-.04	(.23)	.14	(.41)	.63	(.58)
FIND	.31	(.28)	-.44	(.29)	-.11	(.14)	.17	(.22)	-.17	(.10)	-.19	(.19)	.05	(.37)
FRED	-.20	(.29)	-.13	(.29)	.17	(.17)	.26	(.20)	-.10	(.10)	-.49*	(.20)	-.26	(.32)
WRKD	.90	(.57)	-1.10	(.68)	.17	(.39)	.27	(.93)	.09	(.34)	-2.46*	(.87)	-1.51	(1.19)
ECO	2.17*	(.91)	.20	(.78)	-1.08*	(.46)	-.08	(.66)	-.01	(.34)	.19	(.58)	-2.00	(1.07)
NAM	-.48	(.53)	-.06	(.53)	-.43	(.26)	-.28	(.35)	-.09	(.19)	-.55	(.35)	-.61	(.60)
GPR	-.98	(.70)	.34	(.72)	-.34	(.38)	-.26	(.50)	.10	(.24)	-.12	(.56)	.02	(1.01)
COM	-.73	(.93)	.19	(.79)	-.95*	(.44)	-1.10	(.63)	.25	(.31)	.29	(.63)	.41	(.94)
SIB	.40	(.43)	.05	(.37)	-.19	(.21)	-.34	(.29)	.43*	(.16)	.48	(.25)	.24	(.39)
FIN	-.21	(.48)	.24	(.39)	-.20	(.20)	.12	(.35)	.02	(.18)	-.12	(.28)	-.19	(.52)
FRE	-.60	(.39)	.35	(.36)	.26	(.19)	-.25	(.28)	-.14	(.14)	.09	(.27)	-.09	(.40)
WRK	-1.31	(.55)	.89	(.62)	-.04	(.33)	.03	(.75)	.04	(.29)	1.78*	(.71)	1.53	(.91)
Constant	-2.20	(5.83)	12.84	(6.70)	2.99	(3.33)	6.32	(5.11)	13.40**	(2.33)	18.49**	(5.22)	12.76	(8.59)
R^2 (F)	.32	(4.49)	.21	(2.04)	.16	(5.43)	.17	(2.45)	.27	(10.85)	.48	(9.74)	.35	(5.60)

TABLE D1. Two-stage least squares regressions for desire for another child and ideal family size, by country, sex, and number of living children

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with No Living Children													
MDUR	.00	(.04)	-.01	(.03)	.05	(.03)	-.06	(.06)	--	--	-.23	(.17)	-.04	(.06)
PINC	-.94	(.60)	-.18	(1.00)	.56	(1.85)	-.18	(1.49)	--	--	-4.15	(3.62)	.13	(.18)
WEDUC	.19*	(.08)	.05	(.07)	-.01	(.11)	.03	(.11)	--	--	.35	(.65)	-.16	(.12)
IFS	.21*	(.08)	.30	(.16)	.37**	(.06)	.44*	(.17)	--	--	.42	(.38)	.64**	(.13)
ECO	-2.19*	(.86)	.38	(.56)	3.71*	(1.16)	.26	(.43)	--	--	-2.99	(1.69)	-.46	(.81)
NAM	-.58	(.36)	-.15	(.26)	.27	(.81)	.30	(.28)	--	--	1.10	(.87)	-.36	(.37)
GPR	-1.99*	(.65)	.73*	(.34)	1.27*	(.57)	-.07	(.28)	--	--	.11	(1.10)	.43	(.35)
COM	-2.41*	(.78)	1.20*	(.58)	5.80*	(1.61)	.87	(.64)	--	--	-2.41	(1.91)	.68	(.78)
FIN	-.32	(.32)	-.13	(.24)	.18	(.30)	.39	(.28)	--	--	-.39	(.88)	.02	(.24)
FRE	-.53	(.39)	.41	(.26)	.09	(.42)	.11	(.26)	--	--	-1.46	(1.10)	.07	(.26)
WRK	.19	(.41)	.05	(.27)	.01	(.52)	-.13	(.29)	--	--	.30	(.85)	.17	(.28)
Constant	8.55**	(1.59)	6.13*	(2.30)	3.31	(3.19)	2.52	(4.03)	--	--	8.04	(9.74)	-1.44	(2.87)
R^2 (F)	.61	(6.83)	.14	(1.74)	.68	(8.42)	.21	(1.45)	--	--	.32	(1.67)	.27	(6.61)

Desire for Another Child: Husbands with No Living Children

MDUR	--	--	-.07	(.12)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.19	(.21)	-.15*	(.07)
PINC	--	--	.16	(.93)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-4.01	(3.75)	.17	(.18)
WEDUC	--	--	-.00	(.12)	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.35	(.62)	-.24	(.15)
IFS	--	--	.31	(.20)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.84	(.56)	.50*	(.14)
ECO	--	--	-.14	(1.58)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.62	(1.74)	-.29	(1.33)
NAM	--	--	-1.40	(.91)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.06	(1.29)	-.05	(.46)
GPR	--	--	-.61	(.98)	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.76	(1.37)	-.27	(.59)
COM	--	--	-.70	(1.69)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.81	(2.10)	.15	(1.11)
FIN	--	--	-2.62*	(.78)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-1.46	(1.03)	.26	(.32)
FRE	--	--	.23	(.64)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-1.32	(.89)	-.05	(.34)
WRK	--	--	-.24	(.69)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.71	(1.22)	.04	(.33)
Constant	--	--	6.58	(3.73)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-3.98	(11.74)	2.59	(3.12)
R^2(F)	--	--	.60	(3.08)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.70	(2.33)	.59	(6.74)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

Predictor	Philippines B	Philippines (S.E.)	Turkey B	Turkey (S.E.)	Indonesia B	Indonesia (S.E.)	Korea B	Korea (S.E.)	Taiwan B	Taiwan (S.E.)	Singapore B	Singapore (S.E.)	United States B	United States (S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with One Living Child													
ROLD	-.13	(.70)	.65	(.59)	-.07	(.36)	.72	(.63)	-.32	(.49)	.08	(.97)	-.08	(.49)
AGFB	-.00	(.08)	.10	(.10)	.05	(.06)	.03	(.09)	.10	(.06)	.02	(.12)	.11	(.09)
MDUR	-.02	(.13)	-.36*	(.13)	-.02	(.08)	-.40*	(.14)	-.23*	(.11)	-.08	(.15)	-.40*	(.11)
PREVM	3.34	(2.97)	2.10	(1.84)	.24	(.50)	-6.62*	(2.69)	4.57*	(1.66)	-11.16*	(5.06)	.44	(.77)
CLOSS	-1.28	(.97)	-.17	(1.01)	-.37	(.38)	-1.49	(1.08)	-.39	(.96)	4.73*	(2.35)	.74	(1.27)
LBOY	-.03	(.12)	.20	(.12)	-.12	(.07)	.16	(.11)	-.12	(.07)	.12	(.14)	.01	(.08)
PINC	-.38	(1.08)	-2.54	(2.01)	-1.27	(1.91)	-2.07	(2.69)	-.28	(.26)	1.19	(2.94)	.55*	(.22)
WEDUC	.29	(.17)	-.05	(.18)	.06	(.11)	.11	(.17)	.02	(.08)	-.31	(.45)	-.35*	(.17)
IFS	.96*	(.40)	.01	(.46)	.74*	(.24)	1.48*	(.41)	.45*	(.18)	1.17*	(.52)	.05	(.23)
ECO	-1.51	(1.84)	-1.00	(.91)	1.14	(1.04)	-.37	(.91)	-.99	(.73)	.40	(1.28)	-.33	(1.08)
NAM	-1.70*	(.86)	.46	(.47)	-.14	(.42)	.51	(.44)	-.67	(.36)	.43	(.58)	-.61	(.50)
GPR	1.06	(1.04)	.30	(.53)	1.17*	(.49)	.32	(.45)	.57	(.37)	.33	(.75)	.40	(.42)
COM	-3.00	(1.87)	.32	(.96)	1.90	(1.30)	1.36	(1.00)	.07	(.72)	-.18	(1.39)	.36	(1.09)
SIB	.73	(.97)	.46	(.51)	1.25*	(.52)	.92	(.49)	.37	(.39)	.55	(.81)	.86	(.46)
FIN	-.37	(.55)	-.19	(.46)	-.32	(.25)	.42	(.41)	.48	(.31)	.42	(.60)	-.18	(.29)
FRE	-.69	(.65)	.44	(.51)	-.18	(.32)	-.30	(.40)	-.13	(.40)	.36	(.61)	-.98*	(.45)
WRK	-.57	(.68)	-.54	(.46)	.24	(.33)	.20	(.40)	-.26	(.28)	.59	(.65)	-.34	(.31)
Constant	-3.61	(6.63)	11.31	(6.03)	1.11	(4.79)	-14.56	(8.60)	1.19	(4.05)	-12.53	(12.67)	3.93	(4.63)
R^2 (F)	.25	(2.73)	.13	(1.86)	.19	(2.76)	.27	(4.10)	.26	(3.50)	.27	(2.47)	.24	(4.86)

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ROLD	-1.25	(.91)	-1.04	(1.20)	-.61	(.40)	--	--	-1.18	(1.11)	--	--	-.21	(.81)
AGFB	.01	(.11)	.02	(.13)	.08	(.10)	--	--	.03	(.10)	--	--	.07	(.14)
MDUR	.04	(.10)	-.05	(.14)	.04	(.06)	--	--	-.08	(.30)	--	--	.00	(.19)
PREVM	1.34	(3.20)	.02	(2.71)	.35	(.95)	--	--	2.99	(10.46)	--	--	1.12	(1.84)
CLOSS	4.92	(2.42)	-2.31	(1.79)	-.18	(.67)	--	--	-.68	(1.24)	--	--	1.03	(2.37)
LBOY	-.09	(.24)	-.33	(.29)	-.09	(.11)	--	--	-.18	(.10)	--	--	-.03	(.21)
PINC	2.88	(1.75)	-.56	(1.49)	5.36	(3.69)	--	--	.26	(.42)	--	--	.30	(.43)
WEDUC	-.28	(.23)	.17	(.26)	-.34	(.19)	--	--	-.05	(.13)	--	--	-.18	(.38)
IFS	.36	(.33)	.91	(.58)	.18	(.42)	--	--	.48	(.27)	--	--	.20	(.41)
ECO	2.03	(2.69)	-3.01	(2.06)	1.86	(1.35)	--	--	-.68	(.91)	--	--	-.66	(3.02)
NAM	-2.65	(1.81)	-1.28	(1.15)	1.76*	(.75)	--	--	.63	(.47)	--	--	.11	(1.17)
GPR	.66	(1.83)	.26	(1.16)	1.01	(1.10)	--	--	-.47	(.55)	--	--	-.29	(1.29)
COM	.39	(2.82)	-3.13	(1.97)	1.67	(1.65)	--	--	.67	(.88)	--	--	-2.77	(2.65)
SIB	-.83	(1.15)	-.62	(1.02)	-.68	(.77)	--	--	.57	(.50)	--	--	1.13	(1.04)
FIN	-2.10	(1.16)	.45	(1.12)	-.37	(.47)	--	--	.08	(.41)	--	--	-.39	(.59)
FRE	-1.39	(.95)	.31	(1.36)	-.49	(.54)	--	--	.23	(.46)	--	--	-1.35	(.74)
WRK	-.54	(1.17)	.02	(1.27)	.89	(.60)	--	--	.47	(.43)	--	--	-1.02	(.91)
Constant	.24	(6.05)	1.25	(8.31)	-1.81	(5.69)	--	--	.92	(5.84)	--	--	2.88	(8.05)
R^2 (F)	.44	(1.26)	.68	(3.20)	.27	(1.89)	--	--	.43	(2.88)	--	--	.29	(1.29)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with Two Living Children													
ROLD	-.80	(.78)	.03	(.69)	-.81	(.65)	-.39	(.69)	-1.92*	(.85)	-.41	(.80)	-.15	(.69)
AGFB	.05	(.08)	-.01	(.09)	-.04	(.08)	-.19*	(.09)	-.13	(.07)	-.15	(.10)	.07	(.09)
MDUR	.12	(.15)	-.18	(.10)	.08	(.10)	-.08	(.13)	.02	(.16)	-.03	(.12)	-.24*	(.12)
PREVM	4.07	(3.30)	1.23	(1.28)	-.45	(.66)	--	--	9.09*	(2.95)	--	--	2.40*	(.73)
CLOSS	.42	(.92)	-.39	(.61)	-.52	(.48)	1.56	(.98)	1.09	(.87)	-.55	(2.76)	-1.13	(1.36)
LBOY	.09	(.14)	-.25	(.14)	-.03	(.11)	-.24	(.14)	-.34*	(.13)	-.14	(.16)	-.02	(.11)
LIMB	.41	(.22)	-.01	(.21)	-.09	(.17)	.28	(.17)	.17	(.18)	.27	(.24)	.01	(.18)
PINC	-1.52	(.87)	.50	(2.61)	2.18	(2.18)	-1.32	(1.95)	.28	(.32)	-1.33	(2.18)	.06	(.23)
WEDUC	.23*	(.12)	-.00	(.13)	.02	(.13)	.02	(.13)	-.06	(.10)	-.13	(.39)	-.16	(.17)
IFS	.97*	(.42)	1.40*	(.53)	1.42*	(.47)	1.01*	(.35)	1.82**	(.38)	1.45*	(.54)	.73	(.40)
ECO	-2.25	(1.38)	1.09	(1.07)	-1.46	(.94)	.73	(.95)	-.83	(1.01)	-2.22*	(1.05)	-.58	(1.14)
NAM	-.12	(.58)	.33	(.47)	.38	(.57)	.72	(.38)	.10	(.41)	1.03	(.54)	-.93*	(.42)
GPR	.99	(.71)	.53	(.49)	1.15*	(.58)	.96*	(.37)	.47	(.48)	-.03	(.57)	1.03*	(.39)
COM	-2.56*	(1.18)	.14	(.89)	.47	(1.21)	.46	(.91)	-.96	(.81)	-1.13	(1.17)	-.14	(1.02)
SIB	.33	(.70)	-.05	(.47)	-.22	(.61)	.27	(.43)	-1.14*	(.48)	-.12	(.58)	-.34	(.41)
FIN	.28	(.50)	-.20	(.36)	.35	(.38)	-.71	(.39)	-.16	(.40)	-.14	(.56)	-.05	(.28)
FRE	-.68	(.56)	-.05	(.44)	-.01	(.40)	.46	(.34)	.29	(.45)	.15	(.52)	-.59	(.34)
WRK	-.26	(.53)	-.25	(.38)	-.47	(.42)	.12	(.35)	-.34	(.34)	-.26	(.46)	.44	(.35)
Constant	-5.34	(5.13)	-11.26	(9.41)	-13.76	(8.87)	-6.16	(7.49)	-21.67*	(7.71)	-15.70	(12.68)	-6.57	(6.56)
R^2 (F)	.18	(3.37)	.13	(2.72)	.28	(6.38)	.22	(5.83)	.33	(8.93)	.34	(4.92)	.21	(5.45)

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ROLD	1.42	(1.47)	-.94	(1.09)	-.19	(.77)	-1.71	(1.49)	.00	(1.30)	-.25	(1.22)	1.84	(.99)
AGFB	-.02	(.15)	-.14	(.14)	-.14	(.10)	.07	(.23)	.02	(.10)	-.13	(.18)	.21	(.16)
MDUR	-.25	(.29)	-.19	(.20)	-.08	(.09)	.25	(.26)	-.25	(.24)	.11	(.16)	-.42*	(.15)
PREVM	--	--	-.25	(1.98)	1.21	(.83)	--	--	3.15	(5.07)	--	--	.39	(1.61)
CLOSS	-1.12	(1.48)	.07	(1.50)	.18	(.65)	-1.45	(2.34)	2.42	(1.45)	2.88	(2.68)	-2.63	(2.33)
LBOY	.00	(.24)	.09	(.31)	.02	(.14)	-.38	(.28)	-.40*	(.19)	.10	(.24)	-.29	(.19)
LIMB	1.70*	(.45)	-.12	(.52)	-.17	(.24)	.55	(.37)	.43	(.33)	-.08	(.37)	-.21	(.33)
PINC	-1.76	(1.72)	2.36	(2.11)	.19	(2.35)	-2.78	(3.29)	.21	(.43)	-1.80	(3.12)	-.60	(.35)
WEDUC	.11	(.20)	-.17	(.24)	-.07	(.15)	-.03	(.20)	.04	(.17)	-.33	(.62)	.18	(.24)
IFS	1.27**	(.30)	.78	(.57)	.76	(.41)	.41	(.68)	1.96*	(.55)	1.51*	(.49)	.34	(.66)
ECO	1.44	(2.78)	-.37	(2.00)	-.70	(1.46)	-2.43	(1.88)	-2.19	(1.52)	-.18	(1.96)	-.74	(1.64)
NAM	.75	(1.17)	.30	(1.18)	-.17	(.70)	-.46	(.84)	-.35	(.59)	1.77*	(.85)	-.69	(.85)
GPR	.79	(1.37)	1.21	(.93)	2.29*	(.73)	.50	(.83)	1.13	(.78)	2.09*	(.87)	1.86	(1.08)
COM	.76	(2.39)	-.34	(2.04)	.41	(1.40)	-.19	(1.85)	-1.54	(1.21)	.69	(1.99)	1.53	(2.03)
SIB	1.08	(1.26)	1.40	(1.10)	-.01	(.63)	.36	(.93)	-1.33	(.68)	1.10	(1.16)	-.52	(.77)
FIN	-.43	(1.13)	-.64	(.80)	-.17	(.54)	.22	(.77)	-.34	(.65)	.10	(.71)	.07	(.54)
FRE	1.22	(1.26)	-.07	(1.22)	.07	(.53)	-.67	(.99)	.07	(.57)	-.09	(.82)	-.16	(.64)
WRK	-.57	(1.11)	-.77	(1.15)	-.30	(.53)	.14	(1.16)	-.01	(.54)	-1.29	(.99)	-.32	(.57)
Constant	-9.66	(5.71)	-2.02	(8.10)	1.16	(8.77)	.95	(12.77)	-30.72*	(11.80)	-17.63	(12.44)	-4.49	(11.34)
R^2 (F)	.61	(3.83)	.39	(1.48)	.26	(2.63)	.21	(1.14)	.38	(5.00)	.39	(2.99)	.26	(2.01)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

Predictor	Philippines B	Philippines (S.E.)	Turkey B	Turkey (S.E.)	Indonesia B	Indonesia (S.E.)	Korea B	Korea (S.E.)	Taiwan B	Taiwan (S.E.)	Singapore B	Singapore (S.E.)	United States B	United States (S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with Three Living Children													
ROLD	-.26	(1.07)	-.71	(.72)	-.45	(.81)	.66	(.71)	-.47	(.57)	-.26	(.63)	.51	(1.10)
AGFB	.00	(.11)	-.02	(.09)	.03	(.11)	.03	(.08)	-.10*	(.04)	.01	(.06)	.08	(.13)
MDUR	-.17	(.18)	-.02	(.10)	-.06	(.12)	-.20*	(.10)	-.02	(.09)	-.10	(.08)	-.39*	(.17)
PREVM	1.23	(3.01)	2.76*	(1.14)	1.05	(.87)	1.03	(1.63)	.15	(1.26)	--	--	-.21	(1.03)
CLOSS	-.38	(.96)	-.02	(.47)	-.22	(.61)	-.41	(.54)	-.63	(.35)	.80	(1.08)	.42	(1.23)
LBOY	-.15	(.21)	-.30	(.16)	.28	(.20)	-.79**	(.14)	-.76**	(.09)	-.37*	(.15)	-.14	(.24)
LIMB	.42	(.29)	.46*	(.21)	.02	(.26)	.68*	(.20)	.73**	(.12)	.36	(.21)	-.30	(.33)
PINC	-.19	(.92)	-.35	(1.29)	2.19	(2.95)	-2.45	(1.47)	-.01	(.15)	.84	(1.65)	-.08	(.33)
WEDUC	-.15	(.13)	.03	(.10)	.01	(.20)	.10	(.09)	-.02	(.05)	-.38	(.25)	-.29	(.25)
IFS	-.25	(.71)	-.49	(.37)	1.80*	(.58)	.77*	(.35)	.44	(.31)	.51	(.36)	-.36	(.41)
ECO	.65	(1.27)	.27	(.73)	.85	(1.36)	1.18	(.80)	1.25*	(.44)	-.08	(.65)	-2.06	(1.67)
NAM	.85	(.66)	-.17	(.38)	1.62*	(.82)	.65	(.34)	-.02	(.21)	.38	(.36)	-.48	(.62)
GPR	1.07	(.65)	.46	(.36)	1.97*	(.57)	.55	(.34)	.41*	(.20)	.58	(.35)	1.23*	(.54)
COM	.36	(1.25)	.19	(.65)	.16	(1.53)	.36	(.77)	1.15*	(.42)	.34	(.71)	1.19	(1.28)
SIB	1.51*	(.73)	.95*	(.48)	-.46	(.63)	.58	(.33)	.25	(.22)	.26	(.39)	.19	(.59)
FIN	-.92	(.72)	-.11	(.35)	.28	(.46)	-.59*	(.29)	.05	(.22)	-.54	(.38)	-.57	(.46)
FRE	.77	(.57)	-.76	(.41)	-.77	(.49)	-.18	(.28)	.00	(.31)	-.03	(.34)	-1.25*	(.58)
WRK	.15	(.63)	.05	(.31)	.43	(.55)	-.25	(.27)	-.04	(.18)	-.09	(.32)	-.50	(.45)
Constant	9.34	(10.21)	9.10	(5.46)	-24.62*	(10.02)	-9.50	(8.41)	-3.82	(6.04)	-7.62	(7.42)	13.54	(8.06)
R^2 (F)	.11	(1.66)	.12	(1.92)	.20	(4.10)	.26	(5.95)	.29	(12.30)	.23	(2.63)	.19	(2.36)

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ROLD	-.73	(1.20)	.81	(1.57)	1.05	(.93)	-1.28	(1.14)	-.73	(.50)	.58	(.78)	-1.29	(1.33)
AGFB	-.05	(.23)	-.10	(.23)	-.09	(.15)	-.03	(.11)	-.01	(.05)	.10	(.08)	-.15	(.19)
MDUR	.21	(.12)	-.07	(.18)	-.21	(.11)	.12	(.18)	.03	(.07)	.01	(.12)	.17	(.16)
PREVM	--	--	-2.26	(6.13)	2.72	(1.49)	2.71	(2.45)	-.71	(1.07)	--	--	-.43	(1.63)
CLOSS	3.01	(1.96)	-1.79	(1.64)	-.77	(.99)	-.36	(1.00)	.04	(.54)	4.34*	(1.59)	2.54	(2.34)
LBOY	-.05	(.43)	-.87	(.70)	-.11	(.30)	-.46	(.26)	-.34*	(.13)	.16	(.32)	.28	(.42)
LIMB	.17	(.58)	.95	(.82)	-.41	(.42)	.33	(.36)	.37*	(.18)	-.08	(.37)	.10	(.54)
PINC	-3.45	(2.21)	2.48	(3.00)	-2.19	(3.92)	-2.89	(2.33)	.47	(.26)	.36	(2.01)	-.26	(.45)
WEDUC	.25	(.26)	-.16	(.25)	.22	(.30)	-.04	(.14)	-.06	(.09)	.08	(.40)	-.05	(.49)
IFS	.41	(.88)	.79	(.41)	2.49*	(.78)	-.13	(.34)	.66*	(.30)	-.66	(.49)	.33	(.31)
ECO	4.01	(3.33)	3.41	(2.83)	4.88*	(2.04)	1.12	(1.73)	1.05	(.78)	1.65	(1.09)	-2.23	(2.97)
NAM	-1.42	(1.75)	1.30	(1.36)	.43	(1.03)	.33	(.62)	-.38	(.33)	.28	(.58)	-2.25	(1.35)
GPR	3.47*	(1.47)	-1.51	(1.43)	1.92	(1.04)	.59	(.57)	.83*	(.33)	1.31*	(.60)	.93	(1.38)
COM	3.98	(3.06)	3.75	(2.83)	4.22	(2.35)	.62	(1.35)	1.50*	(.60)	.41	(1.45)	2.40	(2.23)
SIB	2.58	(1.37)	2.40	(1.27)	1.95	(1.31)	-.56	(.82)	.43	(.44)	.70	(.55)	-.13	(1.10)
FIN	.75	(1.31)	-.66	(1.09)	1.19	(.81)	-.77	(.63)	.23	(.34)	-.50	(.54)	-.65	(.66)
FRE	.07	(1.03)	-1.08	(1.03)	.44	(.84)	.41	(.53)	.01	(.26)	-.14	(.57)	-1.87*	(.72)
WRK	.81	(1.38)	1.02	(1.01)	-.47	(.83)	1.00	(.56)	.06	(.26)	-.07	(.52)	1.33	(.72)
Constant	4.82	(16.14)	-11.58	(9.13)	-28.26*	(12.84)	13.70	(8.13)	-11.53*	(5.74)	8.29	(9.49)	2.21	(11.28)
R^2 (F)	.33	(1.26)	.40	(1.02)	.21	(1.92)	.31	(2.26)	.17	(2.81)	.25	(1.18)	.48	(1.77)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with Four Living Children													
ROLD	.62	(1.27)	-.52	(.76)	.11	(1.03)	.13	(.72)	-1.03*	(.47)	.41	(.65)	-1.42	(1.49)
AGFB	-.03	(.09)	-.02	(.10)	-.03	(.12)	-.20*	(.06)	-.01	(.04)	-.02	(.07)	-.07	(.16)
MDUR	-.03	(.18)	-.05	(.10)	.01	(.13)	-.07	(.10)	.07	(.06)	-.15*	(.07)	-.07	(.18)
PREVM	-1.27	(1.78)	.95	(.98)	1.05	(.78)	--	--	-.16	(.69)	1.01	(2.08)	1.64	(1.00)
CLOSS	.10	(.70)	-.28	(.44)	-.38	(.59)	.37	(.29)	.19	(.27)	-.51	(1.12)	-1.66	(1.53)
LBOY	-.10	(.30)	-.23	(.23)	-.06	(.25)	-.53*	(.16)	-.43**	(.10)	-.68*	(.21)	.14	(.45)
LIMB	1.04*	(.35)	.58*	(.29)	.49	(.32)	.60*	(.19)	.43*	(.14)	.69*	(.31)	.02	(.58)
PINC	-1.46	(.84)	-.27	(1.12)	3.41	(2.76)	.31	(.89)	.15	(.16)	1.29	(1.56)	.19	(.35)
WEDUC	.14	(.12)	-.04	(.11)	.04	(.18)	.01	(.07)	-.04	(.05)	-.28	(.26)	-.13	(.25)
IFS	.68*	(.34)	.39	(.25)	1.96*	(.76)	.19	(.17)	.35	(.21)	.07	(.31)	.29	(.20)
ECO	3.39*	(1.54)	1.60*	(.67)	1.58	(1.22)	.06	(.54)	-.12	(.42)	-.35	(.68)	-1.78	(1.90)
NAM	.22	(.69)	.30	(.33)	.65	(.62)	-.11	(.22)	-.04	(.18)	-.15	(.38)	.93	(.71)
GPR	2.21*	(.76)	.67	(.35)	1.05	(.62)	.05	(.22)	.16	(.20)	-.27	(.39)	-.71	(.65)
COM	.29	(1.41)	1.04	(.62)	.20	(1.17)	-.49	(.47)	.06	(.37)	-1.20	(.86)	.03	(1.81)
SIB	-.05	(.69)	.57	(.38)	.84	(.61)	.43	(.22)	-.07	(.24)	-.19	(.39)	.27	(.82)
FIN	.95*	(.45)	-.25	(.28)	-.23	(.50)	-.37	(.25)	.03	(.23)	-.34	(.44)	-.39	(.48)
FRE	.47	(.52)	.40	(.27)	.15	(.51)	-.08	(.19)	.03	(.23)	-.01	(.38)	-.91	(.52)
WRK	-.44	(.58)	.28	(.32)	.42	(.52)	-.26	(.18)	.02	(.16)	-.09	(.32)	.70	(.51)
Constant	-7.07	(6.75)	-.71	(3.61)	-34.82*	(13.68)	.79	(4.45)	-4.20	(4.83)	-1.28	(6.06)	2.44	(6.27)
R^2 (F)	.14	(1.90)	.19	(2.35)	.15	(2.58)	.23	(3.32)	.14	(3.64)	.27	(1.64)	.23	(1.27)

Desire for Another Child: Husbands with Four Living Children

ROLD	4.64	(3.02)	-2.91	(1.46)	.03	(.82)	-.92	(1.86)	-.35	(.65)	-.61	(.82)	3.76	(4.70)
AGFB	.19	(.31)	-.03	(.12)	-.17	(.10)	-.12	(.19)	-.00	(.05)	-.08	(.10)	-.14	(.59)
MDUR	-.58	(.38)	.32	(.16)	.01	(.09)	-.02	(.23)	-.01	(.09)	.09	(.07)	-.52	(.52)
PREVM	1.71	(3.61)	-3.38	(2.42)	1.49	(.84)	-3.22	(1.75)	1.46	(.84)	9.32*	(2.17)	3.77	(4.51)
CLOSS	.06	(2.13)	-.31	(.89)	.90	(.71)	-.18	(1.01)	.44	(.39)	-.84	(2.25)	7.87	(7.60)
LBOY	-.05	(.84)	-.10	(.65)	-.73*	(.34)	-.63	(.55)	-.40*	(.15)	-.67*	(.30)	2.47	(2.29)
LIMB	2.25	(1.55)	.23	(.80)	.62	(.37)	.38	(.56)	.41*	(.20)	.48	(.45)	-4.01	(4.11)
PINC	.95	(2.00)	-2.15	(1.86)	.74	(2.85)	5.78*	(2.72)	-.07	(.17)	1.56	(1.81)	.30	(1.22)
WEDUC	-.32	(.33)	.20	(.19)	-.12	(.20)	-.46*	(.19)	-.10	(.07)	.20	(.28)	-.44	(.63)
IFS	1.07*	(.50)	.35	(.18)	1.35*	(.42)	.11	(.33)	.04	(.26)	.45	(.29)	.56	(.41)
ECO	-4.33	(4.30)	.83	(1.26)	.03	(1.45)	3.22	(2.66)	.09	(.74)	-1.45	(1.10)	5.71	(5.48)
NAM	-.77	(1.87)	1.06	(.73)	.56	(.73)	-.61	(1.13)	-.17	(.25)	-.24	(.46)	-.52	(1.79)
GPR	.66	(1.99)	-.63	(1.00)	1.04	(.65)	2.49*	(.98)	.06	(.30)	.07	(.53)	1.68	(2.80)
COM	-1.81	(4.29)	-.22	(1.22)	-.23	(1.26)	1.77	(2.85)	.44	(.58)	-.18	(1.14)	5.27	(6.13)
SIB	-1.62	(2.34)	.63	(.98)	.72	(.70)	.17	(1.31)	-.21	(.34)	-.89	(.58)	.80	(2.93)
FIN	-1.21	(1.68)	-.52	(.85)	.17	(.50)	-.37	(.86)	-.23	(.33)	.64	(.66)	-1.27	(1.78)
FRE	.31	(1.82)	.88	(.63)	-.71	(.59)	-.36	(.67)	-.28	(.24)	.43	(.80)	-.07	(1.88)
WRK	-2.39	(1.55)	-1.92*	(.75)	.86	(.58)	-.35	(.68)	-.11	(.23)	.52	(.72)	-1.31	(1.82)
Constant	-25.59	(15.72)	6.06	(5.99)	-17.21*	(7.90)	-3.70	(9.36)	1.40	(6.26)	-8.84	(8.34)	-9.44	(17.92)
R^2 (F)	.36	(.75)	.62	(2.22)	.21	(1.86)	.42	(1.63)	.15	(1.78)	.58	(2.68)	.73	(.89)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Desire for Another Child: Wives with Five or More Living Children													
ROLD	-.34	(.46)	.19	(.72)	1.49*	(.47)	-.47	(.89)	-1.03*	(.48)	.23	(.67)	1.55	(2.14)
AGFB	-.04	(.05)	.01	(.09)	.06	(.07)	.03	(.09)	-.12*	(.04)	-.06	(.06)	.20	(.27)
MDUR	-.02	(.05)	-.00	(.08)	-.22**	(.06)	-.00	(.09)	.05	(.06)	-.04	(.05)	-.34	(.26)
PREVM	.57	(.91)	1.05	(.59)	.92*	(.45)	.32	(1.00)	-.34	(.57)	.23	(1.26)	.53	(1.15)
CLOSS	.01	(.30)	.11	(.32)	-.08	(.29)	-.62	(.38)	.42	(.23)	-.39	(.49)	.06	(2.42)
LBOY	.65*	(.18)	-.21	(.18)	.12	(.20)	-.65*	(.22)	-.44*	(.18)	-.14	(.26)	-.04	(.73)
LIMB	.66*	(.24)	.03	(.32)	.90*	(.27)	.83*	(.23)	.46	(.25)	-.14	(.38)	.46	(1.03)
PINC	-.77	(.43)	-1.03	(.77)	-.77	(1.31)	1.41	(1.23)	-.05	(.15)	2.82*	(1.28	-.43	(.44)
WEDUC	.05	(.06)	.12	(.11)	.00	(.08)	-.11	(.09)	.07	(.06)	-.44*	(.18)	.01	(.33)
IFS	.39*	(.19)	.12	(.25)	.58*	(.25)	.12	(.22)	.29	(.23)	.36*	(.16)	.05	(.15)
ECO	-.40	(.66)	.77	(.47)	-.43	(.55)	.39	(.69)	-.11	(.40)	-.75	(.55)	-2.53	(2.42)
NAM	.11	(.28)	.40	(.29)	-.14	(.31)	.37	(.32)	.08	(.18)	.04	(.28)	-1.89	(1.07)
GPR	.25	(.28)	.62	(.35)	.56	(.30)	.28	(.31)	.11	(.20)	-.01	(.32)	.83	(.94)
COM	.09	(.59)	.51	(.52)	-.31	(.55)	-.48	(.81)	.18	(.36)	-.40	(.70)	.34	(2.24)
SIB	.52	(.30)	.43	(.32)	.14	(.32)	-.08	(.43)	.22	(.21)	-.00	(.33)	.28	(.93)
FIN	.19	(.24)	-.20	(.29)	.26	(.26)	-.09	(.33)	.49*	(.24)	-.85*	(.31)	.22	(.78)
FRE	-.21	(.23)	.30	(.25)	-.03	(.24)	-.41	(.25)	-.08	(.22)	.14	(.28)	-.04	(.94)
WRK	.19	(.29)	.07	(.35)	.30	(.29)	.04	(.25)	-.12	(.17)	-.19	(.22)	-.11	(.68)
Constant	-1.53	(3.65)	-.79	(3.43)	-10.50	(5.45)	-3.18	(6.82)	-.46	(5.00)	-8.42	(5.67)	-1.26	(10.57)
R^2 (F)	.11	(2.83)	.11	(1.25)	.12	(3.77)	.32	(2.81)	.14	(2.91)	.25	(1.63)	.28	(1.11)

Desire for Another Child: Husbands with Five or More Living Children

ROLD	-.31	(1.13)	--	--	-.50	(.51)	1.63	(1.31)	-1.07*	(.40)	-.43	(1.50)	-24.83	(18.35)
AGFB	-.01	(.13)	--	--	-.10	(.06)	.06	(.14)	-.04	(.05)	-.13	(.16)	-2.59	(2.10)
MDUR	-.13	(.12)	--	--	-.06	(.05)	-.08	(.15)	.08	(.05)	.04	(.09)	2.13	(1.87)
PREVM	.59	(1.57)	--	--	.27	(.43)	-.41	(1.30)	-.63	(.67)	-1.50	(2.10)	-14.84	(10.34)
CLOSS	1.01	(.70)	--	--	.10	(.35)	1.17*	(.51)	.05	(.28)	-1.87	(1.39)	--	--
LBOY	.16	(.43)	--	--	-.24	(.27)	-.53	(.30)	-.30	(.22)	2.74	(1.58)	4.43	(6.66)
LIMB	1.00	(.59)	--	--	1.12*	(.34)	.96*	(.39)	.58*	(.25)	1.95	(1.90)	3.35	(7.51)
PINC	-.25	(.91)	--	--	-1.12	(1.50)	1.33	(1.58)	-.06	(.14)	-.78	(3.45)	2.10	(1.46)
WEDUC	.07	(.13)	--	--	.07	(.10)	-.12	(.12)	.06	(.07)	-.45	(.61)	-.07	(.78)
IFS	-.07	(.17)	--	--	.20	(.26)	-.10	(.15)	-.11	(.18)	.12	(.18)	.91	(.61)
ECO	-.42	(1.57)	--	--	-.40	(.82)	-.61	(.87)	.95	(.50)	2.06	(1.46)	9.14	(12.72)
NAM	-.23	(.73)	--	--	.14	(.41)	-.56	(.50)	.00	(.20)	.22	(.98)	6.95	(8.51)
GPR	-.41	(.77)	--	--	.37	(.39)	-.06	(.47)	.12	(.23)	1.00	(.80)	8.86	(5.90)
COM	-.74	(1.52)	--	--	.65	(.76)	1.30	(.77)	.65	(.42)	2.62	(1.66)	11.60	(10.44)
SIB	.12	(.86)	--	--	.69	(.40)	-.47	(.40)	.12	(.32)	.64	(1.00)	2,60	(1.97)
FIN	.69	(.70)	--	--	-.54	(.32)	-.00	(.63)	.65*	(.26)	-.51	(.81)	-1.98	(2.06)
FRE	-.14	(.78)	--	--	.09	(.33)	.47	(.41)	.15	(.24)	.07	(.65)	1.10	(2.09)
WRK	-.37	(.80)	--	--	-.71*	(.31)	.27	(.42)	.33	(.19)	1.57	(.88)	-.78	(1.83)
Constant	4.76	(6.25)	--	--	3.85	(5.42)	-6.77	(4.17)	5.69	(3.77)	4.57	(8.96)	71.80	(59.56)
R^2 (F)	.14	(.68)	--	--	.15	(2.37)	.62	(2.48)	.27	(2.76)	.65	(1.47)	.90	(1.60)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with No Living Children													
MDUR	.06	(.09)	-.06	(.07)	-.12	(.10)	.18*	(.09)	--	--	-.01	(.16)	-.12	(.12)
PINC	.45	(1.60)	.75	(2.37)	1.47	(6.21)	.61	(2.66)	--	--	-5.75	(3.17)	-.26	(.26)
WEDUC	-.06	(.20)	-.11	(.19)	-.01	(.37)	-.19	(.20)	--	--	.18	(.60)	.29	(.18)
URBAN	-.38	(1.01)	-1.06	(1.01)	-2.80	(1.55)	-.39	(.54)	--	--	.76	(1.39)	1.34	(.96)
MEDIA	.10	(.23)	.06	(.17)	.20	(.30)	.15	(.16)	--	--	.05	(.43)	-.22	(.19)
DAC	1.56**	(.35)	.10	(.70)	1.18	(.72)	1.03	(.60)	--	--	-.16	(.30)	.68	(.46)
ECOV	1.53	(1.96)	1.83	(1.54)	2.93	(3.63)	-.18	(.72)	--	--	1.82	(1.52)	1.71	(.87)
NAMV	.14	(1.02)	.38	(.59)	.82	(2.24)	.06	(.46)	--	--	.88	(.73)	.33	(.55)
GPRV	.29	(1.60)	.87	(1.14)	.86	(1.60)	.28	(.73)	--	--	.78	(1.21)	.27	(.85)
COMV	2.47*	(1.13)	.82	(.94)	.34	(1.87)	-1.04	(.67)	--	--	2.26	(1.19)	.05	(1.07)
FIND	-.89	(.62)	.14	(.48)	.59	(.83)	-.26	(.33)	--	--	-.47	(.51)	.22	(.31)
FRED	-1.06	(.76)	-.58	(.52)	-.01	(.89)	-.02	(.29)	--	--	-.64	(.52)	-.30	(.33)
WRKD	-1.47	(1.15)	-.87	(.66)	2.08	(2.05)	.36	(.69)	--	--	-.87	(.87)	-.67	(.48)
Constant	-8.92	(13.63)	2.13	(10.25)	-21.83	(21.39)	7.86	(8.64)	--	--	13.59	(10.76)	8.64	(5.73)
R^2 (F)	.52	(3.88)	.08	(.79)	.53	(3.53)	.33	(2.28)	--	--	.30	(1.20)	.24	(4.84)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with No Living Children

MDUR	--	--	-.28	(.27)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.23*	(.10)	-.01	(.15)
PINC	--	--	-1.52	(2.19)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-1.09	(3.21)	-.08	(.27)
WEDUC	--	--	-.11	(.32)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.36	(.69)	.03	(.24)
URBAN	--	--	-2.72	(3.63)	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.12	(1.93)	-.43	(.72)
MEDIA	--	--	.80	(.46)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.42	(.47)	.2[illegible]	(.25)
DAC	--	--	1.10	(.72)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.56	(.34)	1.17*	(.42)
ECOV	--	--	-.62	(3.28)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.80	(.94)	-.25	(.86)
NAMV	--	--	-.67	(1.62)	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.00	(.68)	.64	(.59)
GPRV	--	--	.36	(2.90)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-1.80	(1.95)	-.40	(.90)
COMV	--	--	-.43	(2.15)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.79	(1.21)	.40	(.80)
FIND	--	--	2.08	(1.54)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.19	(.92)	-.52	(.31)
FRED	--	--	.35	(1.19)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.05	(.60)	-.13	(.35)
WRKD	--	--	-1.13	(1.74)	--	--	--	--	--	--	-1.36	(.89)	.69	(.55)
Constant	--	--	1.41	(26.32)	--	--	--	--	--	--	28.13*	(9.47)	3.37	(6.82)
R^2 (F)	--	--	.39	(1.01)	--	--	--	--	--	--	.76	(2.18)	.62	(6.03)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

Predictor	Philippines B	Philippines (S.E.)	Turkey B	Turkey (S.E.)	Indonesia B	Indonesia (S.E.)	Korea B	Korea (S.E.)	Taiwan B	Taiwan (S.E.)	Singapore B	Singapore (S.E.)	United States B	United States (S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with One Living Child													
AGFB	.03	(.05)	.06	(.05)	-.06	(.07)	.01	(.04)	-.06	(.05)	-.00	(.06)	.08	(.07)
MDUR	.02	(.06)	-.01	(.06)	.01	(.05)	.03	(.07)	.11	(.07)	-.06	(.09)	-.07	(.12)
PREVM	-1.94	(2.17)	.43	(1.19)	.01	(.62)	1.81	(1.50)	-.16	(1.70)	6.50*	(2.97)	-.23	(.72)
CLOSS	.79	(.71)	1.55*	(.55)	.50	(.48)	.83	(.54)	.44	(.76)	-2.97*	(1.31)	.06	(1.14)
PINC	.33	(.81)	.13	(1.43)	1.62	(2.45)	1.38	(1.41)	.10	(.25)	-.17	(1.87)	-.03	(.23)
WEDUC	-.29*	(.10)	-.20	(.11)	-.09	(.14)	-.15	(.08)	-.03	(.06)	.22	(.28)	-.11	(.17)
URBAN	-.65	(.57)	-.83	(.62)	-.72	(.60)	.31	(.27)	-.91*	(.32)	-.07	(.55)	.19	(.49)
MEDIA	-.11	(.13)	-.06	(.09)	.09	(.11)	-.08	.08	-.07	(.07)	-.21	(.12)	-.13	(.16)
DAC	.40*	(.12)	.30	(.17)	1.05*	(.34)	.24	(.14)	.48*	(.20)	.44*	(.20)	.09	(.23)
ECOV	.39	(.86)	-.55	(.62)	-.09	(.80)	.61	(.45)	.89	(.47)	.29	(.62)	.77	(.68)
NAMV	.59	(.63)	-.45	(.33)	.11	(.52)	.43*	(.21)	.58*	(.22)	-.08	(.33)	.06	(.48)
GPRV	-.29	(.80)	-.49	(.54)	-1.18	(.67)	.62	(.35)	.15	(.47)	.13	(.74)	-.01	(.56)
COMV	.28	(.65)	-.42	(.40)	-.49	(.55)	.18	(.34)	-.38	(.37)	-.06	(.57)	.47	(.52)
FIND	-.33	(.27)	-.62*	(.21)	.15	(.24)	-.24	(.13)	-.33*	(.16)	-.27	(.27)	-.31	(.19)
FRED	.52	(.40)	-.09	(.26)	-.14	(.30)	.21	(.14)	-.02	(.21)	-.32	(.24)	-1.07*	(.32)
WRKD	.17	(.56)	.76*	(.32)	-.29	(.44)	-.04	(.25)	.05	(.29)	.10	(.42)	-.44	(.33)
Constant	7.19	(5.99)	12.51*	(5.21)	7.96	(7.00)	7.79*	(3.39)	12.70**	(3.16)	15.24*	(5.04)	19.00**	(4.22)
R^2 (F)	.24	(2.77)	.20	(3.22)	.12	(1.71)	.23	(3.58)	.33	(5.29)	.25	(2.45)	.14	(2.65)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with One Living Child

AGFB	.01	(.12)	.08	(.10)	.09	(.10)	--	--	.08	(.09)	--	--	.01	(.11)
MDUR	.02	(.07)	.01	(.09)	.01	(.05)	--	--	-.02	(.13)	--	--	-.17	(.12)
PREVM	-4.53	(3.43)	.51	(2.15)	-.50	(1.06)	--	--	-1.95	(4.74)	--	--	-.66	(1.64)
CLOSS	.63	(2.19)	1.62	(1.46)	-.62	(.68)	--	--	-.88	(1.19)	--	--	-1.32	(2.04)
PINC	.72	(1.89)	.33	(1.31)	4.93	(3.80)	--	--	-.67	(.42)	--	--	.13	(.35)
WEDUC	.02	(.26)	-.20	(.23)	-.08	(.22)	--	--	.10	(.13)	--	--	-.20	(.29)
URBAN	-2.61	(1.74)	-1.50	(1.47)	-.19	(.96)	--	--	-.16	(.69)	--	--	-.30	(1.12)
MEDIA	-.40	(.32)	-.04	(.32)	-.10	(.15)	--	--	.03	(.10)	--	--	.03	(.33)
DAC	.33	(.24)	.46*	(.18)	.24	(.34)	--	--	.29	(.22)	--	--	.20	(.19)
ECOV	-.99	(2.76)	.75	(1.58)	.72	(1.57)	--	--	1.02	(.72)	--	--	-.53	(1.23)
NAMV	-1.32	(1.98)	-.05	(.63)	-.35	(.86)	--	--	.05	(.35)	--	--	.86	(.79)
GPRV	-2.28	(1.96)	1.19	(1.36)	-1.28	(1.27)	--	--	-.08	(.60)	--	--	-.93	(1.08)
COMV	-.72	(1.43)	.94	(1.05)	.03	(.78)	--	--	-.78	(.59)	--	--	.55	(.92)
FIND	.01	(.82)	.11	(.44)	-.32	(.34)	--	--	-.01	(.25)	--	--	-.08	(.35)
FRED	-.66	(.80)	-.20	(.62)	.69	(.52)	--	--	.12	(.26)	--	--	-.58	(.41)
WRKD	-.65	(1.21)	.75	(.98)	.02	(.80)	--	--	-.15	(.47)	--	--	-1.01	(.76)
Constant	28.83	(16.08)	-4.73	(11.54)	4.63	(12.16)	--	--	16.25*	(4.56)	--	--	22.37*	(9.06)
R^2 (F)	.32	(.82)	.55	(2.10)	.18	(1.20)	--	--	.35	(2.20)	--	--	.20	(.85)

TABLE D1 *(continued)*

Predictor	Philippines B	Philippines (S.E.)	Turkey B	Turkey (S.E.)	Indonesia B	Indonesia (S.E.)	Korea B	Korea (S.E.)	Taiwan B	Taiwan (S.E.)	Singapore B	Singapore (S.E.)	United States B	United States (S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with Two Living Children													
AGFB	.01	(.04)	-.03	(.04)	-.02	(.04)	.09	(.05)	.04	(.03)	-.01	(.04)	.03	(.05)
MDUR	-.02	(.04)	.09*	(.03)	-.00	(.03)	.06	(.04)	.05	(.04)	.03	(.04)	.03	(.07)
PREVM	-5.12*	(1.34)	-.97	(.74)	.27	(.40)	--	--	-2.75*	(1.28)	--	--	-.72	(.69)
CLOSS	.74	(.48)	.14	(.37)	.25	(.29)	.20	(.57)	.08	(.38)	2.05	(1.08)	1.77*	(.78)
PINC	.75	(.59)	-2.28	(1.38)	-.61	(1.41)	-.32	(1.11)	.00	(.15)	-1.11	(.93)	.12	(.16)
WEDUC	-.10	(.08)	.02	(.08)	-.03	(.08)	-.06	(.07)	-.04	(.05)	.30	(.17)	-.07	(.12)
URBAN	-.63	(.40)	.73	(.44)	-.24	(.38)	.17	(.29)	-.46	(.25)	-.58	(.35)	-.10	(.35)
MEDIA	.02	(.09)	-.01	(.08)	-.02	(.07)	.01	(.07)	-.04	(.04)	-.06	(.08)	.16	(.12)
DAC	.29*	(.11)	.35	(.19)	.53**	(.09)	.35*	(.11)	.20*	(.08)	.26*	(.08)	.39*	(.18)
ECOV	.42	(.65)	-.92	(.52)	.10	(.50)	-.11	(.48)	.56	(.36)	.38	(.41)	-.81	(.52)
NAMV	.47	(.39)	-.17	(.28)	-.50	(.36)	.01	(.23)	.05	(.15)	-.20	(.21)	.57	(.33)
GPRV	-.27	(.59)	.13	(.57)	-.92*	(.47)	-.25	(.34)	.28	(.34)	.38	(.37)	-.70	(.52)
COMV	.06	(.43)	-.12	(.36)	-.37	(.36)	.89*	(.30)	.12	(.24)	-.19	(.22)	.33	(.37)
FIND	-.26	(.20)	.04	(.18)	-.06	(.16)	.05	(.14)	-.11	(.10)	-.00	(.15)	-.19	(.15)
FRED	.11	(.27)	-.10	(.22)	-.23	(.20)	.09	(.15)	-.15	(.13)	-.37*	(.18)	-.33	(.21)
WRKD	.44	(.34)	.20	(.24)	.14	(.29)	-.21	(.24)	.07	(.16)	.02	(.26)	-.53*	(.27)
Constant	7.14	(4.59)	14.72**	(3.75)	17.10**	(4.19)	12.68*	(3.10)	13.52**	(2.12)	17.86**	(3.13)	17.67**	(2.96)
R^2 (F)	.15	(3.04)	.16	(3.70)	.17	(3.97)	.14	(3.68)	.19	(5.06)	.29	(4.49)	.11	(2.93)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with Two Living Children

AGFB	.01	(.09)	-.03	(.08)	.08	(.08)	.02	(.10)	.01	(.04)	-.08	(.09)	.06	(.07)
MDUR	.12	(.10)	.08	(.07)	.03	(.06)	.03	(.08)	.04	(.04)	-.07	(.05)	.08	(.05)
PREVM	--	--	.94	(1.18)	-.76	(.64)	--	--	-.94	(1.77)	--	--	1.35	(.83)
CLOSS	1.18	(1.02)	.18	(.90)	.12	(.51)	-.41	(1.11)	-.91	(.60)	.80	(1.90)	-.48	(1.35)
PINC	.57	(1.11)	-.34	(1.53)	2.75	(2.14)	-.70	(1.72)	.27	(.22)	.48	(1.53)	-.17	(.24)
WEDUC	.02	(.12)	.05	(.18)	-.07	(.12)	-.00	(.10)	-.13*	(.07)	-.04	(.32)	-.08	(.15)
URBAN	-.96	(.91)	-.36	(.90)	-.21	(.66)	.61	(.59)	-.54	(.36)	.06	(.57)	.23	(.55)
MEDIA	-.01	(.17)	-.41	(.21)	-.27*	(.13)	-.05	(.18)	-.14*	(.06)	.12	(.19)	.09	(.19)
DAC	.48*	(.11)	.18	(.17)	.71*	(.25)	.20	(.14)	.20*	(.08)	.26	(.16)	.13	(.14)
ECOV	-.82	(1.28)	.24	(1.14)	-.59	(.90)	.91	(.86)	.76	(.50)	1.60	(.84)	-.55	(.71)
NAMV	-1.84*	(.83)	.97	(.63)	.62	(.64)	.03	(.36)	-.20	(.20)	-.17	(.30)	1.03	(.54)
GPRV	-.24	(.81)	-1.08	(.95)	-1.66	(1.02)	-.24	(.66)	-.10	(.44)	-.57	(.78)	1.01	(.74)
COMV	-.96	(.86)	.29	(.75)	-.27	(.61)	.35	(.54)	-.05	(.33)	.23	(.53)	.69	(.56)
FIND	-.32	(.41)	-.28	(.45)	-.21	(.27)	.07	(.25)	.05	(.16)	-.26	(.25)	.03	(.24)
FRED	.19	(.45)	.57	(.50)	.03	(.37)	.21	(.30)	-.17	(.15)	-.33	(.33)	-.06	(.28)
WRKD	.47	(.77)	.10	(.70)	.11	(.50)	1.29	(.74)	.01	(.24)	.48	(.60)	-.12	(.49)
Constant	15.60	(8.56)	13.38	(8.06)	11.19	(6.20)	11.14	(5.62)	16.34**	(2.89)	16.13*	(5.46)	9.92	(5.03)
R^2 (F)	.44	(2.30)	.30	(1.21)	.19	(1.96)	.10	(.52)	.31	(4.13)	.32	(2.60)	.22	(1.77)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with Three Living Children													
AGFB	.10*	(.04)	.06	(.05)	-.02	(.04)	.01	(.04)	.04	(.02)	.03	(.04)	.06	(.09)
MDUR	-.06	(.05)	.06	(.05)	.05	(.03)	-.00	(.04)	.00	(.02)	.03	(.05)	-.03	(.09)
PREVM	1.44	(1.40)	-.26	(1.14)	-.53	(.35)	-2.05	(1.12)	-.89	(.84)	--	--	-1.07	(.79)
CLOSS	.84*	(.41)	.18	(.40)	.05	(.29)	.10	(.40)	.26	(.23)	-.62	(.82)	-.22	(1.03)
PINC	-.38	(.49)	-1.22	(1.10)	-.30	(2.01)	-1.29	(1.12)	.01	(.12)	1.55	(1.28)	-.08	(.28)
WEDUC	-.06	(.07)	.08	(.09)	.01	(.10)	-.01	(.07)	-.03	(.04)	-.13	(.22)	.18	(.22)
URBAN	-.30	(.40)	1.34*	(.51)	-.28	(.36)	-.18	(.27)	-.31	(.18)	-.16	(.43)	-.41	(.62)
MEDIA	.07	(.09)	-.24*	(.09)	-.06	(.07)	-.09	(.07)	-.08*	(.03)	-.00	(.09)	.17	(.22)
DAC	.14	(.15)	.42	(.23)	.41*	(.16)	-.04	(.11)	.07	(.06)	.26	(.23)	.47	(.25)
ECOV	-.14	(.53)	-.46	(.66)	-.13	(.50)	.21	(.48)	.48	(.29)	.91	(.51)	-1.95*	(.84)
NAMV	-.20	(.48)	-.26	(.39)	-.64*	(.32)	.05	(.22)	.29*	(.12)	.31	(.23)	.76	(.63)
GPRV	-.92	(.58)	-.41	(.48)	-.83	(.73)	.59	(.33)	.18	(.21)	-.44	(.47)	-.61	(.78)
COMV	-.19	(.37)	-.29	(.40)	-.37	(.34)	.54	(.31)	-.44	(.18)	-.21	(.38)	.52	(.66)
FIND	-.23	(.22)	-.19	(.20)	-.14	(.15)	-.33*	(.14)	-.02	(.08)	.13	(.20)	-.18	(.25)
FRED	-.15	(.24)	-.09	(.25)	.02	(.23)	-.23	(.15)	.09	(.10)	-.17	(.21)	-.12	(.36)
WRKD	.13	(.31)	-.04	(.30)	-.15	(.31)	.31	(.24)	-.23	(.13)	-.35	(.31)	.39	(.47)
Constant	17.67**	(3.82)	15.42*	(4.64)	19.85*	(5.73)	16.69**	(3.08)	17.29**	(1.82)	16.57**	(3.62)	16.55*	(5.32)
R^2 (F)	.09	(1.61)	.08	(1.34)	.14	(3.09)	.09	(1.98)	.15	(6.05)	.16	(2.04)	.18	(2.57)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with Three Living Children

AGFB	-.17	(.11)	.08	(.16)	.07	(.05)	.09	(.09)	.03	(.04)	.02	(.08)	-.03	(.13)
MDUR	.04	(.07)	-.03	(.08)	.04	(.04)	.18*	(.07)	.02	(.03)	.09	(.06)	-.06	(.08)
PREVM	--	--	1.49	(4.94)	-.68	(.43)	-3.28	(2.27)	-.06	(.74)	--	--	-1.34	(1.21)
CLOSS	1.08	(1.09)	-.09	(1.35)	.38	(.38)	-1.15	(.86)	.20	(.44)	2.89	(1.84)	1.21	(1.77)
PINC	-1.09	(1.29)	-.96	(2.64)	.10	(1.73)	.55	(2.02)	-.08	(.21)	-.46	(2.01)	.31	(.38)
WEDUC	.02	(.15)	.06	(.21)	-.02	(.10)	.01	(.12)	.10	(.07)	.02	(.42)	-.81*	(.31)
URBAN	.13	(.81)	-1.41	(1.48)	-.04	(.47)	-.26	(.57)	-.69*	(.31)	-.65	(.83)	1.35	(1.04)
MEDIA	-.13	(.17)	.01	(.33)	-.02	(.09)	-.16	(.18)	-.08	(.06)	-.04	(.18)	-.56	(.35)
DAC	-.12	(.23)	.22	(.21)	.34*	(.15)	.25	(.26)	.10	(.16)	-.46	(.37)	.08	(.23)
ECOV	1.43	(1.37)	.74	(1.41)	-.36	(.99)	.56	(.90)	.76	(.51)	.38	(.99)	.57	(1.28)
NAMV	-.26	(1.02)	.75	(.94)	-.40	(.61)	.75	(.46)	.28	(.21)	-.35	(.44)	1.62	(.92)
GPRV	1.52	(1.41)	.05	(1.65)	-.45	(.85)	-1.29	(.69)	.30	(.41)	.95	(.70)	2.13	(1.78)
COMV	-.01	(.86)	-.24	(1.07)	.16	(.48)	-.02	(.57)	-.20	(.35)	-.64	(.81)	2.48	(1.28)
FIND	.48	(.43)	-.19	(.73)	.14	(.22)	.60	(.36)	-.01	(.15)	-.07	(.38)	-.65	(.35)
FRED	-.23	(.48)	-1.32	(.77)	-.07	(.28)	-.08	(.34)	-.10	(.17)	-.17	(.49)	-.50	(.64)
WRKD	.93	(.59)	-.13	(.93)	.55	(.33)	-.03	(.67)	-.17	(.26)	-.48	(.59)	.19	(.74)
Constant	7.40	(8.21)	13.55	(11.79)	12.00	(6.85)	14.78*	(5.63)	15.86**	(3.26)	18.94*	(6.61)	12.01	(11.30)
R^2 (F)	(.26)	(1.06)	.25	(.62)	.22	(2.23)	.17	(1.17)	.10	(1.60)	.15	(.71)	.48	(2.05)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with Four Living Children													
AGFB	.06	(.07)	.09	(.08)	-.02	(.04)	.05	(.08)	.03	(.03)	.01	(.05)	-.19	(.19)
MDUR	-.01	(.06)	-.02	(.06)	.03	(.03)	.09	(.05)	-.03	(.03)	.13*	(.05)	.24	(.15)
PREVM	1.07	(1.40)	-1.00	(1.20)	-.33	(.30)	--	--	.23	(.67)	.57	(2.20)	-2.73	(1.43)
CLOSS	.24	(.55)	.83	(.49)	.07	(.25)	.27	(.43)	-.13	(.27)	1.66	(1.09)	.32	(2.52)
PINC	.73	(.76)	1.17	(1.49)	.78	(1.51)	-.89	(1.32)	-.20	(.15)	-.03	(1.63)	-.35	(.53)
WEDUC	-.09	(.10)	-.10	(.13)	-.05	(.07)	-.07	(.09)	.06	(.05)	.32	(.29)	.61	(.38)
URBAN	-.68	(.56)	.40	(.64)	.04	(.34)	-.12	(.38)	-.16	(.25)	-1.12*	(.55)	.82	(1.27)
MEDIA	.00	(.12)	-.09	(.11)	-.12*	(.06)	.18	(.10)	-.11*	(.05)	.09	(.12)	.27	(.39)
DAC	.24	(.18)	-.06	(.25)	.17	(.13)	-.00	(.27)	.07	(.18)	.33	(.24)	.33	(.45)
ECOV	.33	(.86)	.45	(.90)	-.13	(.42)	2.75**	(.69)	1.24*	(.48)	.63	(.69)	.14	(1.71)
NAMV	.27	(.63)	.12	(.51)	-.06	(.27)	.49	(.28)	.22	(.15)	.02	(.29)	.38	(1.27)
GPRV	-1.25	(.81)	.25	(.75)	.23	(.53)	1.11*	(.45)	.00	(.30)	.23	(.62)	1.18	(1.62)
COMV	-.16	(.52)	-1.25*	(.55)	-.20	(.27)	.41	(.40)	-.03	(.26)	.36	(.59)	-.67	(1.07)
FIND	-.23	(.27)	-.33	(.25)	-.20	(.14)	-.18	(.21)	-.00	(.10)	-.04	(.26)	.28	(.50)
FRED	-.75*	(.32)	-.13	(.32)	-.15	(.19)	.07	(.20)	-.04	(.14)	.01	(.27)	-1.03	(.74)
WRKD	.43	(.50)	-.75	(.46)	-.10	(.25)	-.03	(.33)	.05	(.19)	.03	(.40)	-.92	(.94)
Constant	16.17*	(5.61)	12.98*	(5.96)	15.69*	(4.60)	4.54	(4.52)	17.13**	(2.67)	14.32*	(5.73)	14.84	(13.06)
R^2 (F)	.07	(.96)	.10	(1.21)	.10	(1.82)	.15	(2.31)	.13	(3.68)	.16	(1.01)	.15	(.82)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with Four Living Children

AGFB	-.28	(.17)	.08	(.16)	.10	(.06)	.09	(.15)	-.03	(.06)	.01	(.08)	.53	(.29)
MDUR	-.04	(.15)	-.03	(.09)	-.02	(.04)	.07	(.12)	-.02	(.04)	.03	(.06)	-.11	(.28)
PREVM	-.22	(2.04)	.49	(2.97)	-1.11*	(.47)	.24	(2.20)	1.63	(1.20)	-1.06	(3.25)	3.07	(3.81)
CLOSS	.36	(1.41)	1.60	(1.17)	-.45	(.39)	1.76	(.92)	.15	(.57)	.70	(2.31)	5.40	(5.02)
PINC	.93	(1.36)	4.26	(2.28)	.32	(2.15)	1.87	(4.09)	-.10	(.31)	-2.06	(3.02)	.67	(.81)
WEDUC	.18	(.19)	-.19	(.25)	-.04	(.12)	.01	(.29)	-.07	(.10)	.42	(.39)	-.32	(.52)
URBAN	1.34	(1.12)	1.27	(1.59)	-.30	(.63)	-1.28	(1.00)	-.05	(.47)	-.47	(1.10)	-5.49	(2.51)
MEDIA	-.60	(.30)	.24	(.42)	-.13	(.12)	-.11	(.28)	-.09	(.08)	-.20	(.21)	.02	(.65)
DAC	-.07	(.29)	.87*	(.41)	.27	(.17)	-.02	(.36)	-.36	(.32)	.27	(.23)	.61*	(.21)
ECOV	2.60	(2.48)	.58	(2.53)	.14	(.73)	1.74	(1.81)	1.90*	(.84)	1.38	(1.31)	-3.15	(2.31)
NAMV	-.82	(1.38)	-1.43	(1.51)	-.23	(.46)	.73	(.68)	.12	(.30)	-.08	(.44)	-.94	(1.42)
GPRV	-.23	(1.11)	.00	(1.52)	.15	(.65)	1.26	(1.75)	.72	(.50)	-.31	(.71)	2.35	(2.63)
COMV	.83	(1.15)	.76	(1.20)	.51	(.47)	.55	(.95)	.46	(.49)	-.80	(.91)	3.72	(3.17)
FIND	1.29*	(.57)	-1.11	(.56)	.07	(.22)	.55	(.60)	-.32	(.20)	-.51	(.45)	2.09*	(.77)
FRED	-1.24	(.80)	-.14	(.75)	.40	(.33)	.52	(.57)	.04	(.27)	.40	(.54)	-1.62	(1.17)
WRKD	.34	(1.02)	.09	(1.07)	-.80	(.41)	.34	(.86)	.59	(.32)	-1.03	(.98)	2.74	(2.20)
Constant	11.47	(11.49)	1.32	(11.53)	13.05*	(5.99)	-3.74	(12.32)	12.08*	(4.29)	27.44*	(8.93)	-17.23	(25.36)
R^2 (F)	.34	(.84)	.55	(2.07)	.20	(1.97)	.25	(.88)	.11	(1.40)	.16	(.45)	.81	(2.15)

TABLE D1. *(continued)*

	Philippines		Turkey		Indonesia		Korea		Taiwan		Singapore		United States	
Predictor	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)	B	(S.E.)
	Ideal Family Size: Wives with Five or More Living Children													
AGFB	.09	(.05)	.09	(.07)	-.05	(.05)	.00	(.10)	.07	(.05)	.07	(.08)	.16	(.30)
MDUR	.08	(.04)	.06	(.06)	.07*	(.03)	.06	(.07)	.02	(.03)	.03	(.05)	-.16	(.26)
PREVM	1.25	(1.12)	-.99	(1.07)	-.98*	(.33)	-.82	(1.45)	-.20	(.68)	-.34	(1.64)	-2.41	(1.76)
CLOSS	.44	(.38)	-.46	(.48)	.32	(.24)	.54	(.60)	.41	(.30)	.15	(.80)	-.79	(3.61)
PINC	.08	(.56)	1.54	(1.32)	1.01	(1.22)	-1.86	(2.02)	-.24	(.20)	-1.53	(2.32)	-.23	(.78)
WEDUC	-.04	(.08)	-.30	(.17)	.00	(.07)	.08	(.15)	-.02	(.07)	-.11	(.36)	.02	(.56)
URBAN	-1.55*	(.49)	.76	(.63)	-.28	(.32)	-.16	(.53)	-.26	(.33)	-.07	(.56)	-.59	(1.90)
MEDIA	-.11	(.09)	-.13	(.11)	-.11	(.06)	-.10	(.13)	-.17*	(.06)	-.18	(.15)	.09	(.65)
DAC	.03	(.23)	.61	(.47)	-.06	(.17)	.09	(.28)	-.14	(.21)	.23	(.46)	-.07	(.50)
ECOV	-.36	(.61)	-.00	(.78)	.16	(.41)	.19	(1.13)	.15	(.62)	.15	(.79)	-.47	(2.95)
NAMV	-.70	(.45)	.11	(.48)	-.77*	(.29)	.76	(.51)	-.01	(.18)	.51	(.36)	-1.05	(1.95)
GPRV	.14	(.47)	.61	(.80)	.29	(.41)	.18	(.66)	-.04	(.35)	-1.23	(.65)	.27	(2.44)
COMV	.06	(.44)	.05	(.54)	-.09	(.30)	1.14	(.66)	-.27	(.31)	.05	(.64)	3.74	(2.07)
FIND	-.45*	(.21)	-.01	(.31)	-.41*	(.14)	-.05	(.28)	-.14	(.14)	-.21	(.37)	-1.93*	(.86)
FRED	-.19	(.27)	-.12	(.32)	-.27	(.21)	.01	(.31)	.11	(.18)	-1.17*	(.33)	-3.39*	(1.03)
WRKD	.23	(.36)	-.97*	(.48)	-.50*	(.25)	.42	(.49)	.41	(.25)	.05	(.40)	.46	(1.55)
Constant	15.55*	(4.22)	7.70	(6.03)	18.26**	(3.45)	14.37*	(6.56)	19.75**	(3.26)	29.58**	(6.07)	24.11	(18.55)
R^2 (F)	.08	(2.32)	.10	(1.20)	.09	(3.03)	.09	(.72)	.14	(3.24)	.32	(2.61)	.35	(1.73)

Ideal Family Size: Husbands with Five or More Living Children

AGFB	.02	(.15)	.02	(.11)	-.01	(.06)	.74*	(.28)	.07	(.07)	.18	(.20)	1.70	(.97)
MDUR	.09	(.17)	.09	(.06)	.03	(.04)	.56*	(.16)	.00	(.04)	.06	(.10)	1.04	(.71)
PREVM	.80	(2.22)	-1.68	(1.28)	.28	(.44)	5.65*	(2.76)	.61	(.99)	2.85	(2.50)	3.82	(6.48)
CLOSS	-.06	(1.23)	.67	(.73)	.36	(.37)	-1.51	(1.44)	-.54	(.43)	2.87	(1.77)	--	
PINC	.16	(1.64)	.57	(1.48)	-2.95	(1.77)	-1.52	(3.89)	-.07	(.29)	4.91	(4.44)	-1.83	(2.09)
WEDUC	-.13	(.22)	-.62*	(.22)	.16	(.10)	.26	(.30)	-.03	(.11)	.19	(.77)	.53	(1.43)
URBAN	-2.00	(1.56)	-1.87*	(.79)	-.57	(.54)	1.26	(1.28)	.03	(.50)	-.50	(1.57)	-.59	(8.55)
MEDIA	-.18	(.28)	.28	(.23)	.20*	(.10)	.18	(.40)	-.15	(.08)	-.17	(.36)	1.22	(1.89)
DAC	.42	(.70)	--	--	-.12	(.21)	.27	(.49)	-.55*	(.26)	.45	(.41)	.42	(.62)
ECOV	1.92	(1.71)	.14	(1.35)	1.60*	(.62)	1.45	(1.97)	.90	(.83)	-1.36	(1.73)	-14.62	(10.69)
NAMV	.30	(1.06)	.44	(.57)	.14	(.42)	.28	(.95)	-.00	(.29)	-.50	(1.00)	3.52	(4.72)
GPRV	1.21	(1.36)	.13	(.74)	.16	(.50)	2.24	(1.45)	.86	(.50)	.36	(1.37)	4.84	(7.45)
COMV	1.56	(1.72)	.01	(.78)	.12	(.44)	-.55	(1.49)	.35	(.48)	-.46	(1.80)	-3.02	(6.41)
FIND	.29	(.63)	.07	(.29)	-.17	(.22)	.50	(.63)	-.18	(.22)	-1.35*	(.61)	-2.53	(3.27)
FRED	-1.60*	(.73)	.24	(.52)	.46	(.28)	-.77	(.84)	-.51*	(.23)	-.93	(.79)	3.91	(3.37)
WRKD	.03	(1.14)	-1.59*	(.61)	.23	(.39)	-.10	(1.49)	.53	(.36)	-2.05	(1.35)	1.33	(4.10)
Constant	3.93	(14.18)	11.98	(6.71)	12.51*	(4.83)	-17.11	(16.02)	13.52*	(5.16)	27.46	(13.87)	5.35	(57.41)
R^2 (F)	.15	(.82)	.62	(2.87)	.09	(1.41)	.51	(1.92)	.19	(1.93)	.67	(2.00)	.81	(1.44)

*t significant at .05.
**t significant at .001.

APPENDIX E. THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

The National Research Council was established by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. The Council operates in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy under the authority of its congressional charter of 1863, which establishes the academy as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation. The Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in the conduct of their services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. It is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and 1970, respectively, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences.

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Note: Members of the committee and its panels and working groups participated in this project in their individual capacities.

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